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Abstract 
 In the United States, citizenship as a theory has been constantly subject to contestation 
and disagreement. However, because recognition by a political institution is necessarily prior to 
any more substantive notion of citizenship, the state plays a key role in the regulation and 
definition of citizenship. Research in American Political Development (APD) suggests that 
political institutions and ideas often conflict, and define state institutions as constantly in flux 
and constantly developing (rather than in equilibrium) as different ideas and governing authority 
vie for permanence and durability within the institutional structure. Scholars of APD have 
pointed out that institutional structure allows for endogenous development as political 
entrepreneurs and social movements exploit the frictions created by institutional misalignments. 
Ideational development in the polity marks a shift in authority, but because the state is so 
fragmented, old ideas never die. In light of these theoretical characterizations of the relationship 
among institutions, ideas, and entrepreneurial actors, this thesis examines citizenship as an idea 
during and after Reconstruction (1863-1876). This thesis suggests that the contestation over the 
meaning and content of citizenship status between the Republican-led Congress, the president, 
state governments, social movements like the KKK, and the judiciary that took place during 
Reconstruction not only leads to an endogenous explanation for its failure, but also sheds light on 
how the fragmented state leads to a fragmented and inevitably unsettled definition of U.S. 
citizenship. 
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Introduction 
Rethinking Reconstruction’s Failure: Developmental Citizenship and Institutional Change 
 In July, 2014, I sat in the gallery of a courtroom in the Albuquerque courthouse of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Mexico and watched families being split apart. I sat 
quietly as fathers who had crossed the border with Mexico illegally to be with their families were 
ordered back to Mexico by a judge. The families sat near me in the gallery: a grandmother, weeping 
quietly; a mother in resolute shock; the children largely unaware of the gravity of the situation. I 
watched men brought before the judge in orange jumpsuits and chains speak in short sentences 
through a translator, explaining to the judge they knew what they had done was wrong and that they 
promised to not return illegally. They were not citizens, despite desperately wanting to be. They had 
crossed the border to find work so they could bring money home to their families. Their children 
were citizens, and the mothers were likely green-card holders. But here was a federal district judge, 
an official of the American state, enforcing the boundaries of American citizenship, and telling these 
men they were not within those boundaries. My curiosity about the interaction between the American 
state and the meaning of citizenship in the United States had been piqued.  
 With the 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges  the Supreme Court agreed that denying the 1
right to marry to same-sex couples was an unconstitutional act, thus granting gay couples a right 
previously denied to them. Mary Bonuato began her oral argument on behalf of the petitioners in 
Obergefell with rhetoric of how the denial of a right to a certain class of persons relegates them to an 
inferior status: “If a legal commitment, responsibility and protection that is marriage is off limits to 
gay people as a class, the stain of unworthiness that follows on individuals and families contravenes 
the basic constitutional commitment to equal dignity.”  Bonuato continued her argument by invoking 2
 576 U.S. ____ (2015).1
 Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015) Oral Argument Transcript. 14-556. April 28, 2015, 4.2
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the Fourteenth Amendment: “Indeed, the abiding purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to 
preclude relegating classes of persons to second-tier status.”  Bonuato’s invocation of one of the 3
Reconstruction Amendments in reference to tiers of persons in the United States raises more 
questions about the nature of citizenship. Specifically, it opens the door to understanding how and 
why the boundaries of citizenship in the United States can be contested by the state. We must ask 
how the institutions of American governance have shaped the meaning of U.S. citizenship. How have 
these institutions defined the meaning and content of that status?  
 Attempting to answer this question leads to an unusual realization. In his canonical work 
Civic Ideals, Rogers Smith shows how citizenship has been defined differently throughout U.S. 
history.  He suggests that American political cultures is comprised of several, conflicting 4
understandings of citizenship that ebb and flow between each other. One definition of citizenship 
becomes more popular for a period of time, only to be supplanted by another. Smith documents how 
these multiple traditions of citizenship have fluctuated through U.S. history. Through his work, I 
began to understand how and why these traditions —  civic republican, liberal democratic, and 
ascriptive — explained how the state might grant rights to make gay couples fuller citizens, but also 
simultaneously deport men who had crossed the the border to find work. Smith’s work gave me an 
opportunity to explore a more comprehensive account of how and why the state manipulates the 
boundaries of citizenship.  
 Smith offers a compelling account of when and where different traditions of citizenship are 
more dominant than others, but is less helpful at explaining why dominant traditions differ over time. 
While the state could clearly hold different definitions of the content of citizenship at different times, 
when I saw the judge’s decision to send home a man willing to work and earn a peaceful living for 
his family, I saw a rejection of civic republican values and inclusionary liberal values. When I saw 
the Supreme Court find bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional a year later, I saw an 
endorsement of a liberal democratic tradition of citizenship. Smith’s insight into multiple traditions 
 Ibid.3
 Rogers M. Smith. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. (New Haven: Yale University 4
Press, 1997).
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potentially lacks explanatory power for this comparison. I saw tension between state institutions on 
deciding who was to be a citizen, and what being a citizen means. Luckily, Stephen Engel and others 
have suggested one common link between these two situations where the state exerts its power to 
define citizenship.  Both called upon the fundamental prior concept of recognition. These accounts of 5
citizenship all take for granted the state’s ability to recognize a person as a citizen. Regardless of 
what being a “citizen” means, a person cannot be a “citizen” without being recognized in the eyes of 
the state. As historian of sexuality Margot Canaday has shown, throughout the early to mid-twentieth 
century the state crafted policies that “crystallized homosexual identity, fostering a process by which 
certain individuals began to think of their sexuality in political terms, as mediating and mediated by 
their relationship to the state.”  These policies were implemented to define who qualified as a citizen. 6
Understanding citizenship as constituted, developed, and shaped by the state’s recognition allowed 
me to begin to investigate the relationship between state institutions and ideas about citizenship.  
 Researching the interactions between citizenship as a developmental idea and the state 
requires an analytical lens that can account for institutional, ideational, and policy change over time. 
American Political Development (APD), a subfield of political science, offers just such a lens. At 
base, APD rejects the traditional assumption in political science that the normal condition of the 
polity is a stable equilibrium. Politics is not, APD argues, a condition of “punctuated equilibrium,” 
where political stasis is sometimes disrupted by a shock to the system, such as a war, economic crisis, 
or famine, that forces political institutions to quickly readjust to address the shock, then reassume its 
condition of stasis. Rather, scholars of APD have shown that political change is always happening. 
Of course, shocks to the system do cause political institutions to change, but they are not the only 
sources of change. The analytical tools that APD scholars have developed to analyze political change 
provide a way to understand how citizenship can be defined by the state differently over time and 
even at the same time by different state institutions.  
 Stephen Engel. "Developmental Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Politics: Fragmented Citizenship in a 5
Fragmented State." Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 2 (2015): 287-311; Engel, Stephen. Fragmented Citizens: 
Changing Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Lives. (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2016. Forthcoming. Manuscript on 
file with Author).
 Margot Canaday. The Straight State : Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America. (Politics and 6
Society in Twentieth-Century America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 10.
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 In this thesis, I investigate Reconstruction to understand this developmental relationship 
between state recognition of citizens and the changing meaning of citizenship. Mary Bonuato 
suggested in her argument before the Supreme Court in Obergefell that the Fourteenth Amendment 
plays a role in defining citizenship. Though at the beginning of my research it was not yet clear what 
that role is, unpacking that amendment — the the text, the process of ratification, and subsequent 
early challenges to its implementation —  offered me a starting point. As political scientist Megan 
Ming Francis has pointed out, Reconstruction is presumed by scholars to be one of the “major 
periods in which the governing institutions of the United States were constructed and transformed.”  7
This claim is no doubt true. Consequently, scholarship investigating Reconstruction abounds. 
Nevertheless, more recent work on the period that employs a developmental lens has shed light on 
the political forces at issue in Reconstruction. Political scientist Richard Valelly, for example, has 
argued that Reconstruction has much in common with the civil rights movement in the 1960s. 
Namely, he observed that a “sudden, large increase in rates of black voting and office-holding has 
taken place twice over the course of American political evolution.”  The United States is, in fact, the 8
only democracy in the world to enfranchise a group as large as its black population during 
Reconstruction, and then subsequently disenfranchise them soon after. The title of Valelly’s book, 
The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement, suggests first that there are two 
periods in U.S. history where black enfranchisement has been a key issue. But it also reflects an ebb-
and-flow of citizenship traditions.  
Bridging the Gap Between Ideas and Institutions 
 Since Aristotle, voting has been understood to be an important element of citizenship. If 
voting rights are granted to an identity group and then taken away, then citizenship as an idea in the 
state has changed over time. In addition, it points out that citizenship development in the United 
States is not teleological or whiggish — it does not proceed uniformly toward an ideal end goal. 
 Megan Ming Francis. Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State. (New York, NY: Cambridge 7
University Press, 2014), 16.
 Richard M. Valelly. The Two Reconstructions : The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement. (American Politics and 8
Political Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1.
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Rather, citizenship in the United States is, just as Smith points out, subject to contestation across time 
and plagued by repeated invocations of ascriptive hierarchy. Reconstruction, a formative time for 
citizenship in the United States, therefore proved ripe for investigating from a developmental 
perspective.  As Smith has argued, the multiple (three) traditions of citizenship in American political 
culture are  
visible not only in this complex, contested Reconstruction history, but also in the sharply 
divergent ways in which it has since been viewed….A multiple traditions perspective 
suggests instead that it was politically and intellectually reinvigorated white racism— and 
attachments to ascriptive hierarchies more generally— that played the most decisive role in 
stirring the largely successful opposition to these changes.   9
Smith’s argument shows multiple definitions of citizenship in contest, but he is less helpful at 
bridging the gap from ideas of citizenship to their institutional uptake.  
 Political scientist Brian Glenn explains how scholarship in the realm of American Political 
Development has often fallen into two separate camps.  The first is made up of scholarship known 10
as “historical institutionalism.” Scholars in this area study (1) “how actors make their way through 
the institutional setting,” (2) “how institutions themselves change over time” and what mechanisms 
cause those changes, and (3) “ the mechanisms of path dependency and positive (or negative) 
feedback loops.”  The second camp is composed of “ideational scholars.” These scholars have 11
reminded us that “ideas matter for members of the cultural school, especially ideas about the nature 
of American identity, about ‘us’ and ‘them’ and about what ‘we’ the people owe each other versus 
what we owe outsiders.”  Unfortunately, according to Glenn, “members of the two schools have 12
learned little from one another.”  APD scholarship rarely bridged the gap between them. This 13
tendency leaves unexplored the intersection between ideas and institutions. As a result, not only have 
opportunities for analysis been overlooked, but current studies that exist solely in one camp or the 
other very likely remain incomplete. Indeed, work that bridges the two schools is demanding because 
 Smith (1997), 346.9
 Brian Glenn. "The Two Schools of American Political Development." Political Studies Review 2 (2004): 153-65.10
 Ibid:153. 11
 Ibid: 156.12
 Ibid: 161. 13
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the “researcher must not only effectively capture all of the institutional and ideational variables 
involved, but also provide a convincing explanation of how they interact with one another.”  14
However, this increased workload is not without its rewards. Bridging the ideational and institutional 
divide results in scholarship that is more valuable and comprehensive. 
 Operating from the hypothesis that institutions tend to have a relationship to political ideas, I 
attempt to bridge this gap. I argue that scholars cannot fully account for the development of the 
American state without paying attention to debates over citizenship and how they have interacted 
with institutional development. I trace the intersection of new political ideas about citizenship 
proposed during Reconstruction with political institutions of federal and state governments to see 
how they interact. This investigation has lead to a multi-pronged argument. My overarching 
argument is this: in the United States, ideational conversation is not ended by institutional action. The 
American state is a fragmented entity. Federalism and separation of powers abound by intentional 
constitutional design. As a result, I argue, dissenting political ideas can find voice outside the 
dominant institutional framework, like in social movements or state governments. In the United 
States, citizenship as a theory has been constantly subject to contestation. Because recognition by a 
political institution is necessarily prior to any more substantive notion of citizenship, the state plays a 
key role in the regulation and definition of citizenship. However, research in American Political 
Development suggests that political institutions and ideas often conflict, and define state institutions 
as in flux and developing (rather than in equilibrium) as different ideas and governing authority vie 
for permanence and durability. Scholars of APD have pointed out that fragmented institutional 
structure allows for endogenous development as political entrepreneurs and social movements exploit 
the frictions created by institutional misalignments. Orren and Skowronek argue that insofar as 
political change is “accompanied by the accumulation and persistence of competing controls within 
the institutions of government, the normal condition of the polity will be that of multiple, 
incongruous authorities operating simultaneously.”  Seeing this condition as a “normal” part of the 15
 Ibid: 162.14
 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development. (Cambridge, UK: 15
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 108.
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polity allows for a more robust account of institutional change, because it can produce 
“contradictions for agents, entrepreneurs, and leaders to exploit and alternative for them to 
imagine.”  Ideational development in the polity may mark a shift in authority, but because the state 16
is so fragmented, old ideas never die. During Reconstruction, the fragmented American polity offered 
myriad institutional pathways for dissenting and older political ideas that prioritized state citizenship 
to return and fight once more for dominance. Put another way, I argue that Rogers Smith’s multiple 
traditions ebb and flow across time precisely because the institutional arrangement in the American 
state allows for it. 
 This principle argument, however, has several constitutive elements. First, I suggest that this  
frame of analysis reveals a hole in the literature on Reconstruction. Until now, scholars of 
Reconstruction had attributed its failure to exogenous explanations— a new political climate 
resulting in a partisan shift in Congress, or the Compromise of 1877. Of particular note is historian 
Eric Foner’s explanation for Reconstruction’s failure, the economic crash of 1873.  I suggest here, 17
though, that the ideational contestation over citizenship during Reconstruction that shaped political 
institutions reveals that these exogenous explanations are incomplete. Rather, this thesis points to an 
endogenous explanation for Reconstruction’s failure. Reconstruction failed not only because 
exogenous shocks altered political calculus or eliminated those politicians most supportive of 
Reconstruction policy. Rather, the new ideals of national citizenship that Reconstruction embraced 
were under strain from the start, strain that was created by the existing constitutional design itself. 
This argument fits the insights of APD, which highlight endogenous factors for explaining 
institutional change.  
 Second, the overarching argument sheds light on citizenship as an idea in the United States. 
Ideational scholars have studied citizenship in the United States with the intent to discover what 
being a citizen means. Does being a U.S. citizen mean the “right to have rights”? Does it mean the 
right to vote? Does it call upon a notion of civic responsibility and active participation in the polity? 
 Ibid, 116.16
 Eric Foner. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. (Updated Edition ed. New York, NY: 17
Harper Collins, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1988).
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What of economic freedom and the right to own property? My analysis reveals that perhaps there is a 
reason pinpointing the “true” content of U.S. citizenship has been hard to pin down. Namely, perhaps 
there is an institutional reason. The fragmented nature of the state leads to constant ideational 
contestation. As a direct result of this, citizenship as an institutionally-defined idea is subject to 
change over time, so it is perpetually unsettled.  
Overview of the Analysis 
 The chapters that follow examine how and why Republicans in the wake of the Civil War 
sought to remake the definition of citizenship in the United States by implementing institutional 
change. To the Republicans, the Civil War was at least in part a product of an ideational divide over 
the proper definition of citizenship between the North and the South. In the United States, citizenship 
is two-fold. “Content” or “meaning” of citizenship aside, each inhabitant of the United States owes 
allegiance to two competing sovereigns— the state in which they reside, and the nation as a whole. 
One is both a citizen and inhabitant of, say, Arkansas, Massachusetts, or Colorado, in addition to 
being a citizen of the United States. The dispute over which should be prioritized was, in part, at 
issue in the Civil War. In very general terms, Southern Democrats preferred state citizenship over 
national citizenship. They believed states should be the primary protectors of the rights of its citizens. 
On the other hand, Northern Republicans argued that this lexical ordering of citizenship— state 
before national— was one of the causes of the slavery problem. They viewed their victory in the 
Civil War to mean that their vision of the national government, not the states, as the primary 
protector of the rights of its inhabitants — that national citizenship should be prioritized over state 
citizenship — had won. Republicans wanted to give the national government the power to protect the 
rights of its citizens from infringement by both private individuals and state government. I argue this 
dispute over citizenship shaped the direction and ultimate failure of Reconstruction.  
 The first chapter explains in detail the theory behind the analysis. It examines the literature 
that argues for certain conceptions of citizenship over others, as well as the literature that offers 
several definitions of citizenship in the U.S. Building on the work of Shane Phelan, Judith Shklar, 
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Margot Canaday, and Stephen Engel, it explains why it is important to understand citizenship in the 
context of political institutions, which in turn necessarily define and shape it. Understanding 
citizenship as recognition forces a reorientation towards questions about the state and institutions. 
The chapter uses the scholarship of APD to argue that the state’s fractured and fragmented nature 
allows for several important avenues of political change. Ideas, it is argued, can take hold and fight 
for dominance because of the unique nature of the U.S. polity.  
 The second chapter investigates the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment by beginning with 
a close reading of the ratification debates to determine the intended institutional affect on citizenship. 
Arguably, the purpose motivating the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment “was not to create new 
rights, but rather to incorporate into the Federal Constitution the fundamental rights that individuals 
already possessed under general constitutional theory, but that the states had failed to enforce 
adequately.”  In other words, citizenship was just not the elaboration of rights, but was also realized 18
through the enforcement that came from recognition and regulation by governing authority. 
Reconstruction marked a turning point in notions of state power: the federal government, not the 
states, was now the “main protector of citizens’ rights,” and, as such, the federal government took on 
new responsibilities to recognize citizens specifically and distinctly beyond the capacities of state 
governments.  Richard Aynes suggests that even those who have a narrow view of the purpose of the 19
Fourteenth Amendment must concede that it was designed to establish a distinct set  of “privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States.  The Reconstruction Amendments, it seems, were 20
designed at least in part to affirm national citizenship over state citizenship.  This chapter examines 21
the ideas behind the Republican vision for the country, and explains how it manifested itself in the 
Reconstruction Amendments.  
 Stephen J. Heyman. "The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment." Duke 18
Law Journal 41, no. 3 (1991): 509.
 Eric Foner. "The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction— And Vice-Versa." Columbia Law Review 19
112, no. 7 (2012):1587
 Richard Aynes. "Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter- 20
House Cases." Chicago-Kent Law Review 70, no. 627 (1994): 628, citing Charles Fairman. What Makes a Great 
Justice?: Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-1892, 30 B.U. L. Rev. 49, 77 (1950): 77.
 Smith (1997), 327-337.21
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 The third chapter investigates the institutional friction that occurs within the American 
federal system: the disagreement that arises between state governments, popular understandings, and 
the national government. State governments and popular sentiment had differing understandings of 
the true content of U.S. citizenship from Congress. As a result of this institutional disagreement, the 
Republicans in Congress operated from a point of weakness from the start, despite their numerical 
majority. This contrasts sharply with their apparent hegemonic position that resulted in the passage of 
the three Constitutional Amendments and multiple pieces of legislation from 1863 to 1875. 
Republicans faced a constant siege from ideational dissenters who held on to antebellum ideas of 
citizenship. The first challenge came during the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Despite their majority in Congress and victory in the Civil War, Republicans had to 
employ dubious constitutional maneuvering to get the amendments passed. Specifically, they did not 
count southern state representation to get the Thirteenth Amendment through Congress, but they did 
account for southern states to pass the necessary three-fourths of the states threshold for ratification. 
And with the Fourteenth Amendment, they turned Southern states into military districts for 
ratification purposes to ensure it could pass the required state-ratification threshold.  
 The next challenge came from the executive branch in the form of President Andrew 
Johnson. Johnson was not sympathetic to the Republican project of union and national citizenship. 
He championed states’ rights and believed that the federal government should not be the primary 
enforcer of civil rights. To eliminate this threat at achieving full institutionalization of their vision, 
Republicans promptly impeached Johnson. The third threat was a two-pronged attack. It came 
simultaneously from two more zones that dissenting political ideas can find voice in the institutional 
framework: state governments and the people themselves via social movements or civil society 
organizations. State governments resisted the Republican project by institutionalizing Black Codes 
and election laws that limited the franchise of freedmen. The Ku Klux Klan, a southern social 
movement, also held to dissenting ideas of citizenship and terrorized freedmen and Republicans 
throughout the south. The Republicans responded to these threats by enacting three pieces of 
legislation and one more constitutional amendment in the early 1870s: the Enforcement Act of 1870, 
the Enforcement Act of 1871, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, and the Fifteenth Amendment. Despite 
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these vigorous attempts by Republicans to entrench their vision for national citizenship, there was 
still, to use the words of Richard Valelly, “incomplete institutionalization.”  This is exhibited by the 22
states to enact miscegenation laws that prohibited the “mixture” of white people of European descent 
and blacks of African descent.  23
 Until 1873, the Republicans had been largely successful at quashing attacks from those with 
dissenting ideas of citizenship. Chapter four discusses an attack they could not overcome. It came 
from the Supreme Court in 1873 in the form of the Slaughterhouse Cases.  The Republicans had 24
taken action to ensure the federal judiciary would be on their side to help bolster their project and 
further institutionally embed their vision. They had manipulated the federal circuit courts to enable 
them to appoint more Republican judges, and to ensure most southern states would be in one circuit. 
In addition, they then stripped the Supreme Court of habeas jurisdiction. Despite this active 
manipulation, and the general approval and enforcement of national citizenship in the lower federal 
courts during Reconstruction, the Supreme Court was still able to exploit their position and deal a 
fatal blow to the Republican vision for national citizenship. That attack came in 1873 with the 
Slaughterhouse Cases. Despite more expansive lower court rulings, a bare majority of the Supreme 
Court “strained to read constitutional protections of citizenship and personal rights in appallingly 
narrow ways.”  The court used this case to pick up antebellum ideas of state citizenship and 25
ascriptive hierarchy and put them once again on the path to dominance. Justice Miller’s majority 
opinion re-articulated many of the ideas that President Johnson, state governments, and indeed some 
social movements had held. The Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873 “virtually scratched [the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause] from the constitution.”  Justice Miller declared in the opinion that the 26
Fourteenth Amendment had “not fundamentally altered traditional federalism; most of the rights of 
 Valelly (2004), 701-71.22
 Martha Hodes. “The Sexualization of Reconstruction Politics: White Women and Black Men in the South after the 23
Civil War.” Journal of the History of Sexuality 3, no. 3, Special Issue: African American Culture and Sexuality 
(1993): 403.
 83 U.S. 36 (1873).24
 Smith (1997), 330.25
 Ibid, 78. Internal quotations omitted. 26
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citizens remained under state control, and with these the Amendment had ‘nothing to do.’”  Due to 27
the Supreme Court’s unique position in the polity, however, they could not be reigned in by the 
Republicans. As a result of this case and the Court’s subsequent decisions of United States v. 
Cruikshank  and The Civil Rights Cases of 1883,  the Republican project, and Reconstruction 28 29
generally, failed. 
American Political Development and Endogenous Sources of Change 
 The field of American Political Development has produced several mechanisms for 
explaining change over time. This project not only employs these mechanisms for examining 
development of the American state during Reconstruction, but it also reaffirms their applicability as 
explanatory mechanisms of the development of American politics. These concepts can be best 
understood with reference to the language of “exogeneity” versus “endogeneity.” Again, APD as a 
discipline is tasked, in part, with explaining institutional and ideational change the absence of an 
external crisis or “exogeneous shock” to the political arrangement. Though many types of 
endogenous change are at issue in the analysis that follows, I highlight four key mechanisms here. 
These four mechanisms, “layering,” “critical junctures,” the “reassociation of ideas for antithetical 
ends,” and “recalibration,” are especially relevant in this project, and they will be referenced 
throughout in order to provide an evaluative scaffold form much of the political history discussed. 
 The first, “layering,” helps to explain why the Republican project was doomed from the start. 
Layering involves “‘the grafting of new elements onto an otherwise stable institutional framework. 
Such amendments . . . can alter the overall trajectory of an institution’s development.’’’  Layering 30
one policy arrangement onto another can cause confusion, and the resulting frictions shift the path of 
 Eric Foner. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. Updated Edition ed. (New York, NY: 27
Harper Collins, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1988), 529.
 92 U.S. 542 (1875).28
 109 U.S. 3 (1883).29
 Daniel Béland. “Ideas and Institutional Change in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and Policy Drift.” Social 30
Science Quarterly 88, no. 1 (2007): 22, citing Kathleen Thelen. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of 
Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 35.
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institutional development. Applying this notion to the Reconstruction context can help explain why 
the Republican project failed. At the close of the Civil War, the Republicans established a new vision 
for the country that involved “grafting” several new constitutional amendments and many grand 
pieces of legislation onto the already-established institutional framework. This layering of policy 
arrangements is reflected in Chapter 3. As the Republicans attempted to wrangle the country to adopt 
their vision for citizenship, antebellum ideas that held sway previously did not, of course, just 
disappear. These older ideas remained vital and challenged the new ideational move in the meaning 
of citizenship precisely because it was layered on top of an existing set of institutional arrangements 
that might not fully (or rather, in this case, did not) support this nationalist vision. 
 The second key concept, critical junctures, explains why the Supreme Court’s 1873 decision 
in The Slaughterhouse Cases was so crucial. Megan Ming Francis’s recent book Civil Rights and the 
Making of the Modern American State chronicles how the actions of civil rights organizations, in 
particular the NAACP, altered the path of state building in political and constitutional development.  31
Francis points out that scholars tend to mistake the key turning point in the 1960s civil rights 
movement as the Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.  Rather, she argues that 32
Brown in fact was a product of an arduous litigation strategy by the NAACP. Francis suggests that 
this litigation strategy resulted in an important turning point for the civil rights movement. This 
turning point was the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Dempsey.  This case, she argues, would 33
never even have reached the Supreme Court had it not been for the NAACP’s “tremendous 
organizational effort.”  Moore was, then, a “critical juncture” in the development of the American 34
state. Critical junctures begin path-dependent processes. As such, Brown operated in the wake of 
Moore. This same principle can be seen in Reconstruction. As is argued in Chapter 4, Slaughterhouse 
was similarly a critical juncture. It was the turning point for the Republican vision, and the 
subsequent cases United States v. Cruikshank and The Civil Rights Cases operated in its wake.  
 Francis (2014).31
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).32
 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 33
 Francis (2014), 27. 34
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 The third concept, the purposive reassociation of ideas to achieve antithetical ends, plays on 
an initially unintuitive idea about institutional and ideational development. Nevertheless, it explains 
how Slaughterhouse reached the Supreme Court in the first place. As further explicated in Chapter 4, 
the attorney for the plaintiff was an ex-Confederate official and was a staunch advocate of states’ 
rights. He was staunchly against Reconstruction and the Republican project. And yet, the argument 
he put before the Supreme Court relied on an expansive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. He 
wanted to use the recently-ratified Fourteenth Amendment to protect the rights of white butchers in 
Louisiana. Perhaps the Framers of the Amendment would have supported the theoretical reading of 
the Amendment, but the fact that it was being used to protect white butchers from state regulation of 
their trade may have seemed odd to them. This practice of harnessing an old idea for new purposes is 
what Skowronek has referred to as “reassociation of ideas” which enables the achievement of ends 
antithetical to the original idea.  Framing the attorney’s argument in this way helps to reveal the 35
overlapping nature of political traditions in the United States, and understand the complexity of 
institutional development.  
 Finally, this project reaffirms the key insight of APD, namely that achieving stable and 
lasting political change is extremely difficult. Skowronek and Orren define political development as 
“a durable shift in governing authority.”  A “durable shift” is a political change that lasts— it is 36
“durable” because it is resilient to future attempts for change. Political scientist Stuart Chinn argues 
that moments of reform or institutional change are often succeeded by “a recurrent and clearly 
patterned process of ‘recalibration,’ where recently enacted reforms are recalibrated in light of the 
continuing influence of preexisting institutions and rights.”  If the study of APD is heavily focused 37
on “change over time,” what does it have to say when there is no change? Indeed, scholars of APD 
have been so focused on change that the have overlooked the fundamental lack or difficulty of 
change. Chinn points out that studies of politics change in American history “largely fail to provide 
 Stephen Skowronek. "The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, and the American Political 35
Tradition." American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (2006): 385-401.
 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development. (Cambridge, UK: 36
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 123.
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any systematic treatment of the incongruities between intended reforms and postreform 
conditions.”  In the remainder of this project, I begin to investigate why key moments of 38
institutional change are followed by these moments of “recalibration” that often revert institutional 
reforms to their old state. I suggest that it may be a feature of the institutional structure itself.  
 This thesis exposes a deep irony behind the Republican project of Reconstruction. Not only 
that, it also explains why that irony was able to occur. Despite vigorous attempts by the Republicans 
to enact institutional change and embed their vision for national citizenship in the polity, they still 
failed. Even three constitutional amendments and numerous sweeping acts of legislation were not 
enough to sustain their vision. This was possible because of the heavily fragmented nature of the U.S. 
polity itself. In sum, this suggests that the contestation over the meaning and content of citizenship 
status between political institutions that took place during Reconstruction not only leads to an 
endogenous explanation for its failure, but also sheds light on how the fragmented state leads to a 
fragmented and inevitably unsettled definition of U.S. citizenship. 
 Stuart Chinn. Recalibrating Reform: The Limits of Political Change. (New York, NY: Cambridge University 38
Press, 2014), 7.
Chapter 1 
Towards Developmental Citizenship: Institutional Structure and Citizenship as Recognition 
 A precise definition of what U.S. citizenship means has been actively debated over the course 
of U.S. political history by legal scholars and political scientists. Why has defining this concept been 
so difficult, and what role have governing institutions played in trying to give that concept coherent 
and consistent meaning? It is often unclear what a citizen is, what being a citizen means, and who 
gets to decide who is a citizen and who is not. Indeed, there are multiple examples in U.S. history 
where people were considered citizens, and yet clearly were denied rights. For example, with the 
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, women, who had been largely disenfranchised, were 
granted the right to vote, a right some scholars define as a “gateway” right to other rights. However, 
prior to 1920, women were still considered citizens. That is to say women fell within the purview of 
the state’s acknowledgment. They were entitled to state protection from outside invasion, and they 
were allowed to reside within the borders of the area under control of the state. Similarly, after the 
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, black men were legally entitled to vote, but their 
participation was (and continues to be) limited through the use of qualifying measures such as 
grandfather clauses, poll taxes, literacy tests, and whites-only primaries. Although the Fifteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1870, poll taxes were not fully outlawed until 1966. As such, citizenship 1
cannot be reduced to a cluster of rights. Nevertheless, political scientists, political theorists, and legal 
scholars have often defined citizenship in terms of responsibilities, rights, or recognition. These 
definitions are sources of contention. Additionally, normative theorists are also at odds with 
empiricists as the former conceptualized what the status should mean while empiricists attempt to 
trace how its meanings have changed over time. The debate over the content of U.S. citizenship 
rages, and this project aims to assess this debate with particular attention to how and why the lack of 
conceptual lucidity persists in the U.S. over time.  
 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).1
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 To answer the question of why citizenship remains an open concept, this thesis turns to an 
examination of the constitutional structure, or the horizontal and vertical relations between governing 
institutions in the U.S: separation of powers and federalism. How have these types of institutional 
design influenced how and why the meaning of citizenship shifts over time and remains openly 
contested? This chapter delves into the theory that might indicate how institutions influence ideas 
such as citizenship, and the chapters to follow examine how different governing institutions – 
Congress, state legislatures, state courts, and the federal judiciary – have shaped the meaning of 
citizenship. The thesis concentrates its examination of how political institutions affect political ideas 
on one period when the concept of citizenship was open for robust debate at all levels of governance, 
namely the Reconstruction Era from about 1863 to 1876.  
This thesis contends that the institutional design of the polity fosters perpetual ideational 
contestation, i.e., debate over the idea of citizenship. Ideas may experience periods of durability, 
during which debates about them might appear settled, but these periods are temporary because a 
settled definition is impossible. While a new notion of national citizenship was entrenched in the 
Constitution via the Fourteenth Amendment, was supported by the passage of Civil Rights Acts 
during Reconstruction, and was the cornerstone of a newly ascendant Republican party, it was 
challenged from the outset by an older states’ rights and anti-nationalist sentiment that the Civil War 
hardly vanquished. Perhaps, as suggested in later chapters, the deepest irony is that the Republicans’ 
apparent successful implementation of a new notion of national citizenship is revealed, upon closer 
inspection, to illustrate how weak their position actually was, and how durable older notions of 
citizenship remained, always already available to challenge the Republican vision.  And indeed the 
difficulty faced by the Republicans flowed from the very institutions in which they were situated. In 
other words, the institutional design of U.S. governance keeps alternative ideas alive and permits 
them to be picked up, deployed, and developed by elected officials, judges, and the people 
themselves. This project examines the case of citizenship in the context of these considerations to 
explore why citizenship remains an open concept.  
This chapter begins with an examination of the scholarly debate about the meanings and 
content of citizenship. The analysis is limited to political theory and political development work that 
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focuses on the United States, since the case history that this thesis examines is confined to the United 
States. This chapter draws heavily on Rogers Smith’s examination of citizenship as a contested idea 
that changes over time. It contends that definitions of citizenship that are grounded mostly or entirely 
in either liberal rights or republican responsibilities fail to capture the breadth and depth of U.S. 
citizenship. Rather, Smith’s multiple-traditions theory more accurately describes the overlapping and 
often contradictory traditions that influence the meaning and content of citizenship. Smith’s analysis 
supports the claim that citizenship is not a settled concept and is constantly subject to contestation.  
 Nevertheless, Smith is less helpful when considering why and how certain notions of 
citizenship gain dominance at particular periods. Why does a conception of citizenship grounded in 
liberal rights resonate at one moment while more limited notions of citizenship, where those limits 
are often grounded in ascriptive notions of prejudice, ascend at other times? Under what 
circumstances do these limited notions of citizenship that reify existing systems of racial and gender 
discrimination, that often seem so durable, give way? While Smith offers a way to categorize and 
trace the many different conceptions of U.S. citizenship over time, he does not offer a clear 
explanation of why or how these multiple traditions persist or change over time. This project 
responds to that gap via an analysis of institutional design: the fragmented nature of U.S. governance 
– federalism and separation of powers – and the ways that system may empower distinct actors at the 
state or federal level or across the federal branches goes some way to explain why one tradition may 
become durable or may falter. 
 Once the limits of liberal and republican notions of citizenship are defined, the chapter 
evaluates the notion that citizenship is better understood as a form of recognition. This definition of 
citizenship-as-recognition captures the state’s role in the regulation of citizenship. Importantly, this 
project is not a normative; it does not attempt to settle the debate among citizenship theorists as to 
whether citizenship is best defined as a rights-based status, a responsibilities-based notion, or a status 
conferred by institutional recognition. Instead, it takes as its premise that state recognition is 
necessarily prior to the exercise of rights or responsibilities.  As such, for citizens to exercise rights 2
 Stephen Engel. Fragmented Citizens: Changing Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Lives. )New York, NY: NYU 2
Press, 2016.) (Forthcoming. Manuscript on file with author).
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or responsibilities – for liberal citizenship or republican citizenship to be enacted – the individual 
must first be recognized by governing authorities and other community members of being capable of 
such action.  In short, recognition is a necessary procedural condition of citizenship, and it is prior to 
the substantive content of citizenship status, which may include an emphasis on either (or both) 
rights and responsibilities. 
This definition focuses less on the content of citizenship—what is conferred upon an 
individual subject to the polity’s gaze, such as rights or responsibilities—and more upon the status 
itself of the individual’s relationship with the state. By defining citizenship this way, the analytical 
lens turns away from the citizen herself and toward the governing institutions and their role in 
constituting the citizen.  This move has at least two implications. First, it, leaves unexamined 
stateless conceptions of citizenship, such as cosmopolitan citizenship and citizenship-as-practice. 
These contentions, while valuable in recognizing that citizenship may be constituted in individual 
action or community recognition, overlook the fundamental role that the state and its institutions 
plays in defining the parameters of civic life. Second, since the aim of this thesis is to explore the 
relationship between institutional and ideational development – how governing institutions have 
affected the meaning of the idea of citizenship over time – citizenship as recognition reorients the 
analysis away from the individual claiming a status and toward the institutional power that ultimately 
confers the status. Linking citizenship, via recognition, to institutions enables that exploration. Put 
differently, by defining citizenship in terms of governmental institutional recognition, I can examine 
how institutional design and capacity can alter ideational development and thereby evaluate the 
state’s role in constructing identity and, thus, citizenship.  
 Given my aim to assess how institutions have altered the definition of citizenship, I ground 
this exploration in scholarship in American Political Development (APD) as this field’s analytical 
tools are explicitly focused on tracing institutional and ideational change over time. Furthermore, 
much APD research provides ways to comprehend the polity as fragmented, which helps when 
grappling with why multiple traditions of citizenship may exist simultaneously and may be in tension 
with one another. Specifically, APD rejects the notion that the standard condition of the polity is one 
of equilibrium.  Rather, institutions and ideas conflict, and the state consequently is continuously 
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developing as different ideas and governing authority vie for permanence and durability within and 
across various institutions that exert power over citizens.  
Scholars of APD have pointed out that the polity as made up of multiple distinct and often 
conflicting governing orders enables endogenous development. Either radical or gradual shifts are 
not only the result of some exogenous shock, such as either an election that alters the partisan 
makeup of government or a war or economic crisis. Instead, political entrepreneurs – such as elected 
officials or more popular actors such as social movements –exploit the frictions and opportunities 
created when governing orders are in tension.   3
Ideational development in the polity marks a shift in authority, but because the state is so 
fragmented, older ideas may never die, lying in wait either to be taken up by another institutional 
actor or by the people themselves. As will be suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, such seemingly non-
dominant ideas may find repose either formal institutions – such as courts, legislatures, or the 
executive branch bureaucracy at the federal or state level – or informal institutions such as social 
networks and other groups that foster social movement. Political ideas that differ from the durable 
dominant notions at a given moment can hibernate while other, possibly oppositional, ideas are 
employed in formal institutional rules. The constitutional structure allows for ideational circulation. It 
keeps clashing ideas in play often within but also outside the formal institutional structures of 
governance, thus making a settled notion of citizenship – a stable equilibrium of the idea itself – 
impossible. In short, the institutions of the U.S. state are fragmented, separated, and disjointed. This 
analysis reveals just how fragile ideational durability is in the U.S. polity. Understanding our 
institutional design in this way can help us uncover if, how, and why a settled notion of citizenship 
not only eludes us but, in fact, never can and purposively never should be attained. 
The Problem with Citizenship in the United States 
 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development. (Cambridge, UK: 3
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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 Rogers Smith posits that U.S. citizenship “often simply means that the person is legally 
recognized as having American nationality and is able to carry a U.S. passport.”  However, the term 4
“citizen” has often carried with it much more demanding qualifications, and the content of 
citizenship has been a subject of fierce debate in political theory. As Kymlicka points out, citizenship 
is “intimately linked to ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of attachment to a 
particular community on the other.”  The stability of a modern polity depends not only on its basic 5
institutions, but also on the health and character of its citizens. An accurate definition of citizenship, 
then, becomes a “necessary supplement to earlier theories of institutional justice.”   6
 Arguably the most dominant definition of citizenship conflates citizenship status with rights. 
T. H. Marshall and Judith Shklar are among the more formative theorists who have contributed to this 
liberal conception.  Marshall suggests that citizenship rights occupy one of three categories: civil 7
rights, political rights, and social rights. For many, this accords with their own definition of 
citizenship, which is often colloquially understood to be “the right to have rights.”  Judith Shklar 8
similarly suggests that citizenship in America has two defining marks, the equality of political rights 
and the “overt rejection of heredity privileges.”  Rights-centric theories of citizenship are often 9
blanketed under the term “liberal democratic” notions of citizenship. Kymlicka, however, argues that 
standard liberal rights-based theories have unacceptable limits on tolerance, so we must supplement 
 Rogers M. Smith. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. (New Haven: Yale University 4
Press, 1997), 13-14.
 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman. "Return Of The Citizen: A Survey Of Recent Work On Citizenship Theory." 5
Ethics 104, no. 2 (1994): 352.
 Will Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Second ed. (Oxford, England: Oxford 6
University Press, 2002), 286.
 T. H. Marshall. Class, Citizenship, and Social Development; Essays. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964) and 7
Shklar, Judith N. American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1991). See also Marshall, T.H. “Citizenship and Social Class,” in The Citizenship Debates: A Reader. Shafir, 
Gershon ed., (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 1998), 93-112.
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these traditional rights-based principles with a theory of minority rights.  Critics of rights-based 10
theories generally, however, suggest that they lead to an unhealthy passivity of citizens.  
 Accordingly, many commentators argue that we need to “supplement (or replace) the passive 
acceptance of citizenship rights with the active exercise of citizenship responsibilities and virtues.”  11
For these civic republican theorists, citizenship suggests not only rights, or perhaps even no rights at 
all: citizenship suggests civic responsibility and participation. Liberal democratic theorists have 
suggested what Kymlicka refers to as a “more deliberative model,” but civic republican theorists 
remain unconvinced.  Without citizens who display characteristics of willing and active political 12
participation, democracy may crumble in response to illiberal forces. Civic republicans suggest that 
civic participation is intrinsically rewarding and, as such, is the hallmark of a citizen. They locate 
citizenship in “the activity of ruling and being ruled in turn.”  Civic republicans argue that a citizen 13
is not just a person subject to the laws of the state, nor is it a consumer of rights, but is “an active 
member on the public deliberation and decision-making that produces law and policy.”  Here is 14
where the idea of a “good citizen” or an “ideal citizen” finds its place.  
 However, critics have argued that these theorists sometimes struggle to explain why and how 
civic participation can become lackadaisical among citizens. Additionally, liberal and feminist critics 
point out that this account of citizenship offers grounds for unacceptable exclusions from the polity. 
Due partly to these critiques, civic republican theories have failed to reach doctrinal dominance in 
contemporary understandings of citizenship. 
 A different school of thought sees citizenship in terms of personal empowerment. For some, 
to be a citizen involves an existential refusal of subjection, which in turn means that a citizen “seeks 
 Will Kymlicka. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford Political Theory. (Oxford 10
New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1995).
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mastery over whatever pushes him or her back into subjection.”  This suggests a broader, but 15
ultimately context-free, claim that citizenship asserts “the mastery of humankind over all 
environments.”  In this vein, Castles and Davidson suggest citizenship implies a more inward and 16
abstract notion that citizenship means “acts that establish rule of law and not men.”   17
 None of these single definitions of citizenship, however, has gained dominance or universal 
acceptance in the literature. This seems at least partly because, as competing theories argue, each 
theory runs into serious conceptual problems. Normative rights-centric models can lead to passive 
and lackadaisical populace, and responsibility-centric models do not account for the fundamental 
problem that one cannot exercise responsibilities without rights. More generally, and, as is important 
here, none accurately and comprehensively describes what it means to be a citizen in the United 
States. Recent developments in political theory have brought this conundrum to the center of 
attention. Feminist and communitarian theorists have challenged liberal descriptions of citizenship, 
while liberals in turn challenge civic republicans. In short, as Peter Reiseneberg has said, “there is no 
single office in which [citizenship’s] essence is defined. It has no central mission, nor is it clearly an 
office, a theory, or a legal contract.”  18
 In 1862, for example, when Attorney-General Edward Bates researched what is the true 
content of citizenship in the United States, he found the effort “fruitless.”  The concept of 19
citizenship was, he wrote, “now as little understood in its details and elements, and the question as 
open to argument and speculative criticism as it was at the beginning of the Government.”  What 20
was then over eighty years of exercising citizenship under the Constitution had “not sufficed to teach 
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us either the exact meaning of the word, or the constituent elements of the thing we prize so 
highly.”  Nancy Cott points out that in Dred Scott v. Sanford, Justice Taney, writing for the majority, 21
could dismiss the fact that blacks did indeed vote in some Northern states as evidence of their 
citizenship.  Similarly, if white women were given the title of citizen, then the content of U.S. 22
citizenship could not include those things denied to them, like as office-holding, and jury and 
military service.  In his Dred Scott dissent, Justice Curtis wrote that, under the Constitution of the 23
United States, citizenship is “not dependent on the possession of any particular political or even of all 
civil rights; and any attempt so to define it must lead to error.”  Cott also argues that during the 24
nineteenth century, only a minimal definition of citizenship, “meaning the individual’s allegiance and 
nation’s reciprocal guarantee of protection,” gained any sort of universal acceptance.  A 25
dichotomous understanding of citizenship as either a liberal claim on rights or a republican 
expectation of responsibilities does not help us understand how and why the meaning of citizenship 
may shift over time. 
 Rogers Smith’s work traces how notions of citizenship have changed in the United States 
across time. He uncovers a constant battle among definitions of citizenship. He notes that different 
traditions contend with one another: a liberal tradition that focuses on rights, a republican tradition 
that focuses on responsibilities, and an ascriptive discriminatory tradition that invokes hierarchy. At 
distinct times, one tradition may be more influential among political elites than another. He claims 
ascriptive hierarchies are rampant in U.S. citizenship laws.  Smith suggests a single definition of 26
citizenship, such as a liberal theory, a civic republican theory or a citizenship-as-practice theory, fails 
to capture the distinct if overlapping traditions that constitute American political culture. His 
multiple-traditions thesis holds that “the definitive feature of American political culture has been not 
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its liberal, republican, or ‘ascriptive Americanist’ elements but, rather, this more complex pattern of 
apparently inconsistent combinations of the traditions, accompanied by recurring conflicts.”  His 27
detailed history of the concept of citizenship lends strong support to the view that the idea has always 
been contested. As the battles between liberals and civic republicans intensify, especially after they 
are joined by communitarian, feminist, cosmopolitan, and citizenship-as-practice theorists,  
it has become clear that the concept of citizenship has lost none of its power, but that its place 
in our common life is not a settled one. Citizenship is a powerful political ideal as well as a 
legal status. The debates in political theory have in many ways been irrelevant to these 
current struggles, because theorists have weighted the merits of republican versus liberal 
citizenship as modes of participation and identification while debates in policy and law have 
focused on legal status. All of these venues have important insights to offer about citizenship, 
and it behooves us to consider them together rather than in isolation.  28
Finally, Smith rejects a teleological definition of citizenship. Rather than showing that ascriptive or 
illiberal moments in American citizenship laws are nothing more than temporary deviations from the 
unending teleological progression towards some liberal notion of citizenship, his analysis shows 
convincingly that Americans do share a “common culture but one that is more complexly and 
multiply constituted than is usually acknowledged.”  The American political tradition is, in fact, 29
necessarily defined by inconsistent, overlapping, and conflicting beliefs. His argument lends strong 
support to the view that citizenship as a concept in the United States has always been contested. As a 
result, to claim that there is a singular meaning of citizenship or that citizenship has a content or 
meaning toward which American political development is progressing would be to deny the patterns 
of American political development itself.  
Citizenship as Recognition 
 Since disagreement persists among normative citizenship theorists over what the dominant 
content of U.S. citizenship should be, i.e., rights or responsibilities, this thesis takes a different route 
to uncover how citizenship has come to have distinct meanings over time. If Smith is correct in 
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suggesting that our understanding of citizenship changes over time and continues to be contested, 
then we can ask: what creates this condition, or more precisely, how do our political institutions 
foster this ideational contestation? Defining citizenship as following from institutional recognition 
helps to orient analysis toward this question. 
 Political theorist Iris Marion Young offers one entry point in understanding what citizenship 
as recognition connotes. She contends that the person or citizen is at least in part “constituted by 
another’s gaze.”  While the subject requires recognition as a human capable of activity, she writes, 30
the subject also “receives from the dominant culture only the judgment that she is different, marked, 
or inferior.”  Queer theorist Shane Phelan also calls attention to the distinction between the citizen 31
and “strangers,” who are distinct from full citizens yet nonetheless members of the community. These 
“strangers” ride the line between “us” and “them” because they have qualities of citizenship in 
certain contexts, but not in others. Phelan illustrates this notion by referencing the circumstances of 
the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender communities, whose members are “not currently citizens 
in the full political sense,” because heterosexuality is a prerequisite for full modern citizenship and 
inclusion in the polity.  32
 More specifically, political theorist Judith Shklar reminds us that citizenship is not a notion 
that can be analyzed or discussed outside of social and political context. She writes that “[w]hatever 
the ideological gratifications that the mnemonic evocation of an original and pure citizenry may 
have, it is unconvincingly and ultimately an uninteresting flight from politics if [citizenship] 
disregards the history and present actualities of our institutions.”  In other words, citizenship itself 33
needs to be understood in the context of political institutions; citizenship would be an empty concept 
without institutions. Shklar’s efforts to “historicize citizenship,” rather than see it as an ideal towards 
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which rights movements progress, remind us to understand citizenship in a political context and then 
examine how that context has changed over time.  34
 By defining citizenship in this way, “the operative center of citizenship changes from the 
individual claiming citizenship to the set of institutions that recognize or confer citizenship status.”  35
Necessary for the exercise of both rights and responsibilities, therefore, is the prior notion of 
recognition and acknowledgement. Phelan argues that law guaranteeing equal protection and political 
participation rights are the “sine qua non for citizenship, both because they enact or deny state 
acknowledgement of individuals and because such rights are a prerequisite for meaningful 
participation.”  To be deprived the protection of these laws means being barred from participation in 36
political institutions. Being denied this is the same as being denied the “acknowledgment that is the 
heart of citizenship.”  Accordingly, recognition by political institutions (especially, though not 37
limited to, the state) is a prerequisite to claiming rights, responsibilities, or duties.  38
 Nancy Cott a similar method of analysis in her study of marriage and women’s citizenship in 
the United States.  She points out that throughout much of U.S. history, by marrying a foreign 
national, women born in the United States were deprived of their citizenship status. She argues that 
we must recognize marriage as an institution that “helps to found both men’s and women’s identity in 
the polity.”  The institution of marriage was, perhaps not coincidentally, one highly regulated by the 39
state: it “has thus been the vehicle for the state’s part in forming and sustaining the gender order—or, 
it might be said, in forming and sustaining gender itself.”  Because, then, marriage affects 40
citizenship and is an institution constituted by the state, the state has had a hand in regulating 
citizenship through marriage. Marriage itself, though, involves a bond between persons. Citizenship 
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as an idea, then, represents “not only the bond between an individual and the state but also a bond 
between one individual and many others.”  41
 Examining citizenship as defined through processes of institutional recognition has enabled 
numerous scholars to gain new insight into citizenship in the United States. Indeed, scholars have 
shown how the state constitutes identities. For example, in her influential study of sexuality and 
citizenship in the United States, Margot Canaday contends that the state “did not merely implicate 
but also constituted homosexuality in the construction of a stratified citizenry.”  Her study examines 42
how state institutions defined and treated sexual identities during several periods in U.S. history. She 
reveals how the state was highly influential in the formation of sexual identity. It did this by crafting 
citizenship policies that “crystallized homosexual identity, fostering a process by which certain 
individuals began to think of their sexuality in political terms, as mediating and mediated by their 
relationship to the state.”  Necessary for her analysis is an understanding of citizenship as status. 43
She says that there are no formal categories of first or second-class citizens. Rather, she agrees with 
Nancy Cott that citizenship can be “delivered in different degrees of permanence or strength.”   44
 Additionally, Canaday endorses Rogers Smith’s multiple-traditions thesis but adds sexuality 
to the list of ascriptive traditions in American citizenship policies. In the United States, 
homosexuality was sometimes defined as “outside” of citizenship through formal legal exclusion, but 
more often someone suspected of “sexual perversion” (as it was defined but the state) was not 
formally excluded from citizenship status, but would lose certain rights. Citizenship is, Canaday 
argues, thus best conceptualized by an approach that involves “‘threshold questions’ regarding access 
to the nation-state…alongside… ‘questions about the nature and quality of citizenship as practiced 
within the political community.’”  Her study reveals that state institutions were undeniably active in 45
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the construction of sexual identity through their regulation of citizenship policies. Both 
homosexuality and citizenship arose in tandem with the development of the federal bureaucracy. The 
timing, she argues, was not coincidental: “Rather, homosexuality and citizenship are both a type of 
status that is configured (even, to some extent, conferred) by the state.”  In other words, the 46
consideration of citizenship as recognition and regulation in the context of the state was both 
essential and the undeniable conclusion of her project.  
 Citizenship is, therefore, necessarily constituted in relation to a political context. Engel teases 
out Phelan’s definition by explaining that full citizenship relies not only on the ability to claim or 
exercise rights or responsibilities, but prior acknowledgment or recognition.  Recognition is, then, 47
the necessary element for other definitions of the content of citizenship. Without recognition by 
institutions, other accounts of citizenship are rendered moot. To rephrase Phelan, recognition by 
institutions is the sine qua non of citizenship.  
 And yet, as political scientist Elisabeth Cohen has pointed out, there currently is a dearth of 
investigations into how institutions, especially state institutions, have interacted with qualities of 
citizenship. Rights, for example, require “specific political systems to make them legible.”  Cohen 48
argues that “[r]ecognizing administrative rationality as a peer of liberalism and normative theories of 
citizenship is crucial because it draws the state into the picture…”  And, as is shown convincingly in 49
the work of Cott, Canaday, Phelan, and Engel, the state’s regulatory apparatuses play a crucial role in 
defining, altering, and conferring citizenship.  
 Therefore, in the search for how the meaning of citizenship has changed over time in the 
United States, an analytic reorientation from the individual making rights, duties, practice, or 
responsibility claims to state institutions is necessary.  Because, as Engel writes, citizenship is a 50
relationship that links the individual to the state, it can, “if conceptualized as constructed through 
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regulatory recognition, direct analytic focus to the state as one source of power over that 
individual.”  Engel explains that doing so brings to the fore the idea that institutions exert power 51
over the individual and provides an opening to use developmental scholarship, which focuses on 
ideational and institutional change, to analyze how citizenship in the U.S. has changed over time.  52
Evaluating citizenship in a political context turns us away from normative claims about what 
citizenship should mean to what citizenship content the state confers through recognition. 
Institutions, Ideas, and Political Development 
 Re-conceptualizing citizenship as constituted in the process of recognition turns analysis 
toward the institutions that do the recognizing. Adam Sheingate argues that institutions are often 
understood as instruments of stability.  Indeed, rational choice institutionalists contend that political 53
institutions produce stability through “‘regulative, normative, or cognitive mechanisms’ that limit, 
constitute, or constrain the range of alternatives actors confront.”   And yet, this conception provides 54
little opportunity to engage questions of institutional change or how institutional contexts may 
interact with ideas and alter the ideas, such as citizenship, over time.  Indeed, ideas are mostly 55
treated as epiphenomenal of interests, with little to no political power or value of their own.  When 56
evaluating studies that employ these assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, Robert 
Lieberman points out that they are “limited in their capacity to account for the substantive course of 
politics” because they are bound by the limitations of reductionism, excessive reliance on the affects 
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of exogenous factors, and unnecessary emphasis on order and structure.  They are, in a word, not 57
developmental. They lack the long-lens understanding of historical institutionalists.  
 If we are to capture an account of U.S. citizenship as an idea that is influenced by 
institutional recognition, we must look elsewhere. Speaking to this objective, Lieberman exhorts 
scholars to “find a way to treat ideas as analytically consequential in accounts of political action, 
policy development, and institutional change, [and they must do so] without falling into the 
characteristic traps…[such as] the ad hockery with which institutional accounts usually appropriate 
ideas as explanatory factors.”   58
Ideational approaches on their own, however, run into similar limitations as the institutional 
approaches. They are plagued by the possibility of positing a “single, overwhelming, and, above all, 
stable set of ideas as the driving force in politics.”  Another problem present in ideational accounts 59
is exhibited by the works that “emphasize political ideas as central causal factors but give short shrift 
to the political settings in which ideas become influential and to the causal mechanisms that influence 
the section among ideas in concrete political choices.”  Lieberman thus posits that any convincing 60
and accurate theory of political or institutional development must bridge the gap between ideational 
and institutional approaches to political science, and must incorporate each element with equal 
weight. This project attempts to blend these elements as Lieberman suggests.  
 In order to blend ideational and institution elements successfully, this projects draws insight 
from American Political Development. APD scholarship dismisses the assumption that the state is 
composed of “stable, orderly institutions and regularized behaviors.”  It contends that institutional 61
design is never created in the absence of a preexisting political climate. Since this preexisting climate 
was historically established, “political outcomes tend to be dysfunctional” and the institutional 
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arrangements that arise “come to coexist often in direct conflict with each other.”  This incomplete 62
displacement of one institutional arrangement by another can create tension within and between state 
institutions.  
 APD is not concerned with “snapshots” of political circumstances. Rather, it is focused on the 
longer view of political dynamics; it aims to uncover how politics are constructed in and over time. 
APD scholars are concerned with processes of policy, institutional, and ideational change that tend to 
be slow, nonlinear, and non-rational. Brian Glenn points to two separate schools of APD. This project 
not only draws from both schools, but explicitly aims to bridge these schools. The first school is 
made up of what Glenn refers to as “historical institutionalists.” Broadly, these scholars suggest that 
the goals that “political actors choose to pursue, and those that they are able to pursue effectively, are 
shaped by the institutional arrangements through which they and other political actors must 
operate.”  The other school is made up of “ideational scholars,” who hold the belief that “ideas 63
underpin broad swaths of significant policies in American politics.”  These two schools bear a 64
noticeable resemblance to Lieberman’s two methods for explaining political change: institutional and 
ideational. Glenn’s work shows that Lieberman’s criticisms, though not directly applied to APD 
directly, still hold. If we are to use APD’s analytical perspective  to construct a convincing account of 
the intersection between citizenship and institutions, we must not continue separating analysis of 
institutions from analysis of ideas. And so, this project bridges this gap by investigating how 
institutional design affects political ideas, such as citizenship, by providing space for them to stay in 
play, to never fall out of contention even if they are non-dominant. Crucially, this project suggests 
that using the historical lens of APD allows us to understand how the institutional structure affects 
the play of political ideas.  
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 Skowronek and Orren define political development as “a durable shift in governing 
authority.”  In turn, they define a governing authority in APD as “the exercise of control over 65
persons or things that is designated and enforceable by the state,” and a shift as “a change in the 
locus or direction of control, resulting in a new distribution of authority among persons or 
organizations within the polity at large or between them and their counterparts outside.”  They even 66
call out citizenship specifically, which is at issue here, as an idea that builds and turns on the 
“distribution of authority.”  67
 A key insight that APD offers us, that is of special relevance here, is that the polity is 
“fractured.” Orren and Skowronek point out that the institutions in a polity are not created at the 
same time. They necessarily arise in a preexisting political context. Rather, they are created “at 
different times, in light of different experiences, and often for quite contrary purposes.”  Thus, the 68
search for political equilibrium is flawed. Rather, the state is made up of many regulatory bodies, 
who address varying issues with varying jurisdiction, that were created at different times and with 
different motives. These regulatory bodies do then, conflict with one another concurrently, or with 
themselves non-concurrently. This is how the polity can be described as fragmented.  
 Engel suggests that the fragmentation of the polity is actually a product of how it is 
constructed: “[a]s new policies are layered upon those in place, the juxtaposition and lack of 
integration creates the ‘interplay of multiple institutions [which is] a source of both tensions and 
opportunities.’”  This political complexity provides opportunities for actors to push for, in the 69
rhetoric of APD, shifts in governing authority, where durable shifts — arrangements that appear to 
hold over long spans of time — constitute political change. While rational choice approaches to 
political science often suggest “clean separations — between parts, between inside and outside— and 
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places those separations at the foundations of political analysis,” Orren and Skowronek suggest that 
these notions are limited in their capacity to capture the overlapping, fragmented, and internally 
contradictory aspect of a polity that developmental research like APD attempts to elucidate.  
Attention to the fragmented state of the polity, to the notion that its institutions are hardly 
ever in a state of coherent or consistent equilibrium leads to the supposition that endogeneity is a 
“feature of APD research, not a malady.”  That claim draws attention to the need to differentiate 70
between exogenous and endogenous sources of institutional change. This distinction is important 
because, political scientist James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen point out, shifts that occur 
endogenously “often unfold incrementally,” and are not accounted for when only “exogenous shocks 
that bring about radical institution reconfigurations” are analyzed.  Traditional approaches to 71
institutional change, such as those that emphasize “critical junctures,” focus heavily on exogenous 
forces – that is, forces that occur beyond the bounds of the polity itself and that include such shocks 
as wars, depressions, or public health crises. Change thereby “typically involves a dynamic of 
‘punctuated equilibrium.”  Long periods of institutional stability are, in this model, disrupted by 72
moments in which opportunities for significant institutional reform appear. These junctures are 
“critical” because, political scientist Paul Pierson writes, they place institutional arrangements on 
“paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter.”   73
APD scholars, utilizing the idea that the polity itself is fractured and composed of multiple 
distinct governing authorities that are not necessarily aligned with one another, offer a model of 
change that need not rely exogenous shocks as the only possible causal mechanisms. They challenge 
the notion that these shocks force critical junctures by suggesting that such accounts say nothing 
about the properties that makes an institution more susceptible to this type of force. Second, they 
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contend that political institutions are not only altered by exogenous shocks that force them to emerge, 
adapt, or break down. Instead, they also  “evolve and shift in more subtle ways across time.”  This 74
type of development arises as a result of endogenous forces within the institutional structure. In the 
chapters that follow, I examine the fractured polity during the Reconstruction era. This analysis 
reveals that political change can and does indeed arise from endogenous forces within the 
institutional structure.  
 Dominant ideas can and do achieve dominance within political institutions. This does not, 
however, negate political development. Though it seems acknowledging that durability of political 
ideas in the polity directly conflicts with development, Orren and Skowronek point out that it does 
not. The more durable the ideational shift, “the more resistant the arrangement is reconstructs should 
be to subsequent alteration.”  The relationship between ideational durability within the polity and 75
political development is more complex. Specifically, the more extensive the institutional 
rearrangement, prompted by either exogenous factors, endogenous factors, or both, the more durable 
it is.  
Developmental Citizenship in the American State 
 The projects takes it as a given that citizenship in the United States continues to be subject to 
contestation and proceeds to ask why. The answer is that the idea remains in flux because the 
constitutional structure of governing institutions permits it. If institutional design enables ideas to 
remain in contention, or at least provides the spaces through which non-dominant ideas of citizenship 
may rest in repose until taken up to challenge and perhaps unseat more durable notions, then the 
question that remains is how does such change occur. What are the mechanisms?  
If citizenship is grounded first in the notion of recognition, then institutional design will 
influence whether and how citizenship is consistently conferred. Ideas that have been rejected by the 
governing authority may remain dormant in institutional crevices, ready to reappear and vie for 
ideational dominance once again if context permits. A heavily fractured polity—such as the United 
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States—allows for at least two possible explanatory mechanisms of change over time: first, elite 
political entrepreneurs, such as elected representatives or judges, may exploit such “frictional gaps” 
among different governing institutions for ideationally transformative purposes, and second, social 
movements or the people themselves may exploit these frictions and tensions and bring a disregarded 
conception of citizenship one again to the fore.  
 Scheingate describes the actors who exploit these frictional gaps as “political 
entrepreneurs.”  These political entrepreneurs are those “whose creative acts have transformative 76
effects on politics, policies, or institutions.”  His work suggests that political entrepreneurs are 77
individuals. However, single individuals are not the only ones to have “transformative effects” on 
politics. In the U.S. polity, states offer opportunities for political entrepreneurs to exploit. Legal 
theorist Heather Gerken points out that federalism offers a place where dissenting ideas can find 
voice outside the dominant framework. She suggests that federalism allows for minorities to rule 
without sovereignty by allowing dissenting voices to find voice.  Federalism acts as a mechanism 78
for dissenters to exercise power. In this way, states offer a zone for non-dominant political ideas to 
become institutionalized and establish a foothold from which they can fight again for dominance.  
 Similarly, as Reva Seigel argues, social movements operate in similar ways: “[s]ocial 
movement conflict, enabled and constrained by constitutional culture, can create new forms of 
constitutional understanding—a dynamic that guides officials interpreting the open-textured language 
of the Constitution’s rights guarantees.”  She employs the concept of “constitutional culture” to 79
explore how “changes in constitutional understanding emerge from the interaction of citizens and 
officials.”  It both “licenses and limits change” by constantly challenging the distinction between 80
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politics and law by people and officials the “resources to question and to defend the legitimacy of 
government, institutions of civil society, and the Constitution itself.”  81
 The American constitutional order, Siegel writes, needs “forms of citizen participation to 
ensure its continuing authority,” and citizen engagement through social movements is part of the 
constitutional culture that uphold the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy.  Siegel emphasizes, 82
however, that constitutional culture requires two conditions on those who advocate constitutional 
change. The first is the “consent condition,” which requires that a social movement does not violate 
accepted understandings of how citizens and officials interact when their Constitutional views 
diverge – for example, it would prohibit violence. The second condition is the “public value 
condition,” which requires that advocates and social movements “justify new constitutional 
understandings by appeal to older constitutional understandings that the community recognizes and 
shares.”  Social movements, therefore, act in similar ways to the individuals who normally qualify 83
as political entrepreneurs by harboring old ideas that could be disfavored in formal institutional 
structure, and reasserting them in attempts to make them dominant once again. As such, this thesis 
takes the term “political entrepreneur” to include both individuals and groups, who take the form of 
social movements. Both act as temporary strongholds of old, unfashionable, or losing political and 
constitutional ideas, and exploit the frictional gaps in the formal institutional structure to bring them 
back into play. The chapters that follow will examine the work of individual political entrepreneurs 
such as members of Congress or particular Justices on the Supreme Court as well as social movement 
actors, such as abolitionists and political party members, and state governments.  
 Sheingate argues that treating political entrepreneurs and their innovative actions more 
seriously can bear fruit in the study of institutional change. First, it forces greater attention to how 
institutional structure itself shape opportunities for change. Second, entrepreneurship focuses 
attention “on the boundaries between institutions and the complex characteristics of the American 
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political system as a whole.”  Third, understanding political entrepreneurship makes an endogenous 84
account of political change possible. An endogenous account of change that takes entrepreneurship 
into account is one that does not rely on “the occurrence of some critical juncture or exogenous shock 
that disturbs an institution in equilibrium.”  In other words, Sheingate’s investigation of political 85
entrepreneurship presents us with a method for investigating endogenous change.  
First, though, we must understand how the institutional structure in the polity can affect the 
ideational context and, thus, how a settled definition of citizenship may be impossible. Scheingate 
provides helpful insight here, too. The most important determinant for how susceptible institutional 
structure is to the actions of political entrepreneurs, Scheingate suggests, is complexity. Complexity 
describes a “system of multiple, overlapping, and heterogeneous components connected together in a 
dense network of interrelated links.’”  When Scheingate describes “complexity” within political 86
institutions, he is referring to the same characteristics as Orren and Skowronek when they describe 
the American polity as “fragmented.”  The consequences of having a complex (or fragmented) 87
institutional structure are threefold. First, they are rampant with uncertainty that presents 
opportunities for acts of innovation on the part of political entrepreneurs. By uncertainty, Scheingate 
is referring to the difficulty of predicting intended and unintended outcomes, which are caused by the 
ripple and feedback effects that are characteristic of complex system. Because of these factors, he 
writes, “complex systems are often in flux, system components are related through reciprocal 
causation, and single events can have large aggregate effects. As a result, it is impossible to predict ex 
ante how change in one component will impact other parts of the system. Yet it is precisely this 
uncertainty that presents entrepreneurs with speculative opportunities.”  Similarly, Mahoney and 88
Thelen argue that endogenous institutional change occurs when “problems of rule interpretation and 
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enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways.”  More specifically, 89
as discussed earlier, Orren and Skowronek contend that a polity is rife with internal contradictions 
and overlapping authority relations, and this condition opens up opportunities for political 
entrepreneurs, agents, and other leaders, either individual or groups. Such a polity provides 
contradictions for these agents and entrepreneurs to exploit, and “alternatives for them to imagine.”  90
 Second, Scheingate posits, their inevitable heterogeneity provides the resources for the 
opportunities to be exploited. Third, the “multiple and overlapping character of components within 
complex systems can produce ambiguous relations among actors and institutions.”  With increased 91
complexity comes blurred boundaries between system components: “[h]ierarchies are flattened as 
networks spanning institution replace rigid orders differentiated along functional lines. Put another 
way, increasing complexity render the boundaries separating components less clearly defined and 
more permeable: rising complexity lowers entry barriers”  As an example of a highly complex 92
institutional system, Sheingate uses the United States: “the common observation regarding the 
fragmentation of the American political system can be described in terms of complexity. Separated 
powers, federalism, bicameralism, congressional committees, and executive agencies together 
constitute a complex system of multiple and overlapping sources of authority.”  If the American 93
system is extremely complex, then, as has been shown, it is very susceptible to the actions of political 
entrepreneurs. If the political entrepreneurs, both individuals and groups in the form of social 
movements, take advantage of the openings presented to them by the complexity of the American 
system, then creating a new institutional arrangement and, thus, political development, will follow 
with ease.  
 Scheingate’s work, then, lends strong support to the view that the structure of the American 
system may in fact be institutionally structured to foster a definition of citizenship in the United 
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States that is in flux and changes over time or means different things at one time depending on the 
governing institution that is recognizing the individual as citizen. The only settled definition of 
citizenship we may be able to find, then, is the procedural or developmental one. This definition 
rejects teleology and is depleted of substantive content, such as rights or responsibilities. This 
definition is, namely, that of citizenship-as-recognition. 
 To investigate how state institutions have affected what might be meant by or included in the 
status of citizen, the following chapters will focus on one particular generative moment in the 
redefinition of citizenship by the state: Reconstruction. During Reconstruction, which covers 
1863-1877,  three amendments to the U.S. Constitution – the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth – 94
actively contemplated the meaning and parameters of citizenship and how citizens would be 
recognized by the state. 
Conclusion 
 What citizenship means has vexed scholars and political leaders alike. Normative theorists 
have described citizenship in terms of rights, responsibilities, duties, and practice. However, just the 
fact that this debate over the content of citizenship continues with its current strength suggests 
something else may be at work. In the United States, the institutional structure may actually be 
predisposed to make a resolution of this debate impossible. As has been shown by Adam Sheingate, 
the more complicated the institutional structure in a polity, the more susceptible it is to the work of 
political entrepreneurs who can exploit the frictional gaps to produce shifts in governing authority 
and, thus, political change. Additionally, if we recognize that citizenship is regulated by institutions 
and thus employ the narrow and logically prior definition of citizenship, that of citizenship as 
institutional recognition, we can begin to understand how and why citizenship has continued to be 
such a fiercely contested concept. 
 To investigate this claim, this project draws insight from American Political Development. 
APD scholars have noted that complex interplay and overlap between political institutions gives rise 
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to “unexpected and unforeseen frictions.”  This friction is important for political change and 95
political development in two ways. First, endogenous political change is a result of this friction. 
Second, endogenous factors are more likely to cause political change if this friction exists. The 
endogenous factor most pertinent to this study is that of ideational context, specifically that of 
citizenship. The work of political entrepreneurs who bring differing ideas back into play serves as 
one example of how this friction can allow for political change.  
 The work of political entrepreneurs and institutional friction is what will be explored in the 
following chapters. By investigating the moments of incomplete displacement of “governing 
authority,” the subsequent examples will illuminate how state institutions have affected the definition 
of citizenship in the United States. Though such moments are temporary the “institutions they 
produce have consequences that skew political debates and outcomes for decades, if not centuries.”  96
Based on what has been shown here, if we find institutional disagreement over definitions of 
citizenship, both concurrently and across time, then a developmental citizenship that is constantly in 
flux will have been strongly supported, and the larger claim about a constitutional structure that 
makes this outcome inevitable will be validated.  
 This suggests that institutional disagreement over the meaning and content of citizenship has 
two dimensions. First, different state institutions can simultaneously disagree over what citizenship 
is. Second, a state institution can define citizenship differently at different times. The lens of APD 
suggests that when different doctrines conflict “unexpected and unforeseen frictions may 
continuously arise.”  This project investigates this institutional disagreement – as it is made manifest 97
in the earliest attempts by Congress, the Supreme Court, the states, and the people, to interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment– and its resulting friction and unforeseen consequences, in order to uncover 
how and why a settled notion of citizenship eludes U.S. democratic development. 
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To Preserve the Union: Reconstruction, Congress, and Citizenship 
 Reconstruction, the years between 1863 and 1876, when Southern political institutions and 
state constitutions were redesigned in the aftermath of the United States’ Civil War, broke open the 
idea of citizenship for consideration by multiple political actors at the federal and state level. 
Citizenship as a political idea was unsettled, undefined, and up for grabs during and after the Civil 
War. Historian Eric Foner considers Reconstruction to have left an indelible impact on contemporary 
Americans precisely for this very reason. Issues that agitate U.S. politics, especially ones that relate 
to citizenship, including how the political community is defined, how are rights conferred, the 
respective powers of the state and federal governments, and the “relationship between political and 
economic democracy,” are all Reconstruction questions.  As we have seen, the definition of 1
citizenship in the United States is subject to contestation even if it appears durable during particular 
periods. As long as questions of citizenship, rights, freedom, and democracy persist in our society, 
“so too will the necessity of an accurate understanding of Reconstruction.”   2
 The primary purpose of Reconstruction, namely to outlaw slavery and reposition the newly 
freedmen for some form of acknowledgment by the polity, was addressed through three amendments 
to the United States Constitution. First, slavery was prohibited explicitly by the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment conferred citizenship status on African-Americans, 
which brought them within the polity’s acknowledgment insofar as they might have civil rights, e.g., 
the rights to enter into contracts or serve on juries. It also altered the balance of powers between state 
and national governments to prevent another civil war grounded in a states’ rights claim. Third, the 
newly freed slaves and free blacks were acknowledged to have political rights, namely the right to 
vote, by the Fifteenth Amendment.  
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These three Amendments differed radically from notions of citizenship embraced during the 
antebellum period. Prior to Reconstruction, the individual states “defined the status and secured the 
rights of the inhabitants of the United States.”  They did this, legal historian Robert Kaczorowski 3
writes, through their state legal institutions, statutes, and courts. However, some antebellum legal 
theorists contended that the ability to secure the rights of inhabitants of the United States (as distinct 
from the rights of inhabitants of the several states) should lie not with the states, but with the national 
government. Kaczorowski explains that the debate over whether the national or state governments 
“possessed ultimate authority to determine the status and enforce the rights of American inhabitants” 
resulted in a fierce national political debate that ultimately culminated with the secession of the South 
in 1861.  As a result, the Civil War was a partisan war. Republicans advocated emancipation and 4
Union, but Democrats stood for lenience with Confederate secessionists and slavery.  The 5
Republican ideals of Union, national sovereignty, and emancipation were ultimately victorious in 
battle. Consequently, Reconstruction policy was ultimately controlled and implemented by 
congressional Republicans.  
 These northern Republicans favored national protection of rights over state protection of 
rights because they held that state protection of rights had failed. The Republican-controlled 39th 
Congress of 1865-1867 sought to establish national protection of citizens’ rights, and thereby 
prioritizing national citizenship over state citizenship. The political context of antebellum and Civil 
War-era civil rights deprivations compelled Congress to “take effective measures to secure the 
fundamental rights of American citizens.”  Their efforts resulted primarily in the Fourteenth 6
Amendment. However, Republican idealist notions of “social harmony” ultimately failed.  Between 7
1893 and 1911, political scientist Richard Valelly points out, Congress formally abolished 94 percent 
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of the election statutes passed during Reconstruction.  Republican efforts failed in other ways, too. 8
Historian Eric Foner argues that the depression of 1873 explains why Reconstruction’s aims were 
never fully realized. The depression, Foner writes, “marked a major turning point in the North’s 
ideological development.”  The depression, which “rudely disrupt[ed] visions of social harmony,” 9
resulted in “widespread tension between labor and capital.”  The Republican ideals of equal rights 10
and dignity of labor “gave way before a sense of the irreducible barriers separating the classes and a 
preoccupation with the defense of property, ‘political economy,’ and the economic status quo.”  For 11
Foner, then, the Republican project to institutionalize a new vision of national citizenship over state 
citizenship and equal rights collapsed with the economic downturn of the 1870s. 
 This chapter puts forward an alternative explanation. The Republican vision to reshape the 
balance of powers between the state and federal governments, and reorient the tiers of citizenship 
was redefined because of the constitutional structure of political institutions, which the various 
Reconstruction Amendments did not substantively alter. In other words, the separated and 
fragmented nature of the polity permitted disagreement about the meaning of these Amendments 
among and within political institutions to persist, opening space for the original aims of the 
Republicans to be challenged and ultimately displaced. Political scientists James Mahoney and 
Kathleen Thelen argue that when analyzing institutional change, most scholars point to “exogenous 
shock that bring about radical institutional reconfigurations,” but they ignore or overlook the 
importance of endogenous changes that “often unfold incrementally.”  If that claim is applied to the 12
collapse of Reconstruction ambitions, Foner is no doubt correct that the economic depression of the 
1870s, which was an exogenous shock to the political system, altered the path of institutional 
development. Nevertheless, Foner’s explanation does not examine endogenous sources of change 
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that may follow from the design of political institutions themselves. Specifically, Foner overlooks 
that the polity is set up in such a way to permit older political ideas to be brought back into a policy 
or constitutional conversation even when another idea appears dominant. In short, he ignores a key 
insight of American political development, namely that the polity is constituted by multiple orders 
potentially in tension. This chapter aims to articulate the Republican definition of citizenship and 
how it differed from definitions that had been dominant before the Civil War. This chapter begins the 
story of how congressional Republican ideals of Reconstruction fell victim to the structure of the 
polity itself. As will be further explain in the chapters that follow, Republicans were unable to 
maintain their dominance in a fragmented institutional context where opposition forces could gain 
and build a foothold and challenge the Republican project from the start.  
This chapter explores Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment to shed light on how it 
was intended to alter the meaning of U.S. citizenship. To begin the examination of institutional 
conflict over citizenship, this chapter looks exclusively at Congress and the ideas about citizenship 
that permeated its understanding. The Republican-controlled 39th Congress endorsed a Republican 
definition of citizenship that reflected their vision for the future of the country. Representative John 
Bingham and the other drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to use the national government 
to protect the rights they believed states were infringing upon. Their understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prioritized national citizenship over state citizenship. These various framers, but 
Representative John Bingham in particular, had a clear idea about how they intended to alter 
citizenship when they drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. This is shown by their floor 
speeches in the House of Representatives in the 39th Congress, prior to the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Once ratified, this Republican idea of citizenship pushed forward by 
Bingham achieved a brief period of, to use the rhetoric of APD, durability, namely during the years 
1868-1873. Orren and Skowronek use the term durable to describe a shift in “governing authority,” 
such as an ideational shift, that is “not fixed,” but that has achieved “stability or change in any given 
historical instance [that] must be regarded as contingent.”  Achieving durability in governing 13
 Orren and Skowronek (2004), 123.13
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authority, as manifested in political ideas, is the “constant object of political conflict.”  Durability of 14
their preferred idea of citizenship was the object of Reconstruction-era radical Republicans during 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. As will be shown in this chapter, Republicans succeeded 
at establishing a period of brief durability for their political ideas between 1868-1873. A shift that can 
call itself “durable,” Orren and Skowronek write, is one that lasts at least half a century.  This 15
ideational shift, however, because it lasted for less than a decade, was not durable. The shift was 
broad, as it was reflected in many institutions, but it was not deep, because it failed to displace old 
ideas. It must not be forgotten that a durable shift in governing authority is not immune to ideational 
challenges for future governing authority. Rather, the more durable the shift, the harder it will be to 
displace. A durable shift merely “set[s] the conditions for subsequent politics.”  Over these six years, 16
the Republican project to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship achieved the higher 
ground. Importantly, though, opposing ideas were manifesting themselves elsewhere in other 
political institutions, particularly at the state level and in the state and federal judiciaries, and finding 
voice to challenge the Republican project from the start. As will be shown in later chapters, the 
crucially formative moment for political development in the U.S. came from the Supreme Court in 
1873, when it became clear that the Republican shift was crumbling under the ideational attacks.  
This chapter begins with an explanation for why our analysis of citizenship in the American 
polity begins with Reconstruction. Next, it investigates the Reconstruction-era Republican Party and 
shows how their motto “Free Labor, Free Soil, Free Men” captures a vision of nation, union, and 
U.S. citizenship. Third, it shows how the Republican vision was captured in the Reconstruction 
project, namely in the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. It explains 
the intended meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by investigating one of its principal drafters, 
Representative John Bingham. Bingham’s life story, beliefs, and floor speeches indicate that he 
intended the Fourteenth Amendment to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship. The final 
section shows how the Republican-driven project to prioritize national citizenship over state 
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citizenship achieved dominance in the polity by being taken up in several other institutions. 
However, the developmental moment the Republicans achieved was a broad, but not deep shift. 
Accordingly, it was a shift, but not a durable shift, because opposing ideas were manifesting 
themselves elsewhere. 
Reconstruction and Citizenship 
 Reconstruction marked a turning point in the development of the American polity. Our 
investigation in whether there is indeed a structural reason that explains why a settled definition of 
U.S. citizenship continues to elude narratives of democratic development in the United States begins 
with Reconstruction precisely because one of the animating aims of Reconstruction, if not the 
primary aim, was the reconceptualization of who counted as a citizen and what the relationship 
between the citizen and the government would be. Historian Eric Foner writes that the specific 
questions that agitated the country during Reconstruction were “how our society would respond to 
the destruction of slavery. What system of labor would replace slave labor? What system of race 
relations would replace the race relations of slavery? What would be the role of former slaves in 
American life?”  More broadly, however, the fundamental question the country faced was “who was 17
entitled to American citizenship, and what rights were those citizens to enjoy?”  Arguably, there is 18
no other time in American history where the concept of citizenship was as much up for grabs. Legal 
scholar Bruce Ackerman suggests that Reconstruction marked a turning point not just in 
constitutional development, but also specifically in the definition of U.S. citizenship. For Ackerman, 
the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, known together as the 
Reconstruction Amendments, was a period of “higher lawmaking.”  The struggle over the 19
Fourteenth Amendment specifically, he writes, was “the greatest constitutional moment in American 
 Eric Foner. "The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction— And Vice-Versa." Columbia Law Review 17
112, no. 7 (2012): 1585-1686.
 Ibid, 1586.18
 Bruce Ackerman. We the People (2): Transformations. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 19
1998).
Chapter 2  !48
history.”  During this period, as was also the case during the Founding of the republic after the 20
Revolutionary War nearly a century earlier, “constitutional law became the preeminent language 
through which American debated and defined their national identity.”  Specifically, it was the 21
conflict over civil rights and state power in the wake of a shattering civil war that led congressional 
Republicans in the 39th Congress to reject the apparent assumption by the original Framers of the 
Constitution that states could be relied upon to adequately protect the rights of their citizens. Rather, 
congressional Republicans, specifically the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to redefine 
citizenship by incorporating a “right to protection by state government into the Federal 
Constitution.”   22
 At no other point in history was the content and meaning of U.S. citizenship this up-for-
grabs. The Civil War and the subsequent reconstruction of the Union offers a unique opportunity for 
insight into the institutional conflict over citizenship, so, since we are investigating if the American 
polity is structured to keep citizenship an unsettled concept, it is fitting that our story begins here.  
The Dignity of Labor and the Pursuit of Happiness 
 In 1857, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a fateful decision. In Dred 
Scott v. Sandford  the Court declared that Congress was powerless to abolish slavery and that black 23
people could never become citizens of the United States. In the aftermath of this decision, the 
country fought the Civil War, one of the bloodiest wars in its history. The question of slavery and 
who was a member of the political community established the context for Reconstruction. As a result 
of this crisis, Congress and the states enacted a series of statutes and constitutional amendments that 
for the first time in U.S. history “established as a matter of federal law the principle of equal rights 
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for all citizens regardless of race.”  Why, though, did Congress not stop with the Thirteenth 24
Amendment and its categorical abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude? What was the purpose 
behind the Fourteenth Amendment? Did it suggest something broader about the political agenda of 
the radical Republicans and the direction they wanted to push the nation after the Civil War? The 
conflict over slavery forced the nation to confront the meaning of U.S. citizenship, and to decide 
whether a citizen owed primary allegiance to a state or to the nation as a whole.  
 The Republicans were the self-proclaimed party of “Free Labor, Free Soil, Free Men.”  The 25
Republicans, Carl Schurz, a leader of the Republican party said to a Milwaukee audience on May 26, 
1860, “stand before the country, not only as the anti-slavery party, but emphatically as the party of 
free labor.”  The goal of the Republican party was to make labor honorable.  Foner summarizes 26 27
their platform. 
For the concept of “free labor” lay at the heart of the Republican ideology, and expressed a 
coherent social outlook, a model of the good society. Political anti-slavery was not merely a 
negative doctrine, an attack on southern slavery and the society built upon it; it was an 
affirmation of the superiority of the social system of the North—a dynamic, expanding 
capitalist society, whose achievements and destiny were almost wholly the result of the 
dignity and opportunities which it offered the average laboring man.  28
The roots of antebellum Republican ideology can be largely traced backed to Protestantism, which 
suggested that the pursuit of wealth was a way of serving God, and labor, “which had been imposed 
on fallen man as a curse, was transmuted into a religious value, a Christian duty.”  Republican 29
ideology itself, though, had evolved and adapted to fit modern society. Though its roots were indeed 
in Protestantism, by emphasizing social mobility and economic growth, Republicans “reflected an 
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adaptation of that [Protestant] ethic of the dynamic, expansive, capitalist society of the ante-bellum 
North.”   30
 There were, of course, several strands of Republicanism in antebellum America. Of particular 
note are the radicals. Though it is difficult to define the radicals precisely, Foner cautiously 
categorizes radicals as those who had a “persistent refusal to compromise with the South on any 
question involving slavery.”  Broadly, although the radicals shared the dignity of labor component 31
with their conservative and moderate counterparts in the Republic party, they had strong beliefs not 
only about labor and slavery, but also about the direction of the Union more broadly. Radical 
Republicans attempted to embed the notion of “equality among Americans (a principal not mentioned 
in the original Constitution) into our laws and social reality.”  For most Republicans, the 32
preservation of the Union after the Civil War was an end in itself, and to maintain it they attempted to 
temper anti-slavery rhetoric. Radicals, however, contended that the Union was a means. They held, 
according to Foner, that the Union “had been established for the noble purposes of securing the right 
of all Americans to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the founders had intended that 
slavery should one day cease to exist in the nation.”  33
 Foner points out that it is important to recognize just how revolutionary the Republican 
agenda was. Prior to the war, slavery was “an intrinsic part of the Constitution and federal law,” and 
both northern and southern states “practiced widespread discrimination against black Americans, 
slave and free.”  And, under the original Constitution, the States, and not the federal government, 34
held the primary responsibility for “both defining and protecting American” rights.  After the 35
Revolutionary War, the rights that had been previously conferred (or, as was more often the case, not 
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conferred) by the British crown transferred to the newly independent states. As a result, State laws 
determine which rights and privileges to grant to their citizens, and those citizens expected the “equal 
enjoyment of those privileges and immunities secured to them by their state’s constitution.”  36
However, prior to the ratification of the Constitution of 1787, it was not at all clear what would 
become of these rights when a citizen of one state traveled to another state. A remedy to this 
conundrum was included in Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, and a “streamlined version” 
became Article IV of the Federal Constitution in 1787: “The Citizens of each state shall be entitled to 
all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States.”   37
 During the first half of the nineteenth century, the meaning of this clause was hotly debated.  38
However, as the country entered the period of the Civil War, Constitutional theorist Kurt Lash argues, 
the jurisprudence of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was “theoretically clear and 
surprisingly stable.”  The cases of Corfield v. Coryell (1823),  Campbell v. Morris (1797),  39 40 41
Livingston v. Van Ingen (1812),  Abbot v. Bayley (1827),  and Baker v. Wise (1861)  all embrace 42 43 44
the same principle: the privileges and immunities of Article IV referred to a “limited (if especially 
important) set of state-secured rights.”  In other words, no court read this provision as protecting any 45
national rights, substantive or otherwise. It is for this reason that prior to the Civil War, the states 
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“served as the traditional guardians of life, liberty, and property, and through their institutions, 
statutes, and court decisions, defined the status and rights of different groups of state residents.”  46
 However, the stability of antebellum understanding of Article IV presented a major problem 
for the Republicans. Limiting the scope of the privileges and immunities clause had, as Lash notes, 
the effect of “maximizing the scope of state regulatory autonomy, a states’ right result that protected 
the policy-making power of both free and slave states alike.”   47
 It is in this vein that the Supreme Court decided Dred Scott v. Sandford. In the Opinion of the 
Court, Chief Justice Taney relied on the antebellum reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV (the Comity Clause). By holding that slave owners had a constitutional right to carry the 
slaves, as property, into any territory, Chief Justice Taney appeared, at least to the Republicans, to be 
laying the groundwork for the nationalization of slavery.  This rejection of the power of the federal 48
government was seen by the Republicans as the cause of the Civil War because it opened the door to 
expanded state rights.  Additionally, the reading of the Comity Clause reflected in Dred Scott had a 49
strongly limiting power on the federal government.  Dred Scott therefore proved problematic for the 
Republicans in two ways. First, it opened the door to the nationalization of slavery. Second, it relied 
on skewed reading of the Comity Clause that Republicans believed led to an inevitable but 
inappropriate expansion of state rights. However, there was a solution.  
 The new American states after the Revolutionary War enjoyed the sovereign right to confer 
rights upon its citizens. The adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787, however, added a new 
layer. Under this new constitution, citizens of the United States were granted rights both as citizens 
of the United States and as citizens of the state in which they resided. Federalism created for 
inhabitants of the United States a form of dual-citizenship. As the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
wrote in 1811, the Constitution “clearly recognises the distinction between the character of a citizen 
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of the United States, and of a citizen of any individual states; and also of citizens of different 
states.”  Individuals living in the United States were considered to be both citizens of the nation and 50
citizens of a state. The citizen, legal historian Robert Kaczorowski writes, owed allegiance to both 
the nation and the state, and “both the national and the state governments theoretically possessed the 
constitutional authority and obligation to enforce and protect the fundamental rights of citizenship.”  51
However, prior to the Civil War, the states functioned as the “primary guarantors of the fundamental 
rights of American citizens,” party due to the limited reading of the Comity Clause.  Kurt Lash 52
points out that the “privileges and immunities qua US citizens were simply not the same as one’s 
privileges and immunities qua state citizen.”  In other words, the privileges and immunities one was 53
granted by being a citizen of the United States did not vanish when crossing state lines. Importantly, 
there was an key difference between one’s status as a citizen of a state and as a citizen of the U.S. as 
a nation. Prior to the Civil War, the prior was prioritized over the latter.  
 Though the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship were quite narrow and limited, they 
were entirely distinct from those granted by individual states. This point carried particular weight in 
antebellum America because of the incorporation and creation of new territories that were not yet 
under the control of a state government. These “rights of national citizenship” were often discussed 
in the context of U.S. treaties of cession. These agreements, Lash explains, promised the inhabitants 
of newly acquired territory that, “once they were fully admitted into the Union, they would enjoy all 
the privileges and immunities of US citizens.”  Similar language appeared in the Treaty of 54
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Treaty with Stockbridge Tribe of Indians in 1843. There was, 
therefore, a common understanding in antebellum American law that there existed “rights and 
immunities” or “privileges and immunities” of national citizenship that different completely from the 
privileges and immunities of state citizenship. The conflict over slavery forced the nation to address 
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head on the question whether a citizen owed their “primary allegiance to the national or state 
government, and which of these governments had primary authority over the status and rights of the 
individual.”  A heavy-handed endorsement of state allegiance and state power was causing problems 55
for the Republicans. It followed, then, that they should endorse national citizenship and national 
power.  
 That is what the Civil War and Reconstruction-era Republicans did. As Foner argues, they 
emerged during the winter of 1860, also known as the “secession winter,” as the united defender of 
the Union. Foner argues that the Republicans, but the radicals in particular, “abandoned their 
commitment to states rights and adopted an unqualified Unionism, once it became apparent that they 
would further the antislavery cause.”  The Republicans, it must be noted, were not enemies of 56
federalism. They did not want the federal government to usurp or supplant state power entirely. They 
held, however, that the States “must be kept within their proper orbit, an orbit that would keep them 
from colliding with the rights of the individual.”  Republicans insisted that state secession could not 57
be recognized because it was “inconsistent with the ‘nationality’ of the United States.”  Particularly, 58
Republicans “of all factions” were in agreement that the United States was a nation, and not just a 
league of sovereign states.  The Republican position during and after the Civil War was, Foner 59
writes, that the Union 
should be revered and defended not only for itself, but also because of the purposes for which 
it had been created. high among these purposes was the spread of freedom, which, in the 
1850’s, meant the confinement of slavery. To preserve the Union by undermining this 
purpose would be to subvert the foundations of the Union itself. The goals of Union and free 
soil were intertwined, and neither could be sacrificed without endangering the other.  60
The preservation of the Union and allegiance to it as a Union was the Republican cause. They 
favored a unified and cohesive nation over a league of friendship among sovereign states, at least 
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partially because this league gave the states too much say over the citizenship rights of its 
inhabitants, and the states were not using this authority for good. For the Republicans, but especially 
the radicals, giving the national government power over citizenship rights was the means to securing 
their ultimate goal of “free soil, free labor, free men.” Their project was, therefore, to prioritize 
national citizenship over state citizenship— to tip the balance of the dual-citizenship status of 
Americans towards U.S. citizenship, in lieu of state citizenship.  
John Bingham, Congress, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
 The project of the radical Republicans took the form of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments, known together as the Reconstruction Amendments. The motivating purpose 
behind these amendments, but the Fourteenth Amendment specifically, was to embed Republican 
ideas about citizenship into the polity, namely by prioritizing national citizenship over state 
citizenship. As has been shown, Republicans saw the prioritization of state citizenship as the enemy 
of abolition and the dignity of labor, as well as the reason for the Civil War. It was in this context that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted. After the Civil War, some congressional Republicans 
embraced a natural law theory of American constitutionalism— that the national government had 
always possessed the power to protect the natural rights of U.S. citizens.  Legal scholar Robert 61
Kaczorowski argues that because they believed that national citizenship was primary, and “state 
citizenship derivative,” the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that “Congress possess 
primary authority to secure the civil rights of United States citizens.”   62
The author of the Section 1 of the Amendment was John Bingham, a congressman from 
Ohio. Bingham was a Republican, and his views on the Fourteenth Amendment confirm that it was 
meant to alter the definition of U.S. citizenship by giving Congress the power to protect 
infringements on rights, thus conferring and recognizing national citizenship status, and prioritizing 
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the nation over the states. By seeking to alter the definition of citizenship, upend the balance of 
power, and catalyze political change, Bingham was acting as an elite-level political entrepreneur.  
In a recent notable biography on John Bingham, legal scholar Gerard Magliocca shows how 
Bingham and “the abolitionist dream that was his life’s pursuit were both rooted in the emerald hills 
of western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio.”  Until the age of twelve, John Bingham lived in the 63
small town of Mercer, Pennsylvania. After the death of his mother in 1827, he moved to Cadiz, Ohio 
at his father’s wishes. His family, friends, community, and faith were all aligned, Magliocca writes, 
“in their fervor for abolitionism, devotion to God, and hostility to the Democratic Party.”  In 1835, 64
Bingham enrolled in Franklin College, which in 1849 merged with Marshall College to become what 
is now Franklin & Marshall College. Bingham worked as a lawyer after he moved back to Cadiz in 
1840, but he was “eager to make contacts and establish a reputation,” so he quickly involved himself 
in politics.  He worked on Whig campaigns for many years while he worked as an attorney, but he 65
did not become a candidate himself until 1846, when he ran for prosecutor of Tuscarawas County and 
won with 55 percent of the vote.   66
 Parts of Bingham’s background and some statements he made during early debates over the 
Fourteenth Amendment have lead critics to question whether he truly was an abolitionist, and 
whether he intended the Fourteenth Amendment to radically alter the federal balance. Indeed, 
Bingham made no recorded public statements about slavery until 1848.  However, as Magliocca 67
notes, a letter Bingham wrote to Salmon P. Chase, a leader of what would become the Republican 
Party, in 1845 dispels any doubt we may have about his abolitionist sentiments. In it, Bingham 
requests assistance from Chase to advance the antislavery cause: 
We try to be as active as possible, in efforts to advance the cause, though we labor under 
many discouragements. The counties of Scioto, Lawrence, Jackson, Gallia, and Meigs, are 
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collectively, perhaps as inveterately Proslavery, as the same number of contiguous counties 
anywhere else in the State. If there be any portion of the Ohio field demanding a greater share 
of anti-slavery Labor than any other, it would seem that these central frontier counties 
embrace that portion, and yet we have been wholly neglected….I pray you if possible, send 
us a laborer for a short time this fall, one who has a missionary spirit, whose heart and soul is 
in the cause; who will be willing to address small meetings or large ones, who will go from 
neighborhood to neighborhood, from one appointment to another for a few days until this 
half-dead community shall begin to wake up and show signs of life.  68
As this letter, Bingham’s background, and his future public statements denouncing slavery should 
make clear, John Bingham was a staunch abolitionist. Indeed, on March 14, 1854, during his first run 
for Congress, Bingham addressed a gathering in Cadiz. A Democratic newspaper reported him as 
pronouncing that he had now gone “completely over to the abolitionists.”  69
 John Bingham had unusual Constitutional views for the antebellum era. They oozed 
skepticism of states’ rights, and presumed a strong national government. He believed (prior to any 
proposal of a draft of the Fourteenth Amendment) that Congress had “broad authority to regulate the 
territories under Article Four, Section Three,… and that this included the authority to ban slavery.”  70
He also believed that states were “equal in many respects, but they were ‘unequal in the right to do 
wrong,’ and thus did not have an equal right to bring slaves in the territories.”  Bingham believed 71
that the original thirteen states had an unbridgeable right to have slavery since they predated the 
Constitution, but that states admitted after ratification did not have such a right. In other words, he 
believed that federal courts could invalidate laws in some states that were constitutional in the 
original thirteen. Specifically, he believed that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 did not apply to the 
original thirteen states, but did grant Congress the power to oversee state laws in other states. Though 
the Supreme Court disagreed in 1850 in Strader v. Graham,  saying that the Northwest Ordinance 72
no longer applied once a territory became a state, Bingham argued that the Court’s holding was 
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“irrelevant because the principles of the ordinance were adopted in the Bill of Rights.”  Bingham’s 73
invocation of Bill of Rights is the key point here. He concluded that “[t]he Act of 1789 adopting this 
ordinance, as also the amendment incorporating its great principles in the Constitution, were ‘statute 
restrictions upon the institution of new States’ perpetual obligation.”  This view, Magliocca notes, is 74
basis for holding that the Bill of Rights applied to the states as well as the federal government. It 
seems Bingham believed this was possible through Article IV’s Comity Clause. Bingham was 
convinced that the original Constitution imposed an obligation on the states to protect the rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. It was on this view that Bingham based the first draft of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
 After he was reelected to Congress in 1865, Bingham confronted head-on the concerns facing 
the country. General Lee’s surrender in April, 1865, which marked the official end of the Civil War, 
had raised massive questions about the future of the country. Arguably the most important question 
involved the conditions that were to be imposed upon the conquered southern states as the cost of 
readmission to the Union. Bingham, like most Republicans, felt that “the South should be compelled 
to do more to protect the freed slaves.”  He dismissed the claim that the former Confederate States 75
could retain the rights they had prior to the war, as states with significant autonomy. One of 
Bingham’s primary concerns was to guarantee that every “natural born citizen of the United States” 
was “entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens.”  So, when Bingham returned to 76
Congress in December of 1865 for the 39th Congress, he proposed an initial draft of what would 
eventually become the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 However, Bingham’s solo effort was quickly institutionalized when he was appointed to the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction in 1866. In January of 1866, he spoke to Congress: “The Party of 
the Republic proposes only to take security for the future,” and ensuring this security meant refusing 
the “horrid blasphemy…that this is a Government of white men,” and securing “equal and exact 
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justice to all men.”  Bingham’s solution, Magliocca writes, was a constitutional amendment that 77
would “give Congress and the federal courts the authority to enforce fundamental rights.”  78
Specifically, Bingham proposed an amendment that would give Congress the power to pass “all laws 
necessary and proper to secure to all persons—which includes every citizen of every State— their 
equal personal rights.”  Additionally, to prevent rights of citizens of one state not being respected by 79
another state, Bingham wanted the “Federal judiciary clothed with the power to take cognizance of 
the question, and assert those rights by solemn judgment, inflicting upon the offenders such penalties 
as will compel a decent respect for this guarantee to all the citizens of every State.”  In short, 80
Bingham desired an amendment that would massively empower Congress to recognize, define, and 
defend the rights of citizens against encroachment by state governments. 
 Into this amendment, Bingham poured his “basic theory of citizenship, natural rights, and 
constitutional government.”  Specifically, Bingham rejected Justice Taney’s theory from Dred Scott 81
that national citizenship was derivative of state citizenship. Rather, he contended that national 
citizenship and the privileges that came with it existed outside of state citizenship. The first draft 
gave Congress the power to pass “all necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in every 
State of the Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty, and property.”  By doing so, 82
Bingham sought to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship into the Constitutional 
structure. Specifically, Bingham believed that the Comity Clause “pointed away from state-secured 
rights and toward the rights of national citizenship.”  Thus, this first draft represented a nuanced, 83
albeit unusual constitutional theory: that the Comity Clause bound the states to protect and ensure 
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rights that were listed in the federal Bill of Rights.  Importantly, Bingham believed that this new 84
amendment gave Congress no new powers. He believed that Congress already possessed these 
powers under the Comity Clause. However, the failure of the states to respect the rights they were 
already constitutionally bound to protect “justified the addition of an amendment that authorized 
congressional enforcement of enumerated constitutional liberty.”  Bingham addressed Congress: 85
And sir, it is equally clear by every construction of the Constitution, its contemporaneous 
construction, its continued construction, legislative, executive and judicial, that these great 
provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, 
rested for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States. The House 
knows, sir, the country knows, the civilized world knows, that the legislative, executive, and 
judicial officers of element States within this Union within the last five years, in utter 
disregard of these injunctions of your Constitution in utter disregard of that official oath 
which the Constitution required they should severally take and faithfully keep when they 
entered upon the discharge of their respective duties, have violated in every sense of the word 
these provisions of the Constitution of the United States, the enforcement of which are 
absolutely essential to American nationality.  86
Bingham, then, believed strongly that the states were bound to uphold the Bill of Rights both because 
national U.S. citizenship was already more important, and to help protect it.  
 There was, however, strong disagreement over what precisely Bingham’s proposal meant. 
Democratic Congressman Andrew Jackson Rogers thought that the effect of Bingham’s proposed 
amendment was to “take away the power of the States; to interfere with the internal policy and 
regulations of the States: the centralize a consolidated power in the Federal Constitution which our 
fathers never intended should be exercised by it.”  Additionally, radical supporters of Bingham’s 87
proposal relied on theories of unenumerated federal power that had foundations in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania  to define and protect any and all common law civil rights in the states. Some other 88
Republicans insisted that Bingham’s “Article IV-based draft would do nothing more than authorize 
federal enforcement of the Comity Clause of the Article IV as traditionally understood,”  while 89
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Republican Congressman Robert Hale of New York was not convinced. Hale argued that Bingham’s 
proposed amendment “threatened to ‘utterly obliterate State rights and State authority over their own 
internal affairs,’” so the balance of federalism would be disrupted.  Yet other Republicans assumed 90
that the proposed amendment referred not to Article IV and the Bill of Rights, but “to the same 
common law state-protected rights discussed in antebellum cases and treatises.”  91
 Bingham’s views themselves, however, seemed to have evolved. Though he initially claimed 
that Article IV protected a “national set of rights,” which included the Bill of Rights,  as Lash points 92
out, he later adopted the more common view that the first eight amendments “constituted the 
American Bill of Rights.”  This may partially explain why Bingham produced a revised second draft 93
of the Fourteenth Amendment after Congress moved to postpone the full consideration of the 
amendment until April 1866. When Bingham and the other members of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction began to reconsider the amendment, they did so cautiously, since they were fully 
aware that varying interpretations and theories of federalism, national power, natural and civil rights, 
and, thus, citizenship existed in and outside Congress. On April 21, 1866 the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction began to look again at Bingham’s proposal, but they did so “fully aware of their 
colleagues’ objections to national control of common law civil rights.”  Concerns about 94
overreaching federal power through enforcement of civil rights ultimately lead to the demise of 
Bingham’s first draft. In other words, Bingham’s project to institutionalize national citizenship over 
state citizenship was being met with skepticism and objections.  
 The language that Bingham proposed as a second draft survived debate unedited and 
ultimately became Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment:  95
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No States shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any States deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.  96
This second draft reflected Bingham’s ultimate goals to prioritize national over state citizenship by 
protecting the substantive liberties listed in the Bill of Rights from state infringement. Here Bingham 
used language about national citizenship that was not new. Specifically, it used the language “of 
national citizenship and antebellum legal treaties [such as the Louisiana Cession Act] recently 
discussed in widely published statements and congressional speeches.”  This language reflected 97
Bingham’s overall constitutional theory, which legal scholar Richard Aynes suggests has four parts: 
the (1) national citizenship; (2), Bill of Rights; (3) compact, and; (4) enforcement theories.  The first 98
theory, the national citizenship theory, we have already seen. It holds that “the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause [the Comity Clause] of Article IV, Section 2 protects rights of national rather than 
state citizenship.”  This is the theory reflected more precisely in Bingham’s first draft. Bingham 99
believed, as did many other Republicans, that state infringement on rights was an unconstitutional, or 
at very least improper, violation, since there existed rights of national citizenship that should be held 
out of the reach of the states. The second part of Bingham’s theory, the Bill of Rights theory, argues 
“the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens include, at a minimum, the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.”  The third component, the compact theory, holds that “even before the adoption of the 100
Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution prohibited states from abiding the first eight 
Amendments.”  The fourth and final component, the enforcement theory, holds that the Fourteenth 101
Amendment “provides the enforcement power absent from Article IV, Section 2.  In sum, then, it 102
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seems that Bingham may have believed his proposed amendment was redundant, since it reiterated 
and elucidated what he believed was already in the Constitution. However, because others in 
Congress did not share his constitutional theory, the amendment, which was intended to “enforce the 
Bill of Rights against the states,” was necessary to nationalize citizenship, promote the Republican 
agenda, and prevent another civil war.   103
 Senator Trumbull, a moderate Republican and chair of the Judiciary Committee, supported 
Bingham’s proposed amendment. American citizenship, he claimed, “would be little worth if it did 
not carry protection with it.”  Representative James Wilson of Iowa agreed. The federal 104
government, he claimed, must have the power to protect civil rights, since they were derivative of, 
and necessary for the exercise of, natural rights. If the national government did not do this, then the 
“Constitution fails in the first and most important office government.”  Therefore, as legal scholar 105
Stephen Heyman argues, the 1866 debates “make clear that the Framers understood the Civil Rights 
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate a fundamental right to protection by the 
government, with a corresponding obligation on the states to afford such protection.”  106
 Reconstruction, therefore, marked a turning point in notions of state power: the federal 
government, not the states, was now the “main protector of citizens’ rights,” and, as such, the federal 
government took on new responsibilities to recognize citizens specifically and distinctly beyond the 
capacities of state governments.  Richard Aynes suggests that even those who have a narrow view 107
of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment must concede that it was designed to establish a distinct 
set of “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  The Republican purpose of the 108
Reconstruction Amendments, but the Fourteenth Amendment specifically, then was to “preserve their 
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Civil War victory over state sovereignty and slavery, …[and to] establish in law the primacy of 
United States citizenship and with it the primacy of Congress’s authority to secure the rights of 
American citizens.”  The Reconstruction Amendments were, therefore, designed at least in part to 109
recognize and affirm national citizenship over state citizenship.  It was through these amendments, 110
as well through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, that Republicans in Congress imposed upon the nation 
their view of national supremacy: “sovereignty centered in the nation the primacy of citizens’ alliance 
to the nation, the primacy of national citizenship, and the primacy of national authority to secure and 
enforce the civil rights of United States citizens.”   111
Durability of Citizenship: 1868- 1873 
 Reconstruction-era Republicans succeeded at tipping the scales in favor of the Union, and 
prioritizing national citizenship over state citizenship. Not only had the Reconstruction Amendments, 
which reflected their constitutional vision, been ratified, but also other political institutions endorsed 
similar visions for national citizenship. Authority had been redistributed. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, due partially to action taken on the part of Republicans to harness them to their advantage, 
both federal and state courts, but especially lower federal courts, decided cases that endorsed 
Republican understandings of the new Amendments. The Department of Justice also began enforcing 
the federal primary authority over citizenship. Republican ideas about citizenship had, therefore, won 
the day. To use the rhetoric of APD, Republicans had achieved a shift in governing authority. 
However, as Orren and Skowronek make clear, no shift in governing authority, such as this one, is 
permanent precisely because no shift in governing authority occurs in a political vacuum. Rather, 
political development is the story of multiple governing authorities, each failing to entirely displace 
the other. The more complete the displacement, the more durable the shift; the less complete the 
displacement, the less durable the shift. The more fractured the polity, the more difficult it becomes 
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to displace the old institutional arrangement. Orren and Skowronek claim that a “durable shift” is a 
shift “in authority that hold on for a half-century, in the same polity, and within some broader context 
of years, without getting reversed or deflected by other events, are, prima facie, durable in a way that 
shifts that hold for a decade or less are not.”  112
 Given that the U.S. polity is heavily fractured, it would, therefore, be extremely unlikely that 
the shift the Republicans achieved a high level of displacement. So, unsurprisingly, they failed to 
entirely displace the old institution arrangement. The shift the Republicans achieved was broad 
because it was reflected in several political institutions, but it was not deep: they did not vanquish 
other opposing political ideas. Rather, the opposing ideas – in this case Democratic ideas of 
citizenship, federalism, and national and state power – lay dormant for several years while the 
Republican-driven shift exercised what little durability it had, waiting their chance to fight again for 
dominance. The dearth of depth in the Republican-driven shift is the reason it had little durability— 
it lasted less than a decade.  
 The shift in governing authority that resulted from the actions of Reconstruction Republicans 
lasted until 1873. Between 1868 and 1873, state and federal judiciaries, as well as the Department of 
Justice adopted ideas about citizenship that accorded with those of the Republicans. Prior to 1873, 
Kaczorowksi writes, “all federal courts and most state appellate courts evaluating the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 adopted the Republican theory of the thirteenth amendment and found the Act to be 
constitutional.”  Additionally, federal judges and legal officers, “interpreted the fourteenth 113
amendment as a delegation of primary authority to enforce civil rights, regardless of the source of 
infringement,” thus partially the Republican view, which indicated just how little durability this shift 
had.  For example, in United States v. Rhodes,  Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, sitting as a 114 115
Circuit Court Justice, articulated the Republican theory of congressional rights-enforcement 
authority. Prior to the Reconstruction Amendment, Justice Swayne explained, “the power to [define 
 Orren and Skowronek (2003), 129.112
 Kaczorowski (1986): 900.113
 Ibid, 917.114
 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) (No. 16,151).115
Chapter 2  !66
the status and rights of citizens] belonged entirely to the states.”  The amendments, however, 116
“reversed and annulled the original policy of the constitution.”  He reasoned that these amendments 117
conferred upon all inhabitants of the United States a common status and a uniform set of rights as 
U.S. citizens. “What the several states under the original constitution could have done [to define the 
status and secure the rights of U.S. citizens], the nation has done by” Reconstruction Amendments.  118
By upholding the Thirteenth Amendment in this case, Justice Swayne was “[e]mbracing the 
Republicans’ nationalist theory of constitution interpretation.”   119
 Additionally, Kaczorowski notes that every federal judge who considered the 
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, another Republican project, upheld it.  In In re 120
Turner, Justice Salmon Chase upheld the statue and argued that the Thirteenth Amendment 
“establishes freedom as the constitutional right of all persons in the United States.”  Similarly, In 121
United States v. Hall,  future Supreme Court Justice William B. Woods articulated ideas about the 122
Fourteenth Amendment and its relation to national citizenship that were identical to those of the 
Republicans: 
By the original constitution citizenship in the United States was a consequence of citizenship 
in a state. By [the citizenship clause] this order of things is reversed. Citizenship in the 
United States is defined; it is made independent of citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a 
state is a result of citizenship in the United States. So that a person born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is, without reference to state constitutions or 
laws, entitled to all the privileges and immunities secured by the constitution of the United 
Sates to citizens thereof.  123
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And in Georgia v. Stanton,  the Supreme Court refused to overturn the Reconstruction 124
Amendments, citing their lack of jurisdiction over political questions. Federal judges, Kaczorowski 
notes, uniformly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as a “constitutional delegation of 
congressional authority to secure the fundamental rights of citizens,” which would not have been 
possible prior to the amendment.  Though there was no grand ringing endorsement, the judiciary 125
between 1868 and 1873 did uphold Republican ideas about citizenship, federalism, and national and 
state power, suggesting that the Republican-driven project constituted a shift in governing authority 
that had at least a modicum of durability.  
 The Department of Justice (DOJ) also endorsed the Republican understanding of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. Since they were now armed with “judicially sanctioned legal authority 
to secure citizens’ rights,” DOJ attorneys began a crusade against the Ku Klux Klan in 1870.  126
Hundreds of Klansmen were prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned by, importantly, federal courts 
between 1870 and 1873 for “violating citizens’ rights to life and property, to freedom of speech and 
assembly, to keep and bear arms, to equal protection of the laws, and to vote.”   127
 However, as was noted, the shift in governing authority that resulted from the Republican 
project did not entirely displace the old regime. Differing ideas about citizenship remained during 
this period, but they were articulated outside of the dominant narrative. All the while, President 
Andrew Johnson and other Democratic opponents to the Republican ideology “vehemently insisted 
upon the primacy of state citizenship.”  Proponents of the primacy of state citizenship included 128
President Andrew Johnson,  Illinois Representative Anthony Thornton,  Indiana Representative 129 130
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Michael Kerr,  and Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson.  Similarly, the dissent in State v. 131 132
Washington  “stands out for its clear and comprehensive articulation of the Democratic 133
Conservative critique of the Republican theory of congressional civil rights enforcement” and 
national citizenship.  Justice Crokett, writing in dissent, said that if the Reconstruction 134
Amendments have the power the Republicans claim they do, then Congress “has the supreme 
authority over all our civil rights, and may at its discretion change, modify, or abolish all State laws 
relating to personal security or the acquisition and enjoyment of private property, and substitute 
others in their stead, on the pretext that it is necessary to do so in order to secure personal freedom to 
all.”  Justice Crockett believed that the federal government having the primary power to secure 135
rights, thus rejecting state citizenship, was an impermissible violation of federalism. Under these 
powers, Congress may “define tenures of property, regulate the laws of descents, provide appropriate 
remedies for violation of every right of property, and practically supersede all State laws on these 
important subjects.”  If Congress exercised these powers, “the States government had as well be 136
abolished,” since they would have no operative value, Crocket concluded.  Justice Crockett was, 137
here, rejecting the Republican idea of citizenship. Importantly, however, he was dissenting, because 
during this period it was the Republican idea, that of the primacy of national citizenship, held sway. 
Though there was a shift in governing authority that resulted from the Republican project to reaffirm 
the Union and prioritize national over state citizenship, it did not, therefore, entirely, displace the old 
ideational context. This is because the fractured polity allows for old ideas to stay in play, in, for 
example, judicial dissents. The polity allows for these ideas to come back into play, thus producing 
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change endogenously rather than exogenously. These ideas about citizenship were relegated behind 
the dominant idea until 1873, when another ideational shift occurred.  
Conclusion 
 On the eve of the Civil War, contrasting political ideas abounded. These ideas applied to 
slavery, state power, national power, federalism, and citizenship. After the surrender by the southern 
states, Republicans in Congress sought to embed a narrower and consistent set of political ideas that 
followed from the victory of and definition of Union into the fabric of the Constitution. They wanted 
to ensure “Free Labor, Free Soil, Free Men.” This slogan represented an endorsement of the dignity 
of labor and natural rights. Preserving but refining the Union was a necessary part of their project. 
They sought to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship for two reasons. First, they 
believed prioritization of states’ rights was the evil that caused the Civil War, and, second, it was still 
allowing impermissible infringements on civil and labor rights, which was a hindrance to the 
maintenance and preservation of natural rights. Their project took the form of what we know today as 
the Reconstruction Amendments: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These 
amendments tipped the balance of federalism away from the states and towards the national 
government, and marked a shift towards the prioritization of national citizenship. As has been shown, 
this is evident through the work of John Bingham specifically, the drafter of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
 The Republican project in the terminology of APD, produced a durable shift in governing 
authority insofar as Republican ideas were broadly accepted by Congress and judicial authority (and 
inasmuch as opposition to them by the executive resulted, in part, in impeachment). The political 
ideas of Republicans achieved dominance, and a new concept of national citizenship had been 
implemented. However, it was not a durable shift. Due to the fractured nature of the American polity, 
dissenters that rejected the primacy of national citizenship were allowed to harbor their ideas in other 
ways. As has been explained, because political change never happens in a vacuum, the Republican 
project was not immune to challenge. Eric Foner has argued that the project of Reconstruction was 
eventually derailed by the economic downturn of the 1870s, an exogenous shock. However, as has 
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been foreshadowed here, there may be another reason. Specifically, the Republican project for 
national citizenship fell victim to the constitutional design of the fractured polity. Their ideas did 
indeed achieve dominance for a short period, between 1868 and 1873. Opposing ideas about the 
future of the nation, federal power, and citizenship lay in repose, however, waiting for their moment 
to return to the spotlight and fight again for dominance. Dissenting ideas of citizenship soon lay siege 
to the Republican project. They sought to deconstruct what the Republicans had built, and embed a 
different idea in the dominant institutional framework. Reconstruction-era Republicans did not have 
the final word on the subject of U.S. citizenship — far from it. The Republican ideas merely found 
solid footing for a brief period. 
Chapter 3 
Incomplete Institutionalization of the Shift: Challenging Reconstruction Constitutionalism 
  
In the midst of Reconstruction, the Republicans tried desperately to complete their project to 
establish the federal government as the primary protector of citizenship rights. Implementing their 
new vision for the country required quite a bit of luck, and substantial work due to the fragmented 
and complicated nature of the institutions that make up the American state. With the passage of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, they had achieved a major milestone for the pragmatic and practical 
needs of reincorporating the southern states back into the Union, as well as a significant victory for 
institutionalizing their vision for national and state power, federalism, and citizenship. However, as 
highlighted in Chapter 1, Scheingate reminds us the American polity is a complex entity full of 
overlapping and conflicting institutions.  Because of this fragmentation, achieving fuller 1
institutionalization and a durable shift in governing authority would require more than the 
Reconstruction Amendments – it would require multiple federal institutions, state institutions, and 
social movements to endorse the Republican view of citizenship and federal balance.  
 In fact, what appears to have been a string of Republican victories in the name of a new 
vision of citizenship, i.e., the passage of the Amendments, the passage of Civil Rights Acts to protect 
the newly freedmen, and the impeachment of an obstructionist president, together actually reveal that 
the Republican project was under siege from the start, so they never operated from a place of 
strength. It also reveals the degree to which the institutional structure of American governance 
challenges the rise, implementation, and entrenchment of new ideas. Achieving a shift in governing 
authority that could stand the test of time became significantly harder than Republicans anticipated, 
not only because pockets of ideational dissent remained and were growing, but also because the 
institutional structures of governance provided harbor for these contrary notions. Each attempt by 
Republicans to entrench their vision in the institutional structure was challenged. But, Reconstruction 
is not just a story of Radical Republicans slowly being displaced over time, challenged by more 
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moderate visions and ultimately unseated by exogenous shocks such as the Panic of 1873. Rather, the 
Radicals and their vision were challenged from the start given the institutional design in which they 
operated and which they did not remake. Republicans layered their policies upon old ones, which 
resulted in the frictions that proved problematic for them. They “‘graft[ed]… new elements onto an 
otherwise stable institutional framework.’”  Republicans responded with multiple attempts to 2
entrench their vision in the face of ideational opposition, each more desperate than the last. This story 
reveals a paradoxical picture: though the Republicans ideals were victorious on the battlefield in 
Civil War, they did not win after the Civil War. Reconstruction is not a story of triumphant 
Republicans instituting the vision that won the war. Rather, Republicans layered their constitutional 
vision on an institutional structure that would ultimately thwart their shift in governing authority. 
From the start, their vision was challenged— first by the President, and his obstruction was overcome 
via impeachment. Then their definition of national citizenship in the newly proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment failed, unable to secure the necessary support from three-quarters of the states. To meet 
that challenge, the Republican Congress employed procedural anomalies that call the legitimacy of 
the Amendment into question. In the face of this obstruction and as their electoral coalition began to 
crumble, the Republicans sought to guard their vision by ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, 
and then passing a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871. Finally, as the Supreme Court dealt 
a final blow to Radical vision in 1873 with its ruling in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the increasingly 
besieged Republican Congress attempted one last-ditch effort to entrench their vision in the 
institutional structure of the US polity by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In short, once all of 
the institutional barriers to the new Republican vision of national citizenship are assessed, 
Republican efforts look far less like the actions of victors. Instead they reveal just how difficult it was 
to dislodge a resilient idea of citizenship so opposed and despised by the Radicals. 
 As was shown in the previous chapter, the Republicans did succeed at spreading their vision 
of citizenship across several institutions. Their vision for the prioritization of national citizenship 
over state citizenship was implemented horizontally— across the Department of Justice and parts of 
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the federal judiciary. It also saw temporary partial institutionalization vertically— in some state 
judiciaries, legislatures, and bureaucracies. Yet Democrats continued challenge national citizenship 
by prioritizing state power and rejecting national power. Because of this ideational pushback and the 
actions its entrepreneurial proponents pursued, the Republican vision for citizenship and federal 
power amounts to what political scientist Richard Valelly has called “incomplete 
institutionalization.”  Why was there incomplete institutionalization? What was happening in the 3
states and at the popular movements during this time? Where were dissenting ideas harbored?  
 Whether it was explicit racism or if it was an externality of their belief in the primacy of state 
citizenship, Democratic efforts intended to deny blacks full membership of the political community. 
But after the Civil War, these older ideas about citizenship did not die— they reappeared and found 
voice in new places. Zones of ideational dissent about citizenship remained, and entrepreneurial 
actors seized them without challenge, so the Republican project crumbled. Specifically, during 
Reconstruction two features of the U.S. polity specifically created domains where the ideas about 
citizenship that conflicted with Republican visions could find voice: state governments and social 
movements. This argument attempts to bridge the divide between the two schools of American 
Political Development as Brian Glenn has described them.  The gap between “historical 4
institutionalism” (the first school) and “ideational approaches” (the second) is narrowed by the 
broader argument in this chapter that ideational development in the polity is related strongly to 
institutional development over time. Though Republicans had achieved what might have appeared to 
be a durable shift in governing authority by altering the language of the Constitution itself, they 
layered this shift upon the existing systems of federalism and democracy. As a result, dissenting ideas 
exploited the frictional gaps and found strong footing to challenge the Republican-driven shift. As 
was explained in chapter one, it is a feature of the U.S. polity than these zones even exist— states 
and social movements both factor into the “complex” nature of the U.S. polity Adam Scheingate 
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describes.  The U.S. constitutional structure, in fact, relies on social movements to maintain 5
democratic legitimacy so there is always a place where disfavored ideas can rest in repose and 
potentially unsettle the seeming dominant and durable ideas. Similarly, states can act, in the words of 
Supreme Court Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Louis Brandeis, as “laboratories” for democracy 
and policy.  Importantly, it is a feature of the federalist system specifically that states can endorse and 6
institutionalize non-dominant political ideas. As legal theorist Heather Gerken suggests, federalism 
promotes voice by offering a place where non-dominant ideas can be institutionalized outside of the 
national institutional arrangement.  Gerken reminds us that federalism “promotes choice, fosters 7
competition, facilitates participation, enables experimentation, and wards off a national Leviathan.”  8
She explains how a key component of the federalism system in the U.S. is its ability to allow what 
she has called “dissenting by deciding.” This occurs when “would-be dissenters— individuals who 
hold a minority view within the polity as a whole—enjoy a local majority on a decisionmaking body 
and can thus dictate the outcome.”  By providing places where old, minority, or disfavored ideas can 9
find voice, the structure of the U.S. polity itself allows for the recirculation of political ideas.  
 After the Civil War, Republicans tried and failed to build what Orren and Skowronek call a 
durable shift in governing authority.  They did indeed succeed at building a shift— but not a durable 10
one, because the vision Congressional Republicans had was under siege from the moment it began. 
This chapter analyzes how the states, social movements, and indeed the President acted as zones of 
ideational dissent by harboring non-dominant ideas about citizenship while the Republican-driven 
shift held sway. Gradually, ideas about citizenship that challenged Republican notions began to erode 
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the dominance of the Republican ideas.. After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was 
constant ideational dissent from multiple places, and the political actors that held those ideas 
exploited the fragmented nature of the U.S. polity to attack the Republican project. The Republican 
project was challenged first by President Andrew Johnson, then by the states’ refusal to pass the 14th 
amendment, then by popular social movements such as the KKK, and finally by the Supreme Court. 
The Republicans took action every time to eliminate the threat to their vision, but they ultimately fell 
victim to the federalist institutional structure of separated powers. The complicated, convoluted, 
fragmented, and overlapping nature of the U.S. polity makes ideational stability impossible. To 
illustrate this notion, this chapter begins with a discussion of what Richard Valelly calls 
“Reconstruction Constitutionalism,” which refers to the Republican ideas described in the previous 
chapter—that national citizenship should be prioritized over state citizenship and that the federal 
government should take a more active role in protecting the rights of citizens from infringement by 
states and by other people. Second, I discuss the ratification process of the Fourteenth Amendment. A 
victorious and dominant Republican party that had just successfully eliminated a dissenting President 
Johnson might seem to have an easy time ratifying an amendment that reflected their vision for union 
and national citizenship. However, hamstrung at every turn, Republicans implemented some dubious 
constitutional maneuvering to get the Fourteenth Amendment ratified.  
 Third, this chapter discusses the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson. President 
Johnson was one of the most prominent ideational dissenters; he had to be impeached if Radicals 
were to entrench their vision. Fourth, Republicans realized their project was incomplete in the early 
1870s. Zones of ideational dissent remained. I discuss a two-pronged attack the Republicans faced in 
the late-1860s and early 1870s. It came both from (1) the states in the form of Black Codes, and (2) 
from the people themselves in the form of political violence and intimidation. Southerners articulated 
their dissenting political ideas through a social movement: the Ku Klux Klan. The KKK contested 
emergent Republican conceptions of citizenship with violence and terror. The KKK served as a 
temporary stronghold of older notions of limited citizenship and collectively acted as a political 
entrepreneur by exploiting the frictional gaps in the formal institutional structure to bring the ideas 
back into play. To respond to these attacks and give further life to their project, the Republicans 
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pushed the Fifteenth Amendment through the ratification process, and passed three statutes that gave 
life to that Amendment and put it to work protecting the new rights of national citizenship from 
infringement in the states. These statutes were the (1) Enforcements Act of 1870, (2) the Enforcement 
Act of 1871, and (3) the Second Enforcement Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. 
Fifth, this chapter explains how incomplete institutionalization led to the downfall of the Republican 
project. This chapter focuses on one example that demonstrates there was incomplete 
institutionalization of the Republican project. Racial animus and the re-establishment of interracial 
marriage bans in state governments, after very brief periods where they were often considered to be 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment between 1868 and 1871 show that the Republicans failed to 
fully embed their vision for union and national citizenship across the complex and fragmented U.S. 
polity. State laws regulating “miscegenation” ran directly counter to the more egalitarian ideals of the 
Republican party. These laws sought to preserve the “racial purity” of the white population, and they 
rejected the idea that non-whites could hold equal citizenship status to whites. Importantly, to justify 
the legitimacy of these laws, their proponents drew on states’ rights arguments to justify their 
legitimacy, and condemned the Republican project to prioritize national citizenship over state 
citizenship. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which, I 
argue, was a final, desperate attempt by the Republicans to institutionally entrench their vision for 
Union national citizenship.  
Republicans and Reconstruction Constitutionalism 
 With the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Republican-
dominated Congress emancipated the slaves and proclaimed that national citizenship should now be 
prioritized over state citizenship. However, they did not stop there. In order to both fully 
institutionalize their vision and to more fully protect the ideals they had instituted, further action on 
the part of the federal government was necessary. Robert Kaczorowski writes that national authority 
over citizenship was now primary because “national rather than state citizenship now determined the 
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status and rights of individuals as citizens.”  As a result, Congress, as opposed to state governments, 11
was now authorized to secure the rights of citizens “in any manner that it deemed appropriate, 
consistent with the Constitution.”  Political scientist Pamela Brandwein shows how the 12
disagreement between Reconstruction-era Republicans and Democrats over what precisely was “the 
problem” of slavery animated Reconstruction constitutionalism.  Democrats saw “the problem” to 13
be remedied by formal emancipation, but the Republicans were not so sure. Republicans dismissed 
the notion that “formal emancipation was a clean break with the past.”  For them, slavery was still 14
alive in the postwar South, even after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Racially 
motivated crimes were among the continuing threats of what Republicans believed to be “the 
problem” of slavery. Brandwein points out that some speeches by both Moderate and Radical 
Republicans, despite the formal (legal) prohibition of slavery, refer simultaneously to the end of 
slavery and to the continuation of it. Republicans, then, saw situations in which states and popular 
actions treated blacks poorly by limiting their social and political rights as part of “the problem” that 
Reconstruction was trying to remedy. They believed that simple formal emancipation as achieved in 
the Thirteenth Amendment was insufficient to remedy the problem. 
 The Republicans could not watch states enact statutes limited the social and political rights of 
blacks, both previously free and newly emancipated (states later did with poll taxes, literacy tests, 
grandfather clauses, as well as violence and intimidation) and do nothing. Unless rules were 
established that prohibited states from disenfranchising black men, southern states would gain a great 
advantage in political strength. Under a population-based apportionment scheme, black citizens 
would count for assessing the total number of representatives a state had in the House of 
Representatives. Thus, Brandwein notes, “Southern states would gain political power at the national 
Robert J. Kaczorowski. The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice and 11
Civil Rights, 1866-1876. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005), 3.
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level by using a black population that they were disenfranchising at home.”  In general, Republicans 15
believed that the political process needed protection from future abuse by ex-Confederates who 
“sought to accomplish by legislation what could not be accomplish on the battlefield.”  Ex-16
Confederates may have accepted the legality of the Thirteenth Amendment and the formal 
emancipation it required, but, Representative Sydney Perham of Maine said, “they still believe that 
slavery is the best condition for the colored race, and it is but reasonable to suppose that as far as 
possible this idea would, if they were allowed to govern, be embodied in law, and carried out in their 
intercourse with the colored people.”  Therefore, for both ideological and political reasons, 17
declaring the national citizenship would now be prioritized over state citizenship in the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments was not enough— they would also have to ensure citizenship continued 
to be defined this way by using the arm of the federal government to protect the new national 
citizenship from infringement. 
 However, as many noted, using the federal government in this way could destroy American 
federalism. As Kaczorowski writes, “the supremacy of national sovereignty so centralized power in 
the national government that the states as separate and autonomous political entities could have been 
destroyed.”  Importantly, however, Republicans were no doubt aware of this concern and, 18
consequently, made it clear that they did not want to destroy federalism. Brandwein cogently 
explains that answering the question “did Republicans intend to protect freemen’s rights at the 
expense of traditional limits on federalism?” either negatively or affirmatively rather misses the point 
because it overlooks important nuances. She explains that if the “traditional federal system” refers to 
“state authority over civil rights (the nineteenth-century definition of civil rights and the Bill of 
Rights, as practiced before the war and as defined by the Court in Barron [v. Baltimore (1833)] ,” 19
which held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states, then Republicans expressed the goal of 
 Ibid, 51.15
 Ibid, 52.16
 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1628: 2084.17
 Kaczorowski (2005), 3.18
 32 U.S. 243.19
Chapter 3  !79
changing it.  On the other hand, if the “traditional federal system” refers to “a general notion of 20
limited government, then the Republicans wanted to keep this system.”  Republicans did not want to 21
do away with the principle of separation of powers in government by leaving some duties up to the 
states. What they did, however, was reorient it so the states could not tread on the rights of national 
citizenship as expressed in the Bill of Rights and through the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 Federalism itself was preserved, and robustly so, but Republicans imagined a new, 
reorganized federalism that redefined the “lines of jurisdiction between national and state 
authority.”  Foner elaborates on this new boundary by explaining that Republicans believed that 22
only when states failed to protect citizens’ rights (of national citizenship) would federal action be 
necessary.  It became clear that the Republicans wished states to respect free speech, press, jury, and 23
protection from cruel and unusual punishments. Without these guarantees, Republican Senator 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts proclaimed, “emancipation will be only half done. It is our duty to 
see it wholly done.”  Brandwein argues that Republicans interpreted Lincoln’s belief in Unionism 24
(the belief that a state cannot legally secede) in a unique and important way.  Namely, Republicans 25
used it to legitimize federal oversight of matters that had belonged to the states before the war. The 
dilemma presented to them, however, was that most of the rights they sought to protect with federal 
power “had always been state concerns.”  The Republican project to secure rights of national 26
citizenship with the power of the federal government “raised the specter of an undue ‘centralization’ 
of power.”  To counter these criticisms, the Republicans reiterated their stance on the improper use 27
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of state power before and during the war. Improper exercise of state power, they said, was what 
caused the war in the first place.  
 Political scientist Richard Valelly describes this Republican project to institutionalize national 
citizenship over and above state citizenship as “Reconstruction constitutionalism.”  This doctrine 28
held that the constitution was not merely a set of limits on government, but was rather a “source of 
sovereign, positive, regulatory government able to establish and enforce national rights.”  Adherents 29
of this “nationalist sensibility,” Valelly writes, envisioned a “potent reserve power” in the U.S. 
government for protecting the rights of national citizenship when they were being tread upon in the 
states.  For a time, the Republican vision appeared to be gaining traction. During the mid to 30
late-1860s, national citizenship as embodied and pushed for by the Republicans in Congress took 
precedence by being embedded in multiple institutions. State and federal appellate judges, for 
example, “generally held that the citizenship and privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporate natural rights, including Bill of Rights guarantees, as nationally enforceable 
rights of the newly defined American citizenship.”  They also held that these rights were to be 31
secured by national power. Prior to 1873, when there was a turning point in how judges defined 
citizenship (which will be discussed at length in the next chapter), both federal and state appellate 
court decisions “generally acknowledged that a revolution in federal citizenship had been wrought by 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments” and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  This is evident in 32
cases like United State v. Rhodes.  Additionally, the Republican vision become embedded in the 33
institutions of the U.S. Army and the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned lands, otherwise 
know as the Freedmen’s Bureau. Under the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July, 1866, and from a war 
powers argument, federal officers were instructed to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the ideals 
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of the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Republican vision generally. Federal officers from the 
Freedmen’s Bureau tasked with arresting persons who were charged with offenses against citizens 
“in cases where the civil authorities have failed, neglected, or are unable to arrest and bring such 
parties to trail…” and bring them to trial in the federal courts.  However, there was significant 34
pushback against federal enforcement that hindered the ability of federal officers to protect the rights 
of national citizenship. This pushback came from every direction— the states, local governments, 
state courts, the people themselves, and the federal executive. The Republican project to embed their 
vision of national citizenship in the institutional structure of the U.S. polity, and thus create a durable 
shift in governing authority, was under siege.  
Ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
 The ratification process of the first two Reconstruction Amendments reflects this challenge. 
Upon learning that their vision was under attack, congressional Republicans implemented some 
highly unusual (or even suspect) constitutional maneuvering. To further bolster their vision and 
embed the prioritization of national citizenship, the Republicans proposed the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As was explained in the previous chapter, the Fourteenth Amendment itself reflected 
the Republican vision for union, federalism, and national citizenship. Ratifying the Amendment, 
however, was not an easy process. Congressional Republicans understood that their project was 
under siege from the start. Embedding their vision in the constitutional framework therefore required 
some defensive maneuvering— not the easy, smooth ratification that might appear to follow from a 
victorious and dominant Republican party. From 1861 until 1875, both houses of congress were held 
by Republicans.  Because of this, passing the Fourteenth Amendment and sending it to the states for 35
ratification might appear easy. On the contrary, however. Republicans were challenged here, too.  
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 In 1864 and early 1865, Reconstruction was at its zenith. The second session of the Thirty-
Eight Congress was indeed, as Foner puts it, a “historic occasion.”  In 1865, the Senate approved the 36
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery throughout the Union, with a vote of 38 to 6. 
However, it failed to garner the required two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives. But on 
on January 31, 1865, the Amendment passed this threshold in the House with a vote of 119 to 56 and 
it was forwarded to the states for ratification. Foner chronicles its passage: 
The vote set off wild cheering in the galleries, while Congressmen “joined in the shouting…
[and] wept like children. The following morning [activist and abolitionist Edward] Atkinson 
dated a letter, “Year 1 of American Independence.”  37
When the Amendment was approved in Congress, delegates from 25 states were counted in the 
Senate, and delegates from 27 states were counted in the House. Importantly, house members and 
senators purporting to represent the defeated southern states, however, were not included in the floor 
votes for either chamber. On February 1, 1865, the Amendment was then forwarded to the states for 
ratification in accordance with Article V of the Constitution. On December 18, 1865, however, when 
Secretary of State William Seward proclaimed that the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified 
because it had passed the requisite threshold of three-fourths of the states, the defeated southern 
states were included. At that time, he asserted there were 36 states in the Union.  Curiously, then, the 38
southern states were simultaneously both counted and not counted in the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  
 This occurred because the Southern states were not represented in Congress. Two weeks 
earlier, on December 4, 1865, when the Thirty-Ninth Congress met for the first time, the Republican 
majority, sensing a threat from the Southern states and their delegates, rejected admission of all but a 
single Southern state, Tennessee.  Indeed, as legal scholar Bruce Ackerman points out, by the end of 39
its deliberations, the Thirty-Ninth Congress had “publicly declared that ‘no legal state governments’ 
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existed in the other ten states of the South.”  Legal historian Akhil Amar explains that Congress 40
continued to operate without widespread Southern representation until mid-1868. But in 1866, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was proposed.  
 The Fourteenth Amendment passed the Senate on June 8, 1866 and the House on June 13, 
1866, by votes of 33-11 and 120-32, respectively. Importantly, however, this Article 5 hurdle would 
not have been cleared, Amar notes, had the eighty Southern members been present. The Fourteenth 
Amendment only passed through Congress because the Republicans excluded the Southern states 
from participating, not because the Republicans were necessarily dominant. On June 22, 1866, the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment was forwarded to the states for ratification. But here, yet again, 
the Republicans were challenged. The states to whom the proposed Amendment was forwarded 
included the states whose members had been excluded from Congress. And so, by December, 1866, 
seven southern states had rejected the proposed amendment, but by February 1867, that number had 
climbed to ten.   41
 Despite their comfortable majority in Congress, Republicans were far from being wholly 
dominant. They were under siege. The tricky constitutional maneuvering they had used to exclude 
southern states from Congress in order to push forward their vision for union and national citizenship 
was not enough. The Republicans continued to be hamstrung by Democratic opposition from the 
South. To fight back, the Republicans employed yet more questionable constitutional maneuvering. 
Several options were proposed in Congress. They included three points that seemed “fully settled” 
among Republican leaders: (1) existing Southern governments should be replaced; (2) “rebels” (ex-
Confederate leaders and Democrats) should hold no place in those new governments; and (3) “the 
negroes should vote.”  More radical proposals were floated around, however, including “widespread 42
disenfranchisement, martial law for the South, confiscation, and impeachment of the President.”  43
 Ibid, citing Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428-429 (1867).40
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First, Radical Republicans in Congress moved to seize the legislative initiative. Representative 
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania introduced a bill that would require the Southern government to 
hold constitutional conventions, “elected by manhood suffrage with the exception of former 
Confederates, who would be deprived of citizenship for five years.”  Next, Republican James 44
Ashley of Ohio proposed a yet more radical idea— sweeping away the Southern governments 
entirely. John Bingham, however, found these proposals too radical. They treated white Southerners 
as “alien enemies.”  What was needed, the moderate Republicans argued, was not a hasty, forceful 45
decimation of Southern power and autonomy in favor of Republican ideals. Rather, only a 
“prolonged period of federal control would enable loyal public opinion [to the Republicans] to sink 
deep roots and permit ‘Northern capital and labor, Northern energy and enterprise’ to venture South, 
there to establish ‘a Christian civilization and a living democracy.’”  As Foner chronicles, 46
Representative George Julian of Indiana suggested that the South should be “governed directly from 
Washington and only readmitted at ‘some indefinite future time’ when its ‘political and social 
elements’ had been thoroughly transformed.”   47
 Julian’s speech, Foner notes, struck a chord in Congress.  The Joint Committee on 48
Reconstruction quickly approved a bill to transform the Southern states into military districts. For the 
moderates, military rule of the southern states was, as Curtis points out, a “distasteful constitutional 
anomaly.”  Republicans, Curtis continues, only accepted it with substantial misgivings. John 49
Bingham, however, had an idea. On February 12, 1867, Representative John Bingham proposed that 
the southern states be readmitted on the condition that they ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and 
establish black suffrage.  And so the Reconstruction Acts were born in the spring and summer of 50
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1867. These statutes transformed the ten Southern states (all eleven, minus Tennessee) into five 
military districts and placed the Union army in control of their transition back to statehood.  Without 51
explicitly decimating the southern state government, the Reconstruction Act of 1867 laid out steps for 
states to take to establish new governments that could be recognized by Congress. In effect, the 
Republicans in Congress were conditioning the readmission of each state to the Union upon that 
state’s ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 Foner argues that the Reconstruction Act of 1867 reflected the circumstances of its creation. 
It did not arise out of purely ideological reasons. The Republicans were not riding a wave of support 
for their principles and Reconstruction generally. Rather, it reflected the pragmatic and practical 
necessity of “finding a program upon which two thirds of Congress could agree and the Northern 
electorate would support, and the deeply held beliefs and prejudices that places limits upon 
Congressional action.”  Passing the Fourteenth Amendment was not an easy task because the 52
Republicans faced significant obstacles and vehement opposition. By expelling the Southern states 
from Congress, and then conditioning their readmission both to Congress and the Union upon 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican principles of national citizenship and 
federal power, the Republican Congress was employing creative and questionable constitutional 
maneuvering that did not reflect a place of strength. Rather, it showed the Republicans were 
operating from a place of weakness because their project was under siege.  
The Vision Under Siege: The Impeachment of President Andrew Johnson 
 The next attack on the Republican project came not from the states, but from the President. 
On January 8th, 1867, Republican Senator George Williams of Oregon stood before the Senate and 
proposed that the President report any violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the Senate. His 
proposal was agreed to:  
 Resolved: That the President be requested to inform the Senate if any violated of the 
act entitled “An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights and furnish 
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the means of their vindication” [the Civil Rights Act of 1866]  have come to his knowledge, 
and if so what steps if any have been taken by him to enforce the law and punish the 
offenders.  53
And so, early in 1867 President Johnson reported to Congress. Generals Grant and Howard submitted 
to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton a list of 440 violations. Secretary Stanton, Kaczorowski notes, 
was the only member of President Johnson’s cabinet who supported federal enforcement of national 
citizenship.  This was not the entire story, however. There would undoubtedly have been more than 54
440 violation had federal agents not been requested to only report violations of certain sections of the 
law— namely, section 4, 8, and 9.  Nonetheless, the 440 violations that were reported were 55
condemned within the administration. The Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, considered the 
reported violates to be “an omnigatherum of newspaper gossip, rumors of negro murders, 
neighborhood strifes and troubles…vague, indefinite party scandal and General Howard and his 
agents had picked up…”  Secretary of the Interior, Orville Browning, accused General Howard and 56
his agents of collecting exaggerated claims in a “mean [and] malicious” attempt to force President 
Johnson to 
send out to the country, endorsed by him as facts, these prejudiced and in many instances 
false, and in almost all exaggerated statements, or place himself, by refusing to send them to 
Congress, in a position where they could falsifly [sic] but plausibly charge him with the 
suppression of the facts.  57
As a result of these accusations and the President’s own partisan leanings, the number of violations 
ultimately presented to Congress was a mere three. Kaczorowski suggests that by doing so, President 
Johnson wished to convey the message that “local authorities in the South were adequately securing 
freemen’s rights and that the federal presence there was unnecessary.”  Johnson’s political ideas 58
were becoming clear: he held a different idea about federal protection of citizenship rights than did 
 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d sess., p. 326. 53
 Kaczorowski (2005), 33.54
 Kaczorowski (2005), Chapter 2, n. 27.55
 Ibid, 33, citing Howard K. Beale, ed., The Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. 3 (Boston, 1911): 42-44.56
 Ibid, citing Orville H. Browning, The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning, Vol. 2 (Springfield, Ill., 1933): 130.57
 Ibid, 33.58
Chapter 3  !87
Republicans in Congress. Johnson and his administration, it seemed, were pushing back on the 
Republicans, thus becoming a significant obstacle to full institutionalization of the Republican 
vision.  
 For Republicans, Johnson embodied the first mortal threat to the durability of the shift in 
governing authority they had built. Racism, although important, was not, Kaczorowski argues, the 
sole factor determining Johnson and his administration’s stance on federal rights enforcement and 
national citizenship. Rather, Johnson’s political philosophy drew on ideas that preferred state 
citizenship to be prioritized over national citizenship. He championed states’ rights and Democratic 
Conservative political ideas. The stance his administration took on federal rights enforcement 
rendered the “federal enforcement of the civil rights of Southern blacks and Republicans at the 
expense of the local authority of Southern Democrats antithetical to its political interests and political 
values.”  The Johnson administration’s stance discouraged federal officers from actively enforcing 59
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and promoting national citizenship. The attorney general “consistently 
refused to instruct” other federal officers about the duties and and responsibilities they had under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.  By leaving federal officers to act on their own, the attorney general 60
induced inaction in federal rights enforcement. Johnson was a “remarkably activist” president.  By 61
enacting executive orders and by allowing old provisions to collapse, Johnson “simply cleared away 
Congress’s earlier Reconstruction policy.”  Within the state apparatus, the Republican vision was 62
operating from a weak, defensive position. 
 Republicans, then, needed to eliminate the threat. The Fourteenth Amendment itself acted as 
a campaign platform for the elections in 1866. Republicans hoped voters would see it as an 
alternative to Johnson’s policy, and it seems they did. Republicans won massive gains in that 
election.  Political Scientist Rick Valelly shows how they moved to beat Johnson by drastically 63
 Ibid, 38.59
 Ibid, 39.60
 Valelly (2004), 24.61
 Ibid, 26.62
 Ibid, 30.63
Chapter 3  !88
expanding the party’s electoral coalition to include southerners. Congressional Republicans managed 
to “forcefully” establish a “new, politically winning coalition that joined together about seven 
hundred thousand black southern men and the northern white male Republican electorate” to help 
preserve their dominance and protect their policies.  Doing so was in a way a method for the 64
Republicans to make their shift in governing authority more durable. The “coalition of 1867-1868,” 
as Valelly calls it, was created through land reform policy, use of the military to enable black suffrage 
in the South, the creation of “soldier-citizenship” for black men, “educational and religious 
emancipation,” and mobilizing regional voters.  65
 The Republican Party responded to the threat that Johnson’s hostility posed by “expanding its 
electoral coalition and building a cross-sectional organization.”  Despite their efforts, Johnson 66
continued to threaten the Republican vision. They had not eliminated the threat. Valelly points out 
that by this point, Republicans has run out of electoral options to use against Johnson. In order to 
protect their vision and further ensure national citizenship could be embedded in state institutions, 
Republicans impeached and tried Johnson in February of 1868. Johnson was brought up on eleven 
articles of impeachment. Nine hinged on Johnson’s removal of Secretary of War Stanton, who had 
been appointed by Lincoln and was sympathetic with the Republican project, and the two others 
“charged the President with denying the authority of Congress and attempting to bring it ‘into 
disgrace.’”  None of the charges, though, reflected the real reason Republicans sought to relieve 67
Johnson of his duties: “his political outlook, the way he had administered the Reconstruction Acts, 
and his sheer incompetence.”  By impeaching Johnson, the Republicans had eliminated the next 68
threat to their vision of achieving a durable shift in governing authority.  
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 After the impeachment, however, Republicans realized that simply declaring national 
citizenship to be prioritized over state citizenship in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was 
not enough. They faced yet more attacks, and would have to take further steps to ensure the 
enforcement of their ideals. The Republican project that began with the Reconstruction Amendments, 
therefore, took shape in the form of the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871. 
Extending the Republican Vision: Legislation of National Citizenship 
 The Enforcements Acts of 1870 and 1871 were enacted by the Republican Congress as a 
defense measure to protect their shift in governing authority against a two-pronged attack. The acts 
served as means for further embedding their vision for union and national citizenship in the 
institutional structure in the face of challenges from the states and from the people themselves. Until 
the mid-1870s, it largely manifested itself in attempts to use state power to limit the political and civil 
rights of blacks through Black Codes.The second prong of the attack, the attack from the people, took 
the form of popular social movements that vehemently opposed the Republican project. Specifically, 
the rise of the Ku Klux Klan as a social movement that used violence and intimidation to fight 
against the institutionalization of national citizenship reflects this attack. Both types of attacks on the 
Republican project were done in the name of state power (as opposed to national power), anti-
Republicans, pro-Democrats, and pro-state citizenship. The unifying theme of these attacks was their 
rejection of federal protection of national citizenship in favor of a state’s ability to define the 
meaning and parameters of its citizenship. Importantly, though, each type of attack was only possible 
because of the unique nature of the U.S. polity. Both federalism and social movements are necessary 
parts of the fragmented and complex American state.  
1. Under Siege by the States: Black Codes and Election Laws 
 Decentralized power and overlapping jurisdiction is a feature of American state structure. 
Interestingly, however, it provides unique and robust opportunities for dissenting ideas to find voice 
in the polity, and reach a level of institutionalization that otherwise would be impossible. Legal 
scholar Heather Gerken points out that in America, we offer more to minorities than the rights to 
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speak and vote: we offer them federalism. Federalism, Gerken argues, can serve as a robust 
mechanism for minorities to institutionalize opposition and dissenting views.  
 By providing a mechanism for dissenting voices to find voice, federalism allows minorities to 
rule: they can exercise rule without sovereignty.  Gerken’s describes federalism as a mechanism for 69
dissenters to exercise power. She points first to the obvious examples: states in America, and to cities 
within those states. States have differing policies. Some states have polices distinctly different from 
what may come close to a national consensus on an issue. Gerken points out that when examining 
disputes between states and the federal government, courts often “turn to functional accounts that are 
keyed to the role states play in preserving a well-functioning democracy.”  Though Gerken 70
acknowledges that cities are often included in accounts of federalism, she asks why we have not 
moved farther. “Indeed, some think that localities represent better sites for pursuing federalism’s 
values because they are closer to the people, offer more realistic options for voting with one’s feet, 
and map more closely onto communities of interest.”  We can thus look at these various local 71
governing bodies as “governing separate and apart from the state, just as proponents of sovereignty 
envision states governing separate and apart from the nation. We can think of cities as meaningful 
exit options for minorities, just as we do with states.”  Why not push federalism all the way down? 72
Why not view a governing body such as a school board, a PTA, or a local zoning conference as sites 
ripe for inclusion in our federalism? Gerken’s federalism all-the-way-down incorporates these small 
local bodies into a tally of our federalist institutions. These institutions, she says, rule without 
sovereignty.  The phenomenon she calls dissenting by deciding thus occurs: “would-be dissenters—73
individuals who hold a minority view within the polity as a whole—enjoy a local majority on a 
decision making body and can thus dictate the outcome.”  In the U.S. polity, therefore, dissenting 74
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ideas and minority rule can exist and can be institutionalized outside of the national government. 
Gerken’s account of federalism points out that those who hold dissenting or different political ideas 
can exercise voice and rule outside of the national legislature, and, in fact, federalism guarantees this 
by offering institutionalization of those ideas.  
 During Reconstruction, the states did precisely that. The states acted as zones where ideas 
about citizenship that disaccorded with the Republican project of union, national power, and national 
citizenship could find voice and institutionalization. They did this by enacting legislation that 
rejected the Republican project, and exhibited a firm belief that state citizenship should be prioritized 
over national citizenship. Many states wanted to maintain control of their citizenry by defining its 
boundaries themselves. Laws limiting the political and economic rights of newly-freed blacks were 
one way for the states to do so.  
 As a response to the Civil War and the emancipation of slaves by the Thirteenth Amendment, 
many states passed Black Codes. These codes were a series of state laws that intended to define the 
newly-freedmen’s “new rights and responsibilities.”  Foner explains that the centerpiece of the 75
Codes was “the attempt to stabilize the black work force and limits its economic option apart from 
plantation labor.”  In other words, they intended to ensure that the black population could not 76
compete with the white population for jobs. Near the end of 1865, Mississippi and South Carolina 
had enacted the first two and most severe Black Codes. Mississippi required all blacks to possess 
“written evidence of employment for the coming year.”  Additionally, laborers who left their jobs 77
before the contract expired would be required to forfeit wages already earned and then be subject to 
arrest by any white citizen.  South Carolina’s Code was designed to “reinvigorate paternalism and 78
clothe it with the force of law.”  It barred blacks in the state from pursuing any occupation other 79
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than farmer or servant, except by “paying an annual tax ranging from $10 to $100.”  Virtually all 80
former Confederate states enacted similar statutes. These laws, Foner points out, fulfilled rather 
completely the prediction of Radical Benjamin F. Flanders as Louisiana’s legislature assembled: 
“Their whole thought and time will be given to plans for getting things back as near to slavery as 
possible.”  The Black Codes were, then, an attempt by the states to limit the citizenship status of 81
black Americans by trying to get as close as possible to re-instituting slavery.  
 The immediate negative response in the North to the Black Codes implemented in the South 
led some Southern states to modify the language, but not the underlying purpose, of their laws 
regulating the newly freed men.  By the end of 1866, most states had repealed the provisions in their 82
laws that mentioned race specifically, thus, as Brandwein suggests, conforming to a model of “formal 
equality.”  Importantly, however, “unequal enforcement of racially neutral language remained a 83
problem.”  States that had supposedly “neutral” laws were applied simply to confine the economic 84
and civil rights of blacks. Southern states passed racially discriminatory, though facially neutral, laws 
which required “special head taxes, criminal punishments, restriction of weaponry, and denials of 
political or juridical representations and access to education,” often with the tacit or express approval 
of the Johnson administration (prior to his impeachment).  Simply removing the racial language 85
from the state statutes did not mean equal treatment of blacks in the South. To use the multiple-
traditions language of Rogers Smith, despite appearing liberal and egalitarian, these laws were rife 
with ascriptive tendencies. Smith explains that agents from the Freedmen’s Bureau sometimes 
checked “procedurally unfair and physically brutal punishments” that the Black Codes often 
imposed, but their role was constricted because their own policies “often aimed at similar goals of 
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black contractual employment.”  Even though it was their job to enforce the rights of national 86
citizenship, many federal officers were affected by their racist tendencies. They were, Smith notes, 
“unable to accept that blacks would labor as readily as whites if properly rewarded.”  As a result, 87
federal officers tasked with enforcing the Republican project of union, equality, and national 
citizenship, actually aided the effort to repudiate the Republican shift by using state laws as a means 
of ideational dissent. This state strategy not only displayed “lack of genuine commitment of free 
labor principles,” it also expressed “virulent racist white beliefs in black inferiority.”  Congressional 88
Republicans still believed that the newly-established rights of national citizenship as granted by 
Fourteenth Amendment continued to be denied, and they were correct. Thus, during Reconstruction, 
states, through the implementation of Black Codes affecting the economic and political rights of 
blacks, exploited the complicated and fragmented nature of the American state to express their belief 
that state citizenship should not become subservient to national citizenship. 
2. Under Siege by the People Themselves: The Ku Klux Klan and Popular Racial Animus 
 The second prong of the attack in the mid to late-1860s came not from the states, but from 
within the states yet outside the complex and fragmented state itself. More specifically, the rise of the 
Ku Klux Klan, the “nation’s most notorious terrorist movement,” during Reconstruction sheds light 
on how the fragmented and complex nature of the U.S. polity itself offers yet another zone for 
ideational dissent, this time outside of the formal state structure.  Social movements are a necessary 89
part of the U.S. polity. In the United States, “the people themselves” are relied upon to be the source 
of power and sovereignty. Legal theorist Larry Kramer reminds us that the United States, at the time 
of its founding, was the only country in the world “with a government founded explicitly on the 
consent of its people, given in a distinct and identifiable act, and the people who gave that consent 
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were intensely, profoundly conscious of the fact.”  The founders sought to “preserve popular control 90
over the course of constitutional law.”  In fact, popular sovereignty and the importance of "the 91
people themselves" as an important actor (or set of actors) in the political process has so pervaded 
American political discourse that it is is often employed in rhetoric attacking political ideas to make 
them seem illegitimate. For example, Brandwein points out that during the ratification debates over 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Rep. Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania equated Southern secession and 
Republican reforms. Both were threats to the government and the Constitution, he argued, because 
“both were rejections of popular sovereignty doctrine.”  92
 As a result, since the legitimacy of the government depends upon notions of popular 
sovereignty, social movements are a necessary part of the already complex and fragmented American 
polity. Teasing out the notion of popular sovereignty, Reva Siegel argues that conflict between social 
movements can create new forms of constitutional understanding.  Siegel employs the idea of a 93
“constitutional culture” to demonstrate how social movements are linked to constitutional 
understanding. Constitutional culture, she writes, can be said to explore how “changes in 
constitutional understanding emerge from the interaction of citizens and officials.”  Siegel suggests 94
that constitutional culture shapes both popular and professional claims about the Constitution and 
“enables the forms of communication and deliberation engagement among citizens and officials that 
dynamically sustain the Constitution’s democratic authority in history.”  Constitutional culture links 95
politics and law, to people, citizens, and officials. It provides the resources to explore the “legitimacy 
of government, institutions of civil society, and the Constitution itself.”  Importantly, Siegel argues 96
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that constitutional culture is a normal feature of the democratic constitutional order in the United 
States. Popular understandings of political ideas play an important and necessary role in the 
American polity.  
 Seeing social movements through this lens sheds light on the dynamic of political ideas 
during Reconstruction. As the Republicans in Congress tried to embed national citizenship in the 
institutional structure and bolster their shift in governing authority, social movements, namely the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK), acted as an ideational harbor for dissenting ideas— those of state citizenship, 
ascriptive hierarchy, and racism. As Southern state governments began to be captured by Republicans 
after 1867, the KKK emerged as a “terrorist wing of the Democratic Conservative parties of the 
South.”  Their political purpose was to unseat the Republicans and to disenfranchise Southern 97
blacks. Kaczorowksi explains that the “paramilitary structure” of the KKK made their usually violent 
intimidation of blacks and white Republicans “more systematic and effective.”  In the late 1860s 98
and early 1870s, the Klan’s actions represented “the common concerns of Southern whites who 
wished to retain a racial hierarchy.”  In effect, Foner argues, the Klan was a “military force serving 99
the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class, and all those who desired the restoration of 
white supremacy.”  The Klan vehemently disagreed with the Republican project of Union and 100
national citizenship, and took it upon themselves to restore the political and social structure in the 
South to its antebellum state by means of violence. Klan tactics ranged from property destruction, to 
whipping, maiming, castration, and murder. Their targets were blacks and white Republicans. 
Republican leaders barricaded and fortified their homes, and left their homes armed. When the law 
tried to stem the onslaught of Klan violence, its members terrorized law enforcement officers and 
judges, or intimidated or murdered witnesses. The primary enemy of the Klan was the Republicans, 
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but “the Negro was the mainstay of that party.”  Olsen argues that there existed very little room for 101
accommodation between Klan principles and the Republican “egalitarian principles of 
Reconstruction.”  102
 Klansmen ruled the south. The law appeared “impotent in the face of this terror.”  The 103
Republicans again faced a mortal threat— both to their project and to their supporters. Republicans 
viewed violence by the Ku Klux Klan as a continuing threat of the institution of slavery, and as a 
threat to the political process they sought to protect. Their vision for national citizenship was under 
siege in the South. In order to more fully institutionalize their vision and protect their shift in 
governing authority, the Republicans had to take action.  
3. Stamping Out the Opposition: The Republican Response to the Two-Pronged Attack 
 The Republican response to the attack from the states in the form of Black Codes, and from 
social movements in the form of the KKK, was swift and deliberate. In 1870 and 1871, congressional 
Republicans enacted yet another constitutional amendment and three key pieces of legislation to try 
to eliminate the threats to their vision. Brandwein explains that Republicans developed and mobilized 
a distinction between “arbitrary (slave) power and (legitimate) established right in order to bring 
certain traditionally local matters under federal oversight”  They extended federal control of 104
citizenship rights to beat back the two-pronged attack. The Republican response began with the 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in March, 1870.  It helped reify the federal government’s 
protection of citizenship rights by establishing federal oversight of voting rights, but, crucially, it also 
played a significant part in Republican party-building.  
 Many congressional Republicans believed that nationwide black suffrage was not only 
important ideologically, but for pragmatic political reasons as well— it would ensure they had a 
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stable base of support in the electorate. They believed, however, that it could not easily be achieved 
by statute. Valelly points out that state-level Republican parties outside the South “varied widely in 
the openness to the idea, making it hard to proceed state by state.”  Additionally, state election 105
statutes could always be repealed by Democrats. The Republicans did not want to stand passively by 
as African Americans were “completely shut out from the political process, their citizenship rights 
were wantonly denied in the South and the legal process did not provide them with full equal 
protection.”  This would “threaten the goal of perfecting American democracy” that equated to a 106
strong, equal, and robust national citizenship that was sincerely held by key Republican leaders.  107
Giving the federal government the power to protect voting rights by passing the Fifteenth 
Amendment, then, was both a strategic and ideological commitment to national citizenship. After the 
Amendment was ratified on March 30, 1870, the true shape of the Republican project to 
institutionalize their vision for an egalitarian “free labor” democracy with a robust national 
citizenship began to take shape. For both political and ideological reasons, Republicans quickly 
beefed up the Fifteenth Amendment by enacting a series of Enforcement Acts that gave the federal 
government additional oversight of citizenship rights and status.  
 After the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in March of 1870, Valelly explains, 
Reconstruction constitutionalism “truly burst forth.”  There were three Enforcement Acts: the 108
Enforcement Act of 1870, the Enforcement Act of 1871, and the Enforcement Act of 1871 (the Ku 
Klux Klan Act). These acts, Foner notes, “embodied the Congressional response to violence.”  109
Together, they extended the federal government’s ability to ensure and protect national citizenship. 
Their result was to further entrench the Republican project in the institutional framework. The 
legislative debate over these acts reveals that they did indeed seek to extend the federal government’s 
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power to protect citizenship rights, and thus reifying the prioritization of national citizenship over 
state citizenship in the U.S. polity. Valelly points out that a critical aspect of the legislative debates 
concerned “the federal government’s authority to act on behalf of or against private citizens.”  110
Senator John Pool, a Republican from North Carolina, claimed that the federal government has the 
right to “enforce the rights of the citizens against all who attempt to infringe upon those rights.”   111
 Consider the first act, the Enforcement Act of 1870. Passed on May 31, 1870, this act 
established “a criminal code on the subject of elections.” It authorized further federal oversight of 
citizenship rights by forbidding state officials from discriminating among voters on the basis of race. 
It also authorized the President to appoint election supervisors, who had the power to remove cases 
involving electoral fraud, the bribery or intimidation of voters, and “conspiracies to prevent citizens 
from exercising their constitutional rights,” to federal court, instead of leaving them in state court.  112
Section 1 of the act gave the federal government power to protect citizens’ exercise of their new 
rights of national citizenship under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments by 
defining violation of those rights by either public officials or private citizens as felonies. The second 
Enforcement Act, also known as the Enforcement Act of 1871, protected similar provisions, but was 
more specifically targeted at Democratic practices in large Northern cities, as opposed to in the 
South. 
 As violence persisted, however, Congressional Republicans enacted “a far more sweeping 
measure,” the Ku Klux Klan Act of April, 1871.  This act for the first time made certain crimes 113
committed by individuals as offenses punishable by federal law, not only by state law: 
Conspiracies to deprive citizens of the right to vote, hold office, serve on juries, and enjoy the 
equal protection of the law, could now, if states failed to act effectively against them, be 
prosecuted by federal district attorneys, and even lead to military intervention and the 
suspension of the write of habeas corpus.  114
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This act marked a significant shift in federal power and federal balance. Prior Reconstruction laws 
like the Reconstruction Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Enforcement Acts, had 
left private criminal acts within the realm of local law enforcement officials.  Now, however, by 
making actions within states by private individuals federal crimes, this act “pushed Republicans to 
the outer limits of constitutional change.”  These acts drastically increased the power of the federal 115
government in the realm of rights-enforcement and reaffirmed yet again that the Republican project 
was to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship. The Ku Klux Klan Act was quite effective 
at eliminating Klan violence. In total, between 1871 and 1884, 5,386 cases were brought under the 
Enforcement Acts.  Though the three Enforcement Acts together were targeted largely at Klan 116
violence, they were later used to “combat non-Klan political intimidation, ballot-box stuffing, and 
other types of election fraud.”  Together, the Enforcement Acts fortified the Republican project, and 117
significantly reduced violence, intimidation, and election fraud in the states. They proved an effective 
means to respond to the Democratic attack on national citizenship from the states and from social 
movements.  
Incomplete Institutionalization 
 However, despite the widespread federal prosecution of rights violations, the 
“disenfranchisement of the Negro proceeded apace.”  By 1877, historian Everette Swinney notes, 118
the voting power of black Americans had been “largely neutralized” and the Democratic party had 
regained control of the south.  As history shows, the Republicans failed to entirely displace the old 119
regime. Their shift in governing authority was incomplete, and lasted less than a decade. Valelly 
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explains that the electoral coalition the Republicans had built in 1867-1868 through their institutional 
embedding of national citizenship plainly continued to have life after the Compromise of 1877:  
Republicans maintained an active southern policy, as indicated by (1) the Republican 
platforms’ emphasis on voting rights, (2) Republican-led Senate investigations of southern 
electoral fraud and intimidation, (3) the processing of contested southern elections cases, (4) 
the fostering of a new constitutional basis in Article 1 for federal electoral regulation, and (5) 
agreements and cooperation with biracial insurgencies such as the Virginia Readjusters—
which, for a time, was an extraordinary experiment in biracial democracy. Indeed, the 
coalition’s continuing existence generated a surprising turn in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.   120
 And so, we ask, what happened? The Republican project was extensive, and they responded 
to several attacks that arose from multiple zones of ideational dissent. They passed three monumental 
constitutional amendments and several key pieces of legislation that successfully rejiggered the 
federal balance in favor of the national government, combatted political violence and electoral fraud, 
and prioritized national citizenship over state citizenship. Why, then, was their shift in governing 
authority not durable? Should there not have been more to the picture? Many promising Republican 
institutions emerged after 1868. Why did this institutional change not set black electoral 
incorporation on a better pathway to the future? Plainly there was “incomplete 
institutionalization.”  Plainly, the Republicans failed to eliminate all zones of ideational dissent. 121
Despite the apparent extensiveness of their project, they failed to fully embed their vision for union 
and national citizenship in the institutional framework of the American state. State miscegenation 
laws during Reconstruction illustrate this.  
Miscegenation Laws Exhibit Incomplete Institutionalization 
 In the antebellum south, sexual liaisons between white women and black men, historian 
Martha Hodes explains, threatened the idea of racial slavery in a way that sex between black women 
and white men could not.  Sex between white men and black women was seen as more permissible, 122
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likely due to socially constructed ideas of white male sexuality. However, when children were born to 
a white mother and a black father, not only were racial boundaries eroded, but “boundaries of slavery 
and freedom were eroded too, as free people of African ancestry endangered racial slavery.”  123
Nonetheless, such liaisons were tolerated in the antebellum south, due in part, Hodes argues, to white 
ideology about the “sexual depravity of white women outside the planter classes.”  Thus, white 124
ideology about lower-class female sexuality could overshadow white ideology of black male 
sexuality. But after the Civil War and the demise of legal slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment, 
toleration for sex between white women and black men crumbled. “Mixture” of white people of 
European descent and blacks of African descent became a more serious taboo: 
Because it was the men among the former slaver population who gained suffrage rights and a 
measure of political power— and who therefore had the potential to destroy the racial caste 
system— whites focused on the taboo of sex between white women and black men with a 
new urgency.  125
After the war, white alarm about black sexuality reached new and unprecedented levels. As a result, 
sex and politics became intertwined in the minds of southerners during Reconstruction.  
 In the postwar South, citizenship rights were equated with manhood. Hodes remarks that 
Southern white men wanted to withhold rights of national citizenship from black men because their 
exercise of suffrage and political participation, and equal status threatened the manhood of white 
men.  One way they could do so was to enact laws prohibiting interracial marriage. Kaczorowski 126
reminds us that the concept of “equal rights” in the nineteenth century still permitted segregation. 
Consider schools: equal rights required states to provide schools for black children, but still allowed 
the state to segregate them. If they did not, however, courts held that black children must be admitted 
to schools established for white children. Analogously, laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage 
were upheld so long as they applied equally to both races. The right to “an equality in state conferred 
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rights was understood within the context of separate but equal.”  Examining miscegenation laws 127
during Reconstruction is important here because it provides an example of how incomplete 
institutionalization of the Republican project allowed dissenting ideas, through the complex and 
fragmented institutional structure of the American state, led to its repudiation and ultimate downfall.  
 Examining miscegenation laws in the mid 1860s reveals that Republicans appeared to have 
won here, too. State laws governing miscegenation (coming from the latin miscere, to mix, and 
genus, race) were largely eliminated during the mid to late-1860s. After the Civil War, many 
lawmakers both in and outside the former Confederacy “concluded that the combination of the end of 
slavery and the passage of Reconstruction civil rights legislation would render the remaining 
[miscegenation] laws inoperable.”  Between 1860 and 1871, eight states repealed their laws 128
banning interracial marriage: New Mexico (1866), Louisiana (1868), South Carolina (1868), 
Washington (1868), Mississippi (1870), Arkansas (1871), Illinois (1871), and Florida (1871).  As 129
Reconstruction continued in full force during this period, laws banning interracial marriage were 
increasingly challenged in courts and declared unconstitutional. Altogether, historian Peggy Pascoe 
explains, in seven of the eleven former Confederate states, Republican principles of Union, national 
citizenship, and equality appear to have been institutionalized. These seven states either repealed 
miscegenation laws, removed them from state codes, or declared them unconstitutional in the 
courts.  On one level these challenges to miscegenation laws merely reflected the driving force of 130
Reconstruction in the political climate. When radical Republicans were pushing for federal assertion 
of power over state actions, many southerners “feared that the Democrats’ prediction that 
Republicans intended to make miscegenation [legalize interracial marriage] the law of the land might 
really come true.”  Indeed, bans on interracial marriage and miscegenation laws were seen as 131
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violations of the Constitution between 1868 and 1871. In and outside of the South, when local 
prosecutors brought interracial couples to court for violating state law, they “discovered that laws 
against interracial marriage faced significant new obstacles,” including the key assumption that laws 
banning interracial marriage were a remaining product of slavery, a belief that marriage was a 
“contractual right of free citizens,” and the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment really did 
guarantee what it seemed: equal protection of the laws.   132
 Ultimately, though, the Republican project and the institutionalization of their ideas of 
citizenship began to crumble under siege, and state bans on interracial marriage reappeared. 
Brandwein shows that “northern Democrats used race and ‘miscegenation’ as political weapons 
against Lincoln and the Republicans.”  This time, those weapons worked. In 1870, Indiana state 133
statutes prohibited any person with at least one-eighth “negro blood” from marrying “any white 
women of this state.”  In November, 1870, Thomas Gibson, a sixty year old laborer “having one 134
eighth part of negro blood,” came to trial in Evansville Criminal Court in Indiana for charges of 
being in a relationship with a “white” woman.  At the time, it seemed as though the judge would 135
strike down Indiana’s miscegenation statute. Gibson had a fierce attorney, Andrew L. Robinson. 
Robinson had been a Democrat, but became a free soil abolitionist Radical Republican after finding 
religion during the Mexican-American War.  The stakes in the Gibson case, Pascoe writes, would 136
prove determinant for miscegenation laws across the country, because it would offer judges across 
the country unsympathetic to the Republican project “a template for using state police power to 
sidestep federal guarantees of civil rights” and national citizenship.  Pascoe continues by arguing 137
that Robinson’s argument that marriage, like Gibson’s, were civil contracts protected under the 
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contract clause of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would seem to be good, binding law. But, when the 
case reached the state supreme court, it came before justices “absolutely unwilling” to uphold the 
marriage of a “negro” man and a “white” woman.  In the Gibson decision, Indiana Supreme Court 138
Justice Samuel H. Buskirk wrote a vehement defense of miscegenation law by rejecting the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and other Reconstruction-era legislation. Buskirk wrote, 
We deny the power and the authority of Congress to determine who shall make contracts or 
the manner of enforcing them in the several states….[and] we utterly deny the power of 
Congress to regulate, control, or in any manner to interfere with the states in determining 
what shall constitute crimes against the laws of the state, or the manner or extent of the 
punishment of persons charged and convicted with the violation of the criminal laws of a 
sovereign state.  139
In upholding Indiana’s miscegenation statute in 1871, Justice Buskirk was not only claiming that 
state laws are more important that federal laws and rejecting the Republican project and national 
citizenship, he was providing both a pathway for the reinstitution of miscegenation laws across the 
country and an avenue for dissenting political ideas to find more robust voice. Because of the Gibson 
case in 1871, miscegenation laws came back on the books in dozens of states’ laws during the next 
several decades.   140
 Some, however, still believed that federal courts would be more sympathetic zones to 
challenge state miscegenation laws by taking federal civil rights legislation more seriously. This, 
however, revealed just how strong the dissent from Republican ideas of citizenship remained. States-
rights arguments that rejected the premise and prioritization of national citizenship abounded. During 
the 1870s, few interracial couples brought their cases to federal court. Only a handful succeeded in 
getting federal district courts to hear their cases. The outcome of their cases, Pascoe explains, 
demonstrates “just how much power the connection between marriage and states’ rights could 
muster.”  In all but one of these cases, federal judges “solved the conflict between state 141
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miscegenation laws and federal civil rights laws by adopting states’ rights arguments,”  thus 142
rejecting the prioritization of national citizenship.  
The Institutional Entrenchment Hail Mary: The Civil Rights Act of 1875 
 By the mid-1870s, the political climate had transformed. It looked entirely different than it 
did even five years before. What only a decade before had been a Republican congress trying, and 
partially succeeding, to defend itself from attacks from multiple places within and outside the state 
structure was now gone. The Republican majority in Congress was getting progressively smaller. 
After 1873 and the Supreme Court’s decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases, which will be discussed 
the next chapter, it became clear that the Republicans were fighting a losing battle. The Forty-Third 
Congress in 1875 would be, because of the recent Democratic landslide victory the last time 
Republicans would control both the White House and both Houses of Congress for the near future. 
With political violence having erupted again in the South, and their party’s power in Washington 
about to expire, the Republicans proposed a final desperate attempt to entrench their vision for free-
soil, union, and national citizenship in the institutional structure. They wanted to make the shift in 
governing authority they had achieved last as long as it could. Benjamin Butler, then a 
Representative from Massachusetts, and other Republican stalwarts “devised a program to safeguard 
what remains of Reconstruction.”  Their proposals included another Civil Rights Bill, another 143
Enforcement Act that would expand the President’s power to quash conspiracies aimed at 
intimidating voters and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, a two-year army appropriation to limit 
the incoming House from curtailing the military’s role in the South, a bill expanding federal court 
jurisdiction, and a subsidy for the Texas & Pacific Railroad.  Taken together, Foner suggests, the 144
proposed package embodied a “combination of idealism, partisanship, and crass economic advantage 
typical of Republican politics.”   145
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 The Civil Rights Act of 1875, however, was unlike previous Reconstruction legislation. 
Cognizant of the recent decision in Slaughterhouse, proponents of the bill sought to convince fellow 
legislators that it was a constitutional piece of legislation. The Court had decided that the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not “as broad as the ‘sands of the sea’ or the 
common law, and that the amendment did not radically change the whole theory of federal-state 
relations.”  As a result, proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 sought to convince opponents that 146
they were not relying on a “general, unspecified constitutional basis or on the privileges and immunities 
clause alone.”  Instead, debate over the bill prior to its passage centered on the equal protection clause 147
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  148
 Much of the project, however, was derailed by further attacks, including parliamentary 
maneuvers in Congress, an insurrection in Louisiana in September, 1874 that preoccupied and 
embarrassed President Grant, and division within the Republican party. Foner explains that even the 
Civil Rights Bill reflected the division within the Republican party. The proposed law represented an 
“unprecedented exercise of national authority, and breached traditional federalist principles more 
fully than any prevision Reconstruction legislation.”  Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 did 149
become law after passing the 43rd Congress in February, and being signed by President Grant March 
1. Nonetheless, the myriad hurdles necessary to clear in order to enact this final, last-ditch attempt by 
the Republicans to entrench their vision for national citizenship reflect the party’s weakness. The 
inability of the Forty-Third Congress to agree on a policy for the South shows that the Republicans 
had lost and Reconstruction was doomed. They had succumbed to the attacks that arose from the 
Republican inability to fully entrench its vision across the complex and fragmented state. The shift in 
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governing authority they had achieved was short-lived, and was dying. Reconstruction itself, Foner 
writes, was doomed.  150
Conclusion 
 Even at the beginning of Reconstitution, the Republicans operated from a place of weakness. 
The Union victory in the Civil War validated their project, and they held a majority in both houses of 
Congress, but they could not entrench their vision for union, federal power, and the prioritization of 
national citizenship over state citizenship. They faced the daunting and ultimately impossible 
challenge of institutionalizing their vision across the complex and fragmented American state. The 
Republican project was never easy precisely for this reason. The Republican project was under siege 
from the start. First, they had to overcome institutional hurdles to ratify the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. They had to employ questionable constitutional maneuvering in order to get the 
necessary numbers for ratification. Next, the Republicans faced an attack from President Johnson. 
They responded to this attack by impeaching him and replacing him with President Grant.  
 However, even though they held both Congress and the White House, Republicans could not 
give the shift in governing authority they had achieved even a modicum of durability. They faced yet 
more attacks. In the late 1860s and early 1870s, they faced a two-pronged attack: dissenting political 
ideas found voice in the states and in social movements. The states tried to recapture control of 
citizenship by passing Black Codes that limited the civil and political rights of blacks. The people 
created a social movement that used violence and intimidation to wreak havoc on the Republican 
project in the South. This movement, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Black Codes, were targeted by the 
Republicans with yet another constitutional amendment, the Fifteenth, and a series of Enforcements 
Acts in the early 1870s. Together, the Reconstruction Amendments and the Enforcements Acts gave 
massive power to the federal government to protect the rights of national citizenship.  
 Yet, it was still not enough. The complex and fragmented American state continued to 
provide zones for dissenting ideas to find voice. The Republican project was layered upon an already 
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stable institutional arrangement.  It did not vanquish the old and replace it with something entirely 151
new. The fact that the Republicans layered their ideationally-motivated policies and institutions on 
top of old ones explains why their project faced so much pushback from the start. And so, though 
state miscegenation laws were largely eradicated while the Republicans were at the height of their 
power, they reappeared. One fateful judicial decision in 1871, Indiana v. Gibson, provided grounds 
for the reestablishment of miscegenation laws. These laws and their proponents drew on states’ rights 
arguments that necessitated a repudiation of national citizenship in favor of state control over 
citizenship rights. The Republican project was losing. In 1875, as their power was waning the, 
Republicans, plagued by internal contradiction and external threat, enacted the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 as a final, last ditch attempt to give their shift in governing authority some durability. 
Ultimately, however, the Republican project was unsuccessful. It fell victim to the complex, 
overlapping, and fragmented American state. No matter how hard the Republicans tried to fight it, 
ideational dissent found voice both inside and outside the traditional state institutional apparatus. By 
1873, it became clear the Republicans had lost. Ideational dissenters that favored states’ rights and 
state control over citizenship gained traction, and ultimately found voice in the Supreme Court. 
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Repudiation of the Dominant Shift: The Reappearance of Dissenting Citizenship Ideas in the 
Courts 
 As Congressional Republicans fought desperately during the late 1860s and early 1870s to 
bolster their ideational shift in governing authority— prioritizing national citizenship— the greatest 
threat to the vision was brewing. For a brief moment in the mid-1860s, it appeared as if the 
Republicans had successfully created a shift in governing authority that would, in the words of Orren 
and Skowronek, prove durable. The Republicans had embedded a vision for union, free labor, and 
national citizenship within the institutional framework— both vertically and horizontally. It was 
entrenched in constitutional text, protected from attacks by states and social movements, and shielded 
from the actions of an antagonistic president. Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, this vision 
operated from a place of weakness and the opposing ideas of state citizenship and ascriptive 
hierarchy challenged it from within.  
 For a time it seemed as though the only threats the Republicans would face would be from 
the executive branch, the states, and from the people themselves in the form of social movements. 
The Republicans repeatedly tried to stamp out ideational dissent by passing several constitutional 
amendments, and they bolstered these with enforcement statutes. Nevertheless, the clearest and 
deepest challenge they would soon face was an attack they ultimately were unable to withstand. It 
came from the Supreme Court beginning in 1873. This chapter documents the story behind this attack 
congressional Republicans could not beat. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse 
Cases of 1873  sharply rejected the intended meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least insofar 1
as it was explicated in Chapter 2. In doing so, the Court rejected the new Republican vision of 
national, egalitarian citizenship in favor of the older antebellum state-centered, ascriptive definition 
of citizenship.  
 83 U.S. 36 (1873).1
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 The story documented in this chapter gets to the crux of the argument in this project as a 
whole. Had it not been for action taken by the Supreme Court in Slaughterhouse, the Republicans’ 
vision may have been more deeply embedded, and they may have succeeded at creating a durable 
shift. As a result, because that vision of citizenship was a fundamental part of Reconstruction, 
Reconstruction as a whole may not have failed. Scholars who argue that Reconstruction’s failure can 
be attributed exclusively to exogenous factors like a new political climate resulting in a partisan shift 
in Congress, the economic crash of 1873, or the Compromise of 1877, overlook the important 
interaction between institutional design and political ideas. Indeed, they overlook how a fragmented 
state enables oppositional ideas to gain traction. The interplay between differing conceptions of 
citizenship in political institutions during Reconstruction suggest that this interaction between ideas 
and institutions is crucially important for political development in the United States. That differing 
ideas of citizenship in the United States were actively disputed within and between political 
institutions during Reconstruction sheds light on how endogenous state change played a key role in 
its failure. Indeed, as Kaczorowski cogently explains, as far as the Republican project for national 
protection of citizenship rights was concerned, “Reconstruction ended long before the Compromise 
of 1877.”  In other words, the failure of Reconstruction followed from the institutional design laid 2
out in the Constitution itself.  
 More specifically, until 1873, ideas that state citizenship should be prioritized over national 
citizenship remained in dissent. As documented in the previous chapter, these ideas were voiced 
outside of the national institutional structure, in state governments and social movements, and within 
the structure of the federal government by the President and even to a small extent, as will be 
explained in this chapter, by the Supreme Court. Until 1873, however, these threats to the Republican 
position of ideational dominance in the institutional framework did not successfully gain a strong 
institutional foothold. Each threat was quelled by Republican defensive action. But, as Orren and 
Skowronek, and Sheingate remind us, the American state is an unusually complex or fragmented 
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entity.  Political ideas that have been rejected by the dominant governing authority find institutional 3
crevices to remain dormant, ready to reappear and fight for ideational dominance once again if 
context permits. Because the United States is a heavily fractured polity, opportunities for political 
entrepreneurs to bring ideas to the institutional fore abound. Political entrepreneurs can exploit the 
“frictional gaps” between different governing institutions for ideationally transformative purposes.  
 In 1873, the Supreme Court and its Justices brought previously dissenting ideas to the helm. 
The Justices articulated ideas about citizenship that had to this point been in opposition— ideas about 
state citizenship that had been finding voice outside the dominant narrative, in state laws and social 
movements. Even as Republicans held both houses of Congress and the White House, ideas that 
citizenship in the United States should prioritize state over national citizenship found an institutional 
pathway to challenge the Republican vision. Justices on the Supreme Court in 1873 did something 
crucially important for state development in the U.S.: they picked up those dissenting ideas and put 
them on a path to dominance. 
 This judicial move proved formative. By stressing ideas of citizenship that emphasized state-
over-nation, re-articulated ascriptive hierarchy, and rejected federal protection of citizenship rights, 
the Supreme Court struck a decisive blow to the Republican project. This chapter, then, suggests that 
a major turning point or critical juncture for the dominant conception of citizenship was the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873. This case marked a shift in dominant citizenship 
doctrine in the United States. After this case, which read into the Fourteenth Amendment a different 
definition of citizenship than what its framers intended, the antebellum notion of citizenship 
decisively surfaced. As has been argued throughout this project, after the Civil War but prior to 1873, 
Republican ideas of national citizenship held sway. However, 1873 marked a return from a 
Republican, national and rights-based notion of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, to the 
more state-centered and ascriptive understanding of citizenship. 
 This chapter reveals how the Supreme Court during the 1870s and 1880s waged, in Rogers 
Smith’s words, the “mounting repudiation of Reconstruction egalitarianism and inclusiveness in 
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favor of an extraordinarily broad political, intellectual, and legal embrace of renewed ascriptive 
hierarchies.”  Though some Republicans continued to push institutionalization of national citizenship 4
and racial equality, their ideational dominance in the polity was displaced. Because the Court 
exploited the opportunity inherent in the fragmented polity and picked up non-dominant ideas of 
citizenship, future legislators under this subsequent shift in governing authority were able to agree on 
“new legal system of racial and ethic subordination and exclusion.”  The period following 5
Reconstruction, namely the years 1876-1898, were thus, as Smith calls it, “the Gilded Age of 
Ascriptive Americanism.”  6
 To uncover this story of political development, this chapter begins with a brief discussion of 
the Court’s actions before 1873. Though Republican ideals of egalitarian, nationally enforced and 
protected citizenship remained dominant, it was becoming clear that they would face an attack from 
the Supreme Court they could not beat. Until 1873, though, the Court did not explicitly challenge 
Republican dominance. In fact, the Court, and the federal judiciary generally, largely enforced the 
Republican definition of national citizenship and federal power. Republicans enacted several pieces 
of legislation to ensure the federal judiciary would not be an institutional pathway for dissenting 
ideas about citizenship to challenge their project. By 1872, however, Republican actions to discipline 
the judiciary proved insufficient. In late 1872 the Court foreshadowed its rejection of national 
citizenship rights in its decision in Blyew v. United States.  And in 1873, the Justices jumped at the 7
opportunity to attack the Republican-led shift in governing authority when a case ripe for the 
opportunity presented itself. This case, The Slaughterhouse Cases, its background, and the argument 
the Justices in the majority make are discussed in this chapter’s second section. That the Court could 
challenge the Republican shift in governing authority despite its apparent support, as evidenced by its 
decisions prior to 1873, illustrates just how fragile shifts in governing authority are in the American 
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state. This fragility is caused at least in part, I argue, by the fragmented, complex, layered, and 
sometimes internally-contradictory nature of the American polity.  
 Third, I examine some of the Court’s subsequent decisions that continue to reflect this post-
Slaughterhouse definition of citizenship— one that contrasted sharply with Republican definitions. 
United States v. Cruikshank (1875)  and The Civil Rights Cases (1883)  are discussed in this section. 8 9
Cruikshank involved charges brought under the Enforcement Act of 1870. The Court ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the First and Second Amendments against the states. In 
doing so, they rejected national citizenship and the power of the federal government to regulate 
actions within states, including protecting the rights of blacks against private encroachment. The 
Civil Rights Cases expressly rejected the final last-ditch attempt by the Republicans to entrench their 
vision of national citizenship, the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  
An Increasingly Hostile Court 
 While Reconstruction was in full-swing in the mid to late-1860s, the Republican ideals of 
union, free labor, and national citizenship were dominant. Republicans had successfully achieved a 
functional shift in governing authority through the passage of the three Reconstruction Amendments 
and several important pieces of legislation that increased the federal government’s power to protect 
the rights of citizenship. As documented in the previous chapter, however, the Republicans were not 
free from challenge. Their project was under siege from the start— by President Johnson, then by the 
statutes and by the people themselves. The federal judiciary, however, was initially not a zone where 
dissenting ideas of state-centered ascriptive citizenship found voice. Indeed, for a time, bolstered by 
the Republican project to increase their jurisdiction and assist in enforcing national citizenship, the 
federal judiciary embraced ideas of national citizenship, free labor, union, and egalitarianism. This 
was no coincidence, however. Republicans took action to ensure the federal judiciary would be 
sympathetic to their project. They altered the makeup of the Supreme Court by constricting its 
membership, consolidating federal circuits, and stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in select 
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cases. But as Reconstruction continued, the Republicans continued to face attacks, support for the 
Republican project in the judiciary started to wane and the Supreme Court started to exploit the 
inevitable frictional gaps that arose.  
 Prior to 1873, lower federal court decisions generally acknowledged and supported the 
Republican project. Its initial readings of the Reconstruction statutes and Amendments were 
“expansive.”  They endorsed the idea that through Reconstruction, the Republicans sought to 10
prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship. Kaczorowski notes that federal and even state 
appellate court decisions “generally acknowledged that a revolution in federal citizenship had been 
wrought by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the statutes enacted to enforce them.”  11
This outcome was likely because the Republicans in Congress specifically manipulated the federal 
judiciary in order to solidify their shift in governing authority. Engel points out that Republicans used 
strategies both of “undermining judicial legitimacy and harnessing judicial power” to ensure the 
federal judiciary would not be hostile to Reconstruction policy and their project of national 
citizenship.  Many of Congress’s actions toward the judiciary during the Civil War and 12
Reconstruction were motivated by the same desire to entrench their vision for national citizenship 
and make durable their shift in governing authority as the impeachment of President Johnson and the 
dubious ratifications of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  In other words, the federal 13
judiciary “was conceptualized as a threatening and conspiratorial opposition supporting Slave 
Power” and hostile to the entrenchment of national citizenship over state citizenship.   14
 In an effort to ensure the federal judiciary would be an ally to the Republican project, 
between 1862 and 1870, congressional Republicans passed five separate pieces of legislation that 
tinkered with its structure and jurisdiction. First, the 1862 Judiciary Act “re-configured the state 
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composition of the judicial circuits.”  Engel argues that this first act reveals a Republican hostility 15
not towards judicial review itself or the judiciary as a “structurally undemocratic institution,” but 
rather to the influence of “Southern Slave Power” on the bench.  This act consolidated all ex-16
Confederate and Southern states into just three federal circuits— down from five— thus limiting the 
influence of the tradition of appointing a justice from each circuit district. Major reform, however, 
came in 1866 with the Judicial Circuits Act. This act reorganized the federal circuits again, partially 
to account for newly admitted states, reduced the total number of circuits from ten to nine, and 
trimmed the membership of the Supreme Court from ten to seven. The 1866 Act prevented President 
Johnson from appointing judges who shared his hostile feelings towards the Republican 
Reconstruction policy to lower federal judgeships. Together, these two pieces of legislation had the 
effect of limiting Southern influence on the Supreme Court and “rout[ing] out opposition” to the 
Republican vision in the judiciary.   17
 Manipulation of the judiciary worked in other ways, too. It seems the Republicans in 1867 
believed the lower federal judiciary might be a faithful ally (at least relative to southern state courts) 
to their project as a result of their manipulation through recent legislation: they passed the Habeas 
Corpus Act, which significantly expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts. Passed on February 5, 
1867, this act amended the Judiciary Act of 1789. It gave federal courts the ability to review and 
grant petitions “in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of 
the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States.”  Specifically, it granted federal courts 18
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions for prisoners in the custody of states. This is noteworthy for 
two reasons. First, it extended the reach of the federal government into the protection of citizenship 
rights from state infringement, thus bolstering national citizenship. Second, it only happened after the 
Republicans had already taken deliberate action to harness the power of the judiciary in their favor. 
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Republicans only granted more power to the federal judiciary after they had already taken action to 
turn that branch into an ally. At the same time, however, the Republicans stripped the highest federal 
court, the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction. Under the impression that the Supreme Court could use 
cases arising under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to challenge the Republican Reconstruction 
vision by declaring Reconstruction legislation unconstitutional, Congress repealed the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals under the act.   19
 But active manipulation of the judiciary did not end there. Structural manipulation continued 
in 1869 with the passage of another Judiciary Act. This act, also known as the Circuit Judges Act of 
1869, fits the pattern of “eliminating a threatening opposition from its entrenchment in the federal 
judiciary.”  The act increased the Supreme Court membership to nine justices and established a new 20
intermediate circuit of appellate courts. It also gave Republicans control over appointments to the 
lower federal judiciary. Engel argues this act can also be understood as a measure by Republicans to 
harness the power of the judiciary to support their project.  The Republican actions to manipulate 21
the judiciary in their favor were “driven by a desire to secure their partisan objectives,” and they 
follow from their keen awareness that “they could not hold their status as the single constitutional (or 
even dominant) party and [their understanding] that they could use the judiciary, while they held 
presidential and congressional power, to promote their constitutional vision and entrench their 
interest against the Democratic alternative.”  22
 Congressional Republican action to forcefully wrangle the Court was only partially 
successful. Lower federal judges “uniformly adopted the expansive understandings of the fourteenth 
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866” that animated the Republican theory of national 
citizenship.  Additionally, as Kaczorowksi writes, despite the “the seemingly overwhelming adverse 23
pressure and conditions in which they operated, the federal courts generally upheld the authority of 
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the federal government under the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871.”  Similarly, the fact that even 24
unsympathetic Southern federal judges who were ideologically hostile to the prioritization of national 
citizenship largely upheld the constitutionality of Republican civil rights legislation during 
Reconstruction “demonstrates how strongly held their view that the judicial function was to 
implement Congress’s will unless it was obviously unconstitutional.”  Republican manipulation of 25
jurisdiction and circuit consolidation, therefore, successfully harnessed the lower federal judiciary as 
an ally. Attacks on the Republican project did not come from the lower federal judiciary. But despite 
their victory in the Civil War and their ability to enact their project for union and national citizenship, 
congressional Republicans were far from a hegemonic delegation. Their calculated manipulation of 
the federal judiciary and constant defense from attacks from elsewhere in the polity suggest, 
somewhat counterintuitively, that the Republicans were always operating from a point of weakness.  
 Republicans sensed the Supreme Court could not so easily be disciplined as the lower courts. 
This sensibility is indicated by their 1868 jurisdiction-stripping. Additionally, although the lower 
federal courts tended to support and bolster the Republican project, historian Eric Foner notes the 
Supreme Court “tend[ed] to obstruct congressional Reconstruction policy.”  Despite their deliberate 26
efforts to entrench their vision in the polity, the Republicans would soon face a clear adversary in the 
Supreme Court.  
 In 1866, in Ex Parte Milligan,  the Supreme Court voided the wartime conviction of a man 27
from Indiana by a military court established by Republicans, on the grounds that civilian courts were 
operating at the time. Writing for the majority, Justice David Davis insisted the case had nothing to 
do with the South, but nonetheless it “threw into question the legality of martial law and Freedmen’s 
Bureau Courts,” thus casting an air of doubt over the Republican project.  And in 1867 in Cummings 28
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v. Missouri,  the Supreme Court overturned the loyalty oath in Missouri’s constitution for lawyers, 29
ministers, and others.  Though, somewhat ironically, Foner notes, this was the first time a state 30
constitution had been considered under federal judicial power. The case did indeed reflect an 
expansive national power and federal oversight of state action, but it, along with Milligan, “suggested 
that Republicans might soon face a hostile Supreme Court.”  31
 An attack came first from the Supreme Court in 1872. It was, however, a tempered, stunted 
attack. Similar to other historians, Kaczorowski points out that by 1872, the national climate was “no 
longer favorable” to national civil rights enforcement and national citizenship.  Due at least in part 32
to the Republican’s manipulation of the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to 
give its opinion on Republican civil rights legislation did not come until 1872. Kaczorowski notes 
that due to electoral shifts, the “political forces in Congress that produced the Reconstruction civil 
rights enactments were fragmented.”  As documented, Democrats had managed to find voice for 33
their ideas in state governments, social movements, and the people themselves. As a result they had 
“regained much of their respectability and power in national as well as local politics.”  It was in this 34
context that the Supreme Court heard its first challenge to Reconstruction civil rights legislation. The 
case originated in 1868 in Lewis County, Kentucky. Two white men, John Blyew and George 
Kennard, “brutally axed to death and mutilated the bodies” of several members of a black family.  35
The subsequent investigation results in charges of murder in Lewis County jail. However, United 
States Marshals removed them from state custody and placed them under federal arrest. Both 
defendants were tried for murder in United States District Court in Louisville, Kentucky, and found 
guilty and sentenced to death.  
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 The Court heard arguments on the proper limits of federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. The trial judge, Judge Bland Ballard, upheld federal jurisdiction by interpreting the 
congressional intent behind the law as “prescribing a concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights that 
permitted the states a role in establishing the conditions under which civil rights were to be exercised 
and enjoyed.”  The Supreme Court deliberated on this question for more than a year. On April 1, 36
1872, the Court announced its decision. Its decision indicated unwillingness to endorse the 
Republican project, but a hesitancy towards attacking it outright. The Court, Kaczorowski notes, 
“sidestepped questions concerning the national government’s authority over the administration of 
criminal justice.”  Ultimately, the decision was a compromise between endorsing and launching a 37
full-scale attack on the Republican project. The Court managed to sidestep the larger questions 
regarding what it believed to be the “proper” role of the federal government in regulating state laws, 
civil rights, and citizenship. In turn, it upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but 
it eliminated the jurisdiction given to the federal courts over criminal prosecution of whites for 
crimes against blacks.  Foreshadowing its future actions, the Court in Blyew v. United States,  38 39
Kaczorowski points out, “failed to affirm explicitly the broad legal theory of national civil rights 
enforcement authority applied by the lower federal courts.”  Consequently, it left unanswered 40
questions of the future of the Republican project and the prioritization of national citizenship over 
state citizenship. Unfortunately, however, there seems to be “no record explaining why” the Court 
left these questions unresolved.  41
 Throughout Reconstruction, therefore, the federal judiciary’s relationship to the Republican 
project was directly tied to the actions of congressional Republicans. Through both circuit 
consolation and jurisdiction alteration, Republicans tried to harness the judiciary to support their 
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project. It succeeded for a time, especially in the lower federal judiciary. The Supreme Court was a 
different story. Though Republican action made an outright assault on the Republican-driven shift in 
governing authority less likely, it could not seal all the frictional gaps. It became clear throughout 
Reconstruction that though the lower federal judiciary largely supported Reconstruction efforts and 
national citizenship, the Supreme Court would soon launch an attack on the Republicans they could 
not beat.  
  
Tipping the Scales: The Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873 
 That attack came in 1873 on the heels of Blyew. In a key entrepreneurial move, the Supreme 
Court dealt a fatal blow to the Republican vision of national citizenship. Importantly, however, there 
was no single moment of “switching,” where the Court decided to no longer support Reconstruction 
and national citizenship. As explained, the Court exhibited hostility all along, but Republican 
manipulation of circuits and jurisdiction postponed a full-scale assault from the Court. Rather, in 
1873, the institutional hurdles the Republicans put in place to limit any hostile influence from the 
federal judiciary were all cleared in one formative case. This case, the Slaughterhouse Cases of 
1873,  amounted to a categorical rejection of the Republican project to promote federal oversight of 42
citizenship rights in the states.  
 Slaughterhouse was the first major Reconstruction-era Supreme Court decision. Though its 
facts did not involve Klansmen or a violation of the rights of black Americans, it “held implications 
for fewer (congressional and judicial) protections of black rights.”  As legal scholar Richard Aynes 43
remarks, the Slaughterhouse Cases are “simultaneously unremarkable and extraordinary.”  It is an 44
unremarkable case (or, more specifically, set of cases) because of the seemingly mundane matter at 
issue— whether butchers can be compelled to do business at a specific, central state facility. It is 
extraordinary, however, in its legal ramifications for larger issues of state and national power, the 
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Fourteenth Amendment, and citizenship. Aynes points out that in spite of the fact that three of 
Slaughterhouse’s “significant” legal conclusions have been rejected and “‘everyone’ agrees the Court 
incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the conclusion that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had no meaningful place in our constitutional 
scheme continues to live on.”   45
 The dispute at issue in Slaughterhouse arose in Louisiana in 1869. When New Orleans was 
first settled in 1718 on the banks of the Mississippi, its geographic location presented many 
advantages for trade and commerce. Thomas Jefferson predicted that New Orleans “will forever be…
the might mart of the merchandise brought from more than a thousand rivers….With Boston, 
Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia on the left, Mexico on the right, Havana in front, and the 
immense valley of the Mississippi in the rear, no such position for the accumulation and perpetuity of 
wealth and power ever existed.”  Indeed, by 1840 the city had become a massive trading center, the 46
hub of commerce between Latin American, Europe, and goods traveling up and down the Mississippi 
River. However, the location also presented numerous disadvantages— notably, its climate and 
topography. New Orleans sits squarely in a vast swamp and marshland. In the nineteenth century, the 
average temperature was 54.4 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter, and 79.3 in the summer; average 
annual rainfall was over fifty inches, and the highest point in the city was just fifteen feet above sea 
level. The levees built to keep the river out of the city sometimes broke, inundating the city with 
water. Labbé and Lurie explain that throughout the nineteenth century, there were complaints about 
“pools of stagnant water standing in low-lying areas, in vacant lots, and under houses.”  In this 47
environment, drainage was a serious concern. Underground drainage did not exist, so the city 
depended largely on “irregularly graded ditches and canals to carry water away from inhabited 
areas.”  Mosquito-infested swamps dotted the city and surrounding area. Exacerbated by the damp, 48
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humid conditions were the unfortunate practices of waste disposal. It was common practice to 
“dispose of refuse by throwing it into one of the swamps or by dumping it onto a vacant lot.”  49
Indeed, during the nineteenth century, inhabitants of New Orleans used the ground between the river 
and levee as a dumping ground for human waste, garbage, and dead animals. City-contracted waste 
collectors were unsupervised, so several days might pass before garbage and offals from local 
slaughterhouses were removed from the streets.  The physical conditions of New Orleans, the waste 50
disposal practices of its inhabitants, and the “stubborn refusal” by city officials to address these 
problems are important elements to the background of the Slaughterhouse Cases.  
 The dispute at issue reveals some of the “political tensions” surrounding the rapid economic 
development of nineteenth-century America.  Along with the booming industry and manufacturing 51
during this period, the meat-packing industry was developing a “modern corporate structure.”  52
Complementing this centralization of control was an invigorated health and sanitation effort. In New 
Orleans, this was driven at least in part by its “very active” medical community.  Between 1796 and 53
1869, New Orleans was engulfed by thirty-six separate waves of yellow fever.  Doctors believed 54
(incorrectly) that the disease was caused by breathing gases, referred to as “miasma,” exuded by 
decaying animal and vegetable matter.  Scientific errors aside, Labbé and Lurie argue that this 55
theory had the effect of “focusing attention on the relationship between good health and 
environmental cleanliness.”  Medical professionals called for more stringent sanitary practices in the 56
city to alleviate yellow fever.  
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 Plagued by deplorable sanitary practices and an ever-growing population, the city of New 
Orleans “found itself plagued with all the nuisances that accompany the business of providing meat 
to the markets of a growing metropolis through a system of private slaughterhouses.”  Animals were 57
herded through the streets, and slaughtering sometimes took place in the open within sight of the 
public. With an eye towards addressing the deplorable conditions of the city, the Louisiana state 
legislature passed the Slaughterhouse Act in 1869. Formally titled “An Act to Protect the Health and 
City of New Orleans, and to Locate the Stock Landings and Slaughter Houses,” the act incorporated 
seventeenth individuals into the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company, 
then granted this company an exclusive right to maintain a single central slaughterhouse facility 
outside of the city to the south. This company would have the “sole and exclusive privilege” of 
“conducting the business of landing, keeping, or slaughtering animals for in the contiguous parishes 
of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard” for twenty-five years.  Importantly, however, all butchers, 58
whether part of the corporation or not, would be allowed to use the facility.  
 The Act, however, posed a “direct threat to the interests of a large and coherent group of 
tradesmen who knew how to complain.”  After exhausting the state court system, the butchers who 59
were not part of the corporation challenged the state’s action in federal court. The cases were heard 
by Justice Joseph Bradley and Judge William Woods on the Circuit in 1870. Bradley issued two 
opinions, siding with the butchers who challenged the statute. The corporation appealed and brought 
the case before the Supreme Court. It was argued first on January 11, 1872. Because Justice Nelson 
was not present, the case was reargued on February 3, 4, and 5, 1873.  The corporation was 60
represented by Republican Senator Matthew Carpenter, former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Jeremiah S. Black, and Louisiana radical Republican politician Thomas Jefferson Durant.  61
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The butchers were represented by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice (and Confederate Assistant 
Secretary or War) John A. Campbell, and J.Q.A. Fellows, a lawyer from Louisiana.  62
 Campbell, a staunch supporter of state’s rights and former member of the Confederacy, 
argued that a group of white butchers should be protected from state infringement by a 
Reconstruction Amendment— showcasing how political ideas can be reassociated for antithetical 
ends.  Deep irony notwithstanding, Campbell presented arguments based on common law and the 63
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Labbé and Lurie draw attention to Campbell’s apparent dual 
agenda. Indeed, his first goal was to represent his clients, the butchers, in court. But he was also on a 
larger crusade. He wanted to “employ the Constitution’s new Reconstruction amendment as legal 
weapons to bring about Reconstruction’s ultimate demise.”  In fact, Slaughterhouse was only one of 64
several cases in which Campbell represented clients resisting Reconstruction measures. His efforts 
contributed “significantly to the eventual failure of Reconstruction.”  Accordingly, his arguments 65
must be understood with reference to his dual purposes. 
 In his submitted briefs and oral argument before the Supreme Court, Campbell traced the 
history of monopolies in French and English common law, and argued the slaughterhouse produced a 
monopoly that if not “void at common law, could be so under both the thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendments.”  Likening the slaughterhouse situation to slavery, he also suggested that the 66
monopoly created a “servitude” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.  To demonstrate this, he 67
had to suggest that “involuntary servitude” covered much more than black chattel slavery. 
Specifically, he suggested it could be applied to protect the rights of southern white butchers. Again 
highlighting the irony of an ex-Confederate’s position on Reconstruction, Campbell suggested that 
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the Louisiana state act is “even more plainly in the face of the fourteenth amendment” because it is a 
“more comprehensive exposition of the principles of the Thirteenth [amendment].”  He argued that 68
the Reconstruction Amendments “forever destroyed” the traditional states-rights doctrine by granting 
more power to the federal government. To be a freeman in the United States under the new 
Reconstruction Amendments, Campbell suggested, meant protection of one’s privileges and 
immunities under the Constitution. The privileges and immunities he had in mind were an immunity 
from compulsory work, imposed occupation, employment, or trade, the lawful pursuit of skills or 
materials necessary for trade, and the full enjoyment of the fruits of one’s labor.  69
 In other words, Campbell had to liken the situation of the white butchers to black slaves. As 
Labbé and Lurie point out, he realized that this comparison “might be somewhat extravagant.”  70
Nevertheless, he insisted that the butchers had been prohibited from “doing their usual or customary 
work, except upon the property and for the compensation and profit of” those who ran the 
slaughterhouse.  The slaughterhouse had barred the butchers from pursuing their chosen occupation 71
and trade in the manner they liked and so, therefore, Campbell argued, the law forced upon the 
butchers a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Reconstruction Amendments. A former 
slaveowner himself, Campbell suggested that the basic motive behind the Amendments had been that 
“man has a right to labor for himself, and not at the will, or under the constraint of another.”  He 72
admitted that the Reconstruction Amendments altered the federal balance of power: “the sovereignty 
of the State government is reduced… to a very limited extend.”  He continued: “life, liberty, 73
property, privilege, immunity, civil, political and public rights have been placed upon a foundation 
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that the [state legislatures] cannot subvert or destroy.”  Campbell saw the Fourteenth Amendment as 74
having altered the federal balance of power to ensure that liberty be safeguarded. The purpose of the 
Amendment was to “establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United States one people.”  At 75
least to an extent, Campbell was embracing the Republican theory of national citizenship.  
 Arguing on behalf of the company established by the Louisiana legislature to run the 
slaughterhouse, Thomas Durant relied heavily on precedent to furnish an argument that highlighted 
state power, namely the state police power. He cited Prigg v. Pennsylvania  to assert that “the police 76
power of the State extends overall subjects within the territorial limits of the State, and has never 
been conceded” to the federal government.  Durant also called upon Chief Justice John Marhsall’s 77
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden  to highlight the validity of state police power, something that “has 78
never been denied,” as they are “considered as flowing from the acknowledgment power of a State to 
protect its citizens.”  He placed the statute squarely within a state’s power to protect the health and 79
well being of its inhabitants. With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, Durant and his co-counsel 
suggested that by “all persons born or naturalized in the United States,” the Amendment means “only 
the people of African descent, because all other people were already citizens of the United States.”  80
Durant’s argument called upon an expansive definition of state power, and seemed to argue for a 
reaffirmation of state citizenship over national citizenship.  
 The arguments on behalf of the parties presented the Court with an odd scenario that seemed 
to have turned the Reconstruction Amendments on their heads. Admittedly, the Reconstruction 
Amendments were ratified in response to the Civil War and targeted most directly at slaves and ex-
slaves. It is worth reiterating, however, that their framers intended them to establish a national 
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citizenship generally. As discussed in Chapter 2, Republicans strove to prioritize national citizenship 
by giving the federal government the power to enforce civil and social rights violations. Republicans 
saw states’ rights and the prioritization of state citizenship as the cause of the Civil War, so they 
sought to override it. But here, the parties in Slaughterhouse had rejiggered the framework for ends 
not quite antithetical, but partially so.  Understanding the decision in this way may help shed light 81
on the narrowness of the decision— a 5 to 4 breakdown.  
 Ultimately, the Court rejected all of the petitioner’s (Campbell and the butchers) arguments. 
Justice Samuel Miller, an abolitionist appointed by Abraham Lincoln in 1862, delivered the opinion 
for the Court on April 14, 1873. Kaczorowksi notes the opinion was a “curious and contradictory 
mixture” of “nationalist Republican assumption about Reconstruction and the need for national 
protection of civil rights that led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment” combined with a 
“narrow conclusion that reflected the ideas of states’ rights Democratic Conservatives concerning the 
scope of authority” the Fourteenth Amendment conferred upon the national government to protect 
civil rights and national citizenship.  After a summary of the statute, Miller addressed Campbell’s 82
argument. He took note that the act was argued to have created a monopoly, and conferred “odious 
and exclusive privileges upon a small number of persons at the expense of the great body of the 
community.”  He reminded readers that the act was denounced for depriving “a large and 83
meritorious class of citizens -- the whole of the butchers of the city -- of the right to exercise their 
trade.”  But Miller subsequently dismissed Campbell’s argument with one terse sentence: “But a 84
critical examination of the act hardly justifies these assertions.”  85
 Importantly, Miller pointed out, the act indeed determined where livestock were to be 
slaughtered, but it did not prevent anyone from practicing the trade of a butcher. The act only defined 
the location for slaughtering and forbade slaughtering elsewhere. He found it “difficult to see a 
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justification for the assertion that the butchers are deprived of the right to labor in their occupation.”  86
Next, Miller turned to the power under which he believed the act to be a valid exercise— the police 
power. This power, he wrote, “must be from its very nature, incapable of any very exact definition or 
limitation,” and indeed the slaughterhouse issue in this case, and the issues of health and hygiene it 
seeks to remedy are “among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this power.”  Labbé and 87
Lurie point out that Miller could have ended his opinion here. He had made the case that 
Slaughterhouse Act was a valid, even routine, exercise of Louisiana’s police power. Remaining, 
however, was the question of whether the Act violated provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 To consider this question, Miller began with a quick reminder about the history of the 
Amendments. Even the “most cursory glance” at the three Reconstruction Amendments, Miller 
wrote, “discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times, which 
cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning.”  88
Miller explained that “fortunately” that history is “fresh within the memory of us all.”  He 89
concluded that when considering the history behind these Amendments “no one can fail to be 
impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all.”  That purpose was for Miller “the 90
freedom of the slave race, the security and the firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection 
of the newly-made freeman and citizens.”  Legal scholar Richard Aynes points out that in his 91
opinion, Justice Miller nonetheless “begrudgingly acknowledged” that African Americans were not 
the only ones protected by this amendment.  When discussing the citizenship clause of the 92
Fourteenth Amendment, Miller argued that it was designed to define citizenship and agreed that it 
was targeted to overrule Dred Scott v. Sanford. The clause  
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declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship 
of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born 
within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its 
main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, 
"subject to its jurisdiction" was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, 
consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.  93
That the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the 
national government citizens of the United States is undisputed. But a second observation about the 
citizenship clause is “more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case.”   94
 This observation involves the crucial distinction between state and national citizenship that 
the Republicans desperately sought to employ. Miller argued that the distinction between these two 
types of citizenship is “clearly recognized and established.”  At issue, though, was which the 95
Fourteenth Amendment protected. Did it protect the set of “privileges and immunities” of all citizens 
of the United States (including citizens of each state), meaning the rights that all citizens had under 
the Bill of Rights, or did it protect just the “privileges and immunities” that were granted by the 
original Constitution as citizens of the United States, as distinct from citizens of each state? Indeed, 
as the investigation into the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment make abundantly 
clear, Republicans intended the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the Bill of Rights to each and every 
citizen of every state and reaffirm national citizenship over state citizenship. But this very same issue 
was now before the Supreme Court. What did the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
mean? To answer this question, Miller relied on Corfield v. Coryell,  a case from 1823. Corfield 96
defined the “privileges and immunities” that were granted to citizens of the United States as distinct 
 The Slaughterhouse Cases 83 U.S. 36 (1873).93
 Ibid.94
 Ibid.95
 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).96
Chapter 4 !130
from citizens of the states. These privileges were excruciatingly narrow.  Indeed, Corfield was 97
explicitly addressed by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment as something they hoped to 
address with the Amendment. Nevertheless, Justice Miller decided that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed only these rights, and did not protect the broader rights from the Bill of Rights from state 
infringement. The second clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller argued, “protects from the 
hostile legislation of the States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as 
distinguished from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States”  To use the words of 98
Richard Aynes, Miller suggested here that only a limited number of rights were protected by section 
1, “each of which was already protected by the federal government and enforced against the state by 
the Supremacy Clause.”  As such, because the rights claimed by the butchers in this case were rights 99
protected by the states, were they to be privileges and immunities under Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, Miller reasoned, would “radically” change the “whole theory of the relations of the 
State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people.”   100
 Miller inferred that the Fourteenth Amendment was, therefore, made to enforce “any law 
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  In other words, 101
Miller arrived at the conclusion that the Amendment was intended only to protect privileges and 
immunities possessed by a person in their capacity as a national citizen, and did not alter the state-
national citizenship dynamic from before the Civil War. And because these privileges and immunities 
are narrow, the Louisiana state law did not violate any rights belonging to the butchers. Whatever the, 
albeit narrow, privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens may be, the rights claimed by the butchers 
to have been violated by the Louisiana state legislature were not among them.  Next, Miller briefly 102
addressed due process claim under the Fifth Amendment. His decision found no restraint that 
Louisiana placed on the trade of the butchers to amount to a deprivation of property that would 
trigger a due process violation. Finally and to an argument under the Equal Protection Clause. But 
here, Aynes notes, unlike his treatment of the Reconstruction Amendments as a whole, Miller 
“suggested an extreme racial limitation:”  103
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination 
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within 
the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency that 
a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.  104
As such, Miller found no valid claim before the Court.  
 Justice Miller’s decision in Slaughterhouse gutted the privileges or immunities clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Political scientist Howard Gillman suggests that Miller was hesitant to 
exploit the Court’s newly expanded jurisdiction. He seemed not to want to “impose a federal trump 
on activities that had previously [prior to the Civil War and Reconstruction] been the exclusive 
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domain of local government.”  Miller proposed a rather ironic question: “was [the Amendment] 105
intended to bring with the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging 
exclusively to the States?…All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs 
[Campbell and the butchers]…be sound.”  Indeed, Miller posed this question as if the answer were 106
a vehement and undeniable “no.” Unfortunately, however, extending federal oversight of the civil 
rights to ensure their protection against state infringement was, in fact, precisely one of the 
motivating purposes behind the Amendment itself. As Foner points out, the conclusions drawn by 
Justice Miller about the the distinction between the privileges and immunities of state versus national 
citizens “should have been seriously doubted by anyone who read the Congressional debates of the 
1860s.”  107
 The impact of the Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse has been well documented. Foner notes 
that Justice Miller proceeded to “interpret [the Fourteenth Amendment] in so narrow a manner that 
his decision evoked cries of protest from many who had drafted and voted on it.”  The case “quite 108
controversially rejected the idea” that the Reconstruction Amendments had been intended to “change 
significantly the federal system or to elevate national citizenship above that of the states…”  109
Indeed, as Kaczorowski reminds us, the Republican framers understood the Reconstruction 
Amendments as “constitutionally revolutionary” because they delegated to Congress the authority to 
oversee the rights of citizenship— a “radical” change to the respective roles of the state and national 
governments.  Instead, the decision turned the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 110
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Amendment into a “dead letter.”  Despite voluminous evidence to the contrary, the Court concluded 111
that “Congress intended to retain primary citizenship in the states.”  By “emasculat[ing] the 112
fourteenth amendment’s citizenship and privileges and immunities clauses,” the Court “diminished 
the amendment’s scope,” “destroyed the national government’s authority to secure directly citizens’ 
fundamental rights,” and generally rejected and repudiated the “Republican theory of citizenship and 
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship.”   113
 Slaughterhouse marks a definitive moment in the development of American politics. Pamela 
Brandwein shows how the Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse used arguments common among 
Northern Democrats during Reconstruction and successfully managed to embed those arguments in 
the dominant narrative for decades to come. Brandwein suggests that in presenting the distinction 
between state and national citizenship as “long resolved— hence, beyond the scope of legitimate 
contention— [Justice Miller] refused to acknowledge that dispute over the structure of federalism 
went beyond the question of federal authority over formal slave law.”  Justice Miller refused to 114
acknowledge that question regarding the proper bounds of state and federal authority over personal 
rights “also characterized slavery politics and were implicated in the Civil War.”  Brandwein 115
devotes much of her book to demonstrating that the Democrats’ theories of state versus national 
power and sovereignty were “racialized.” In fact, the primary dissent in Slaughterhouse, written by 
Justice Field, reflected quite closely the Republican views of federalism, the Civil War, slavery, and 
the Fourteenth’s Amendment’s endorsement of national citizenship. Field’s dissent even “emphasized 
free-labor principles” that grounded the Republican ideology.  In other words, it is striking how 116
closely the majority opinion in Slaughterhouse reflected the Democratic preference for the 
prioritization of state citizenship, while the dissent reflected what had been (barely) the dominant 
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idea during Reconstruction, the prioritization of national citizenship. Indeed, Brandwein points out 
that Justice Bradley, who also joined Field’s dissent, filed a separate dissent that “sounded very much 
like” John Bingham, the primary drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment and its national citizenship 
presumption.  But when the Supreme Court endorsed the Democratic theory of state power and 117
slave history in its decision, it also “implicitly institutionalized their race theory.”  This move struck 118
the decisive blow to the slowly-crumbling Republican vision.  
 Until Slaughterhouse, congressional Republicans had narrowly, though successfully, quashed 
every attack on their dominance. The Court’s move here, though, proved too much. Brandwein shows 
how Slaughterhouse had lasting implications for future questions of democracy, federalism, and 
citizenship. Justice Miller’s act of rejecting Republican national citizenship and picking back up the 
Democratic theory of citizenship “worked to limit future judicial approaches to the problems of 
democracy in particular ways.”  These ways included submerging “several dimensions of 119
Republican slavery critiques,” and “draining institutional memory” of traces that could have been 
employment by future movements to “support federal protections of individual rights where states 
had a history of abuses.”  Not only did the Court reject the Republican definition of citizenship, but 120
its actions had implications for the future of the Republican project— it rendered its return 
particularly difficult by closing off opportunities for political entrepreneurs to bring back national 
citizenship. Indeed, in 1900, when the Supreme Court “looked backward to the ‘known conditions of 
affairs’ that produced the Fourteenth Amendment… Miller’s history was definitive.”  Over time, 121
Miller’s version of the war’s issues, the proper roles of state and federal power, and “his critique of 
‘the problem’ with slavery took on an objective quality.”  In fact, to this day Slaughterhouse’s 122
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause is still on the books. Despite 
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it now being widely agreed to have exhibited a fundamental misreading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Slaughterhouse has not been overruled. In the 2010 case of McDonald v. City of 
Chicago  Justice Samuel Alito declined to defend Slaughterhouse, but noted that many legal 123
scholars consider the case to have been wrongly decided. Thus, as Foner writes, the “cramped 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment survives.”  Slaughterhouse was a critical “turning point in 124
Reconstruction.”  With the Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse, then, all hope for Reconstruction 125
was lost.  
Re-Entrenching the Antebellum Vision: Cruikshank and The Civil Rights Cases 
 After Slaughterhouse, the Republican-led shift in governing authority was over, and the 
primacy of national citizenship was being quickly eroded by Democratic ideas of federalism and a 
preference for state citizenship. Actions the Republicans had taken to reconstruct the country at the 
close of the Civil War and to embed the project of union and national citizenship were being 
overturned, amended, and rejected. The Supreme Court continued to be the prime pathway for these 
ideas of state citizenship over national citizenship to return to dominance. After Slaughterhouse, 
Brandwein writes, the Supreme Court justices were working in a legal field that was characterized by 
three things: (1) “Court precedent that presented the content of national citizenship as essentially 
unchanged by the Civil War;” (2) “declining Republican strength;” and (3) minimal sanction for 
being inclined the weigh state jurisdiction more heavily than the democratic participation of black 
citizens.”  Also notable was the “traditional fear of central [federal] power and its associated 126
conceptualization of central power as the ‘danger’ to democracy.”  Of course, as political scientist 127
Megan Ming Francis points out, winning one Supreme Court case “does not amount to a new durable 
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change in the national governing establishment.”  It can, however, mark the end of one by creating 128
an additional discursive shift that paves the way for the a new governing authority. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse acted as a judicial precedent for decisions that “later halted efforts 
by the Grant administration to protect civil rights when it revived its policy of vigorous civil rights 
enforcement to combat the renewal of Southern terrorism in 1874.”  In a way, then, Slaughterhouse 129
not only ended one shift, but it began another— one a product of the context (the “legal field”) that 
Slaughterhouse allowed. Because of Slaughterhouse, then, the brief era of the primacy of national 
citizenship was over, and later attempts to bring it back, like the Grant administration’s actions in 
1874, would not be tolerated. The elements the Court endorsed in its decisions after Slaughterhouse 
in 1873 “were packaged in a ‘totality of remembrances, traditions and familiar ideas’ that borrowed 
heavily from Northern Democratic slavery criticism.”  Specifically, two more cases in the ensuing 130
decade did substantial damage to what remained of Republican attempts to entrench their vision. 
These cases, United States v. Cruikshank (1875)  and The Civil Rights Cases (1883),  both reflect 131 132
the change in ideational dominance that Slaughterhouse instigated. 
 United States v. Cruikshank (1875) 
 Two years after Slaughterhouse, the Supreme Court heard another case that dealt specifically 
with Reconstruction, the Republican project, and national citizenship. United States v. Cruikshank 
arose out of the bloodiest incident of Reconstruction. The incident, the Colfax Massacre, involved a 
“level of violence tantamount to a localized civil war.”  It was a product of the confusion that 133
followed the bizarre Louisiana gubernatorial election of 1872. The election results were widely 
disputed. Both Conservatives, led by incumbent governor Henry C. Warmouth, and Republicans, led 
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by challenger William P. Kellogg, claimed victory in the election. For a brief time, Louisiana 
experienced the “political anomaly of having two governors and two legislatures claiming and 
exercising governmental authority.”  Both governors appointed candidates to fill the positions of 134
judge and sheriff of Grant perish. Both pair simultaneously claimed to be the legitimate officeholders 
and attempted to occupy the parish courthouse. The Republican-appointed candidates succeeded at 
occupying the courthouse, and reinforced it with armed supporters. But on Easter morning, April 13, 
1873, a “‘veritable army’ of ‘old time Ku Klux Klan’” led by the Conservative candidates stormed 
the courthouse after a three-week siege.  Federal investigators sent from New Orleans reported that 135
Conservative white forces slaughtered several whites and almost three hundred black freemen, 
including dozens that had already surrendered.   136
 The Justice Department’s reaction to the massacre, Kaczorowski notes, “reflected the 
administration’s ambivalence towards civil rights enforcement.”  After realizing the manpower 137
required to round up and charge between 300 and 400 defendants, the attorney general balked. The 
attorney general was evidently “less interested in vindicating federal law and the dead victims of 
criminal violence by bringing offenders to justice than in merely discouraging future crimes.”  138
Eventually, just 97 defendants were brought up on federal charges. Each defendants was accused of 
32 violations of sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870.  The first 16 counts charged that 139
the white defendants had conspired to deprive a pair of black victims, “being citizens of the United 
States ‘of African descent, and persons of color,’” of various rights protected by the Constitution of 
the United States, including many rights secured by the Bill of Rights.  These rights included the 140
right of assembly, the right to keep and bear arms, the right to protection against deprivation of life, 
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liberty, and property without due process of law, the right to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property, and the right to vote.  The two-month long 141
trial resulted in only three convictions.  
 On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of the men accused of slaughtering 
freedmen in the Colfax County courthouse on the grounds that sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement 
Act of 1870, which prohibited two or more people from conspiring to deprive someone of their 
constitutional rights, could not be justified under Congress’s powers. The Court affirmed and upheld 
Justice Bradley’s stance on the case, which he expounded upon in his circuit opinion. Bradley 
believed that sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 could not stand if they were read to 
reach private violations of rights in the Constitution. The Court argued that the Reconstruction 
Amendments “only empowered the federal government to prohibit violations of black rights by 
states.”  The responsibility to punish individuals for rights violations rested where it always had— 142
with local and state authorities. Somewhat ironically, the decision did uphold the federal 
government’s ability to protect the rights of national citizenship, but these had been defined so 
narrowly in Slaughterhouse that this reaffirmation was virtually meaningless. By holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the states, the Court’s opinion amounted to a “repudiation of 
original intent rather than an attempt to apply it.”  The decision “rendered national prosecution of 143
crimes committed against blacks virtually impossible, and gave a green light on acts of terror where 
local officials either could not or would not enforce the law.”  The Supreme Court decided this all 144
in the name of federalism and the prioritization of state citizenship.  
 Cruikshank operated in the wake of Slaughterhouse, and as a similar repudiation of the 
Republican project. Chief Justice Morrison Waite, writing the majority opinion in Cruikshank, 
merely “repeated [Justice] Miller’s history” of the Reconstruction Amendments.  The decision was 145
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“widely publicized as a decisive blow to national civil rights enforcement authority.”  Indeed, 146
because of the decision, Democratic Conservatives who were hostile to the Republican vision 
“became increasingly confident that the permanent elimination of Enforcement Acts prosecutions 
was at hand.”  The broader importance of Cruikshank for Reconstruction must be stressed. In it, 147
like in Slaughterhouse, the Court was presented with questions concerning the power to enforce civil 
and political rights. The resolution of those questions, Kaczorowski writes, would “define anew the 
constitutional structure of the American federal union by determining the primacy of national or state 
authority over the fundamental rights of Americans.”  By doing so, the Court would be 148
“sanctioning or rejecting congressional Reconstruction.”  Cruikshank simply continued the 149
Supreme Court-driven “erosion of Reconstruction.”   150
 The Civil Rights Cases (1883) 
 Nearly a decade after Slaughterhouse, the Court had not let up. Bolstered by its previous 
decisions and mounting popular support for state citizenship and the ascriptive hierarchy it produced, 
the Court continued to reject Republican Reconstruction actions that had attempted to embed the 
primacy of national citizenship. The period bookended by 1876 and 1898 Rogers Smith dubs “The 
Gilded Age of Ascriptive Americanism.”  This was a result of the failure of Reconstruction, caused 151
at least in part by Supreme Court action. But in 1883, the Supreme Court decided a case that sealed 
the fate of Reconstruction. It overturned the final, last-ditch attempt by the Republicans to embed 
national citizenship: the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 
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 This case, The Civil Rights Cases of 1883, was a consolidation of five similar cases that were 
decided together as one issue.  The cases concerned denials of services to blacks seeking entry to 152
an inn, a hotel, better seats in a theater, and use of transit service. Justice Bradley’s principal 
argument was much like Miller’s in Slaughterhouse. It touched on the issue of state versus national 
citizenship, and again rejected the federal government’s ability to enforce civil rights and protect a 
broad definition of national citizenship. The cases triggered the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and 
congressional power to pass the act under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The act provided 
that “‘all persons…regardless of any previous condition of servitude’ were to be provided access to 
all public accommodations, including inns, railroads, theaters, ‘and other places of public 
amusement.”  The Court denied that Congress had the power to pass the act.  153
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of 
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to 
the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal 
with in other matters of intercourse or business….When a man has emerged from slavery, 
and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that 
state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a 
mere citizen and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen 
or a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are 
protected.  154
Indeed, businesses had denied services to blacks, but Bradley argued that if Congress could regulate 
their conduct, it would amount to “tak[ing] the place of state legislatures” and “supersed[ing] 
them.”  And, Bradley wrote, it would be “absurd to affirm that.”  155 156
 Brandwein shows how The Civil Rights Cases were similarly influenced by Justice Miller’s 
version of slavery history espoused in Slaughterhouse. Republicans had suggested that mobility, like 
access to hotels and transit services, were civil rights that ought to be protected by the federal 
government. But the Court disagreed. It identified mobility as a social right, and not one that the 
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federal government could have any hand in regulating. The denial to blacks of access to theaters, 
inns, and public transportation was not “incident” to slavery. Smith points out that though the 
argument staunchly endorse states’ rights, Bradley’s opinion was laced with racism. Bradley 
“brusquely” dismissed claims that economic discriminations were “badges or incidents” of slavery in 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Indeed, Justice Bradley “expressly denied that race-based 157
denial of access to public accommodations was a brand of slavery.”  Brandwein points out that 158
Bradley’s views on the Fourteenth Amendment, Reconstruction, and slavery were “more Northern 
Democratic than Republican.”  This set of cases, then, overturned one of the last vestiges of the 159
Republican project to ensure the federal government had to ability to enforce national, egalitarian 
citizenship. This case not only entrenched the prioritization of state citizenship more deeply, but it 
opened the door for a new element of citizenship. Smith notes that Justice Bradley’s opinion “might 
be read as a triumph of pro-business economic ideology, as owners were allowed to discriminate if 
they so chose, subject at most to state constraints.”  The turn to a definition of citizenship 160
dominated by economic freedom would be at the heart of dominant citizenship doctrine for decades 
to come.  161
Conclusion 
 The Republican vision for “free soil, free labor, free men,” union, and a national, egalitarian 
citizenship was finally dismantled by the Supreme Court. Until 1873, Republicans successfully 
fended off attacks— from the states, the President, and the people themselves— but the attack from 
the Supreme Court proved too much. Despite Republican action to limit the contrarian capability of 
the federal judiciary, by first rejiggering circuit courts, and partially stripping the Supreme Court of 
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jurisdiction, frictional gaps remained. For Republicans, Reconstruction was a story of defense and 
evasive action. From the very beginning, Republicans found themselves in a vulnerable position. 
They attempted to harness the federal judiciary for political purposes, and bring it to their defense. 
They hoped the judiciary would help bolster their vision. It did for a time. The lower federal judiciary 
interpreted Reconstruction Amendments and legislation expansively, giving the federal government 
power and leeway to enforce national citizenship and protect its infringement from both state and 
private infringement. But in 1873, a case presented itself to the Court that ultimately lead to the end 
of the Republican project, and Reconstruction itself.  
 It is less clear why and how the Court picked up the non-dominant ideas and put them on the 
path to dominance. However, the makeup of the Court and the voting breakdown of their decisions 
reflects the slowly eroding dominance of national citizenship. Slaughterhouse, for instance, was a 5-4 
decision— the idea to put state citizenship back on a path to dominance just barely won. But by 
1883, this notion of state citizenship was endorsed in The Civil Rights Cases  by an 8-1 margin, 162
reflecting the further entrenchment of ideas of state-based ascriptive citizenship ideas. Importantly, 
however, the Supreme Court did not “switch” from supporting the Republican project to suddenly 
denouncing it in Slaughterhouse. No sudden jurisprudential shift emblematic of Justice Owen 
Roberts’s in the post-New Deal decision of West Coast Hotel v. Parish  in 1937 that gave rise to the 163
term “the switch in time that saved nine” occurred. Rather, true to form, the Republicans acted during 
Reconstruction to limit the Court’s power in order to prevent it from doing something like 
Slaughterhouse. Republicans were painfully aware of the federal judiciary’s capacity, but the 
Supreme Court’s specifically, to challenge or even destroy their project, so they took offensive action 
to prevent it from being exercised. Specifically, congressional Republicans limited the Court’s 
jurisdiction and consolidated federal circuits in an effort to control the judiciary and limit its capacity 
to exploit the frictional gap by bringing non-dominant citizenship ideas once again to the fore. These 
are not the actions of a hegemonic congressional delegation— they are the actions of a regime 
operating from a point of weakness. 
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 This chapter has highlighted at least three concepts that are reflected in the broader story of 
development in American politics. The first is what Skowronek terms the “reconstruction of 
meaning.”  Skowronek postulates that the dominant strands in American political thought, such as 164
Rogers Smith’s multiple traditions, are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they interact with each other 
by exchanging ideas and purposes can be mutually constitutive. This interaction can be “a creative 
act of first-order significance, one that, for better or worse, alters the meaning of both [traditions].”  165
A political tradition, Skowronek, suggests, may be said to “bear on the development of the polity” 
when the “promulgation of alternatives is at once informed by received ideas and productive of 
purposes absent in prior formulations, and both effects should be manifest in the distinctive qualities 
on the composites arrived at.”  The interaction between political traditions can result in “elements 166
of what were contrary ideals can be insinuate into the newly formulated synthesis.”  The argument 167
by the butchers took full advantage of the opportunity to reassociate political ideas to ends 
antithetical to their original purpose. The attorney for the butchers, Campbell, was an ex-confederate 
official who was hostile to the Republican vision. Nevertheless, once the Reconstruction 
Amendments were instituted, he attempted to harness their language to his own purposes.  
 The next concept is that of “critical junctures.” A critical juncture in political development is 
an event that limits the options for future events. In a way, a critical juncture sets the scene for path-
dependency. The decision in Slaughterhouse was just such a moment. Up until the decision, the 
Republicans successfully had fended off all attacks from ideational dissenters. Slaughterhouse, 
however, offered a moment for radical change. In her account of the development of the NAACP’s 
litigation strategy during the first half of the twentieth century, Megan Ming Francis argues that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954  cannot properly be understood 168
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without reference to Moore v. Dempsey in 1923.  This is because Moore established a “political-169
legal context” that represented an opportunity to “redirect both U.S. constitutional development and 
the future of civil rights struggles.”  Prior to the 1920s and Moore, the federal government had “no 170
role in state or criminal trials.”  But Moore made clear that “states could not always be trusted to 171
properly deal with matters of criminal procedure and that…the federal government could 
intervene.”  Moore was, then, a critical juncture. This chapter has argued that Slaughterhouse 172
operated in a similar manner. By establishing a new “political-legal context” more favorable to 
antebellum ideas of citizenship, Slaughterhouse set American constitutional and political 
development on a new path that enabled the Court’s subsequent decisions in United States v. 
Cruiskshank and The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 to come more easily.  
 Finally, this chapter has highlighted the difficulty of political development in the United 
States. It has provided more evidence that the fragmented nature of the American polity makes 
“durable shifts” in governing authority difficult to accomplish and, therefore, highly unusual.  173
Political scientist Stuart Chinn has argued that key moments of reform or institutional change are 
followed by “a recurrent and clearly patterned process of ‘recalibration,’ where recently enacted 
reforms are recalibrated in light of the continuing influence of preexisting institutions and rights.”  174
Indeed, as demonstrated by the Court’s entrepreneurial actions in Slaughterhouse, the fragmented 
nature of the state makes institutional change possible. Crucially, however, the same feature that 
makes change possible also limits change. This is not to suggest that reform and development in 
American politics does not happen. Rather, the conditions in the aftermath of such moments of 
reform “demonstrate the stubborn resilience of older ideas, principles, and institutions that carried 
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elements of the old order into the new.”  The story this chapter has told is one that has closely 175
reflected this point.  
 As a result of Slaughterhouse, therefore, Supreme Court cases from 1873 until 1883 “closed 
down inquiry among many generations of justice into what it mean to be included in the national 
collective. The meaning of national citizenship and the basis of public life were not reopened as 
legitimate judicial questions, except in minority opinions.”  Indeed, the Court’s decisions in the 176
SlaughterHouse Cases and Cruikshank “reflected the changed political climate and the retreat from 
Reconstruction idealism.”  This point sheds light not only on the end of national citizenship and the 177
Republican project, but on the end of Reconstruction. This chapter has tried to show that 
Reconstruction’s failure was not purely a result of exogenous factors— a new political climate 
resulting in a partisan shift in Congress, the economic crash of 1873, or the Compromise of 1877. 
These explanations for Reconstruction’s failure overlook the important interaction between 
institutional design and political ideas. Ideational contestation over the meaning of citizenship in the 
wake of the Civil War happened within the institutional framework. This chapter has suggested that 
because of this interplay between ideas and institutions in the fragmented American state, 
Reconstruction was doomed from the start. 
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Conclusion 
Fragmented Citizenship and Political Change 
 Citizenship as a concept was up for grabs during Reconstruction. The end of the Civil War 
offered a unique opportunity to reshape the country. Never before, and not since, has a comparable 
carte blanche been presented to policymakers in the United States. The Confederate states had lost 
on the battlefield and the North was pushing to remold the country into one that was not as 
susceptible to division. One thing was clear: chattel slavery would end. Beyond that, chances for 
institutional reforms seemed ripe for picking. Congressional Republicans certainly believed this. 
They held a majority in Congress and forced through three constitutional amendment and multiple 
transformative pieces of legislation in an effort to not only “reconstruct” the broken country, but 
ensure it would not break again. Their remedy called for a continuation of the federal power that had 
begun before, but also as a result of, the Civil War.  Republicans believed one of the primary causes 1
for the Civil War was that states held too much power over their citizens. When Republicans looked 
at the inhabitants of the United States, they saw people who believed themselves to be state citizens 
first, and national citizens second. Prioritization of state citizenship was one of the evils that caused 
the Civil War to begin with. Flipping this lexical ordering of citizenship from state first, nation 
second, to national first, state second offered two benefits for the Republicans. First, doing so would 
require enhanced power by the federal government to protect the rights of citizens, which would 
result in a more unified citizenry. This would lower the likelihood of another civil war. Second, this 
enhanced federal oversight of civil and social rights would ensure slavery would end.  
 The apparent carte blanche, though, was not quite what it seemed. In fact, it was no carte 
blanche at all. From its very inception, the Republican project to fix the problems they believed 
caused the Civil War was met with fierce opposition. Embedding their vision for “free soil, free 
labor, free men” was much trickier than Republicans anticipated. They wanted to give the federal 
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York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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government primary oversight over the rights of citizenship and relegate state citizenship to the 
backseat. But, antebellum ideas of citizenship still existed and found ways to push back on the 
Republican project. To pass the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Republicans had to use 
some dubious constitutional maneuvers — southern states were not counted at one point in the 
ratification process, but were counted at others. And to pass the Fourteenth Amendment, Republicans 
in Congress simply turned the Southern states into military districts to limit their influence. But next, 
Republicans were challenged by President Johnson, who vehemently opposed the Republican vision 
because he also held antebellum ideas of citizenship— the state citizenship should be prioritized over 
national citizenship. To reify their project and quash the opposition, Johnson was promptly 
impeached by Republicans.  
 All the while, though, antebellum ideas found other ways to challenge the Republicans. They 
found voice outside the dominant institutional framework, in state governments and social 
movements. States, where ascriptive, states’ rights definitions of citizenship still held sway, enacted 
Black Codes and other laws to limit the citizenship rights of freedmen. Social movements too, a 
method where “the people themselves” can easily voice their ideas, found ways to challenge the the 
prioritization of national citizenship. The Ku Klux Klan went on a reign of terror in the South, 
lynching, disemboweling, or otherwise using means of violent intimidation against freedmen and 
Republicans who held different ideas of citizenship. Republicans responded to these threats by 
passing a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871. These acts further extended federal oversight 
over citizenship and successfully quashed opposition for a time. 
 Despite Republican active manipulation of the federal judiciary to ensure it would be an ally 
to their project, the fatal blow to the Republican project of Reconstruction came in 1873 from the 
Supreme Court. The Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873 offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to 
bring back antebellum ideas of citizenship. Republicans had restructured the federal circuits, and 
stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdiction with an eye towards harnessing the judiciary for support. 
It was not enough, however: frictional gaps abounded. In Slaughterhouse, the Court rejected the 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment intended by its framers — the reading that understood the 
Fourteenth Amendment as upending the antebellum concept of citizenship. Justice Miller’s opinion 
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for the majority echoed Southern Democratic critiques of the Republican vision for national 
citizenship. The consequence was definitive — Slaughterhouse had dealt a blow to the Republican 
vision they could not recover from. Slaughterhouse set the antebellum definition of citizenship on a 
path to dominance once again. Accordingly, the Court entrenched the state-over-national citizenship 
doctrine further in United States v. Cruikshank in 1875 and The Civil Rights Cases in 1883. As a 
result of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the the Republican idea of citizenship, Reconstruction was 
doomed.  
  
Citizenship as Recognition and Political Change 
 This project has both drawn from and reinforced the idea that citizenship is necessarily 
constituted by a political context. Without recognition by the state, citizenship, no matter its content, 
cannot exist. Citizenship is, then, a category defined and delimited by the state. This is documented 
by Margot Canaday, Shane Phelan, Stephen Engel, Nancy Cott, Peggy Pascoe, and others.  If state 2
institutions are subject to change over time, then citizenship must be as well. In this project, I have 
suggested that there may be a link between institutional change, and a developing concept of 
citizenship in the United States. This project has attempted to begin bridging the gap between the 
development political ideas and political institutions. This relationship has been significantly under-
explored in the literature. As a result, many accounts of institutional change or ideational change 
remain incomplete. Political ideas and political institutions interact with one another in mutually 
constitutive and developmental ways. One can lead to the reshaping of another.  
 Understanding citizenship as constituted and defined by the state leads to several further 
insights. First, as has been most explicit in this project, it leads to an endogenous explanation for the 
 Margot Canaday. The Straight State : Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America. (Politics and 2
Society in Twentieth-Century America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); Shane Phelan. Sexual 
Strangers: Gays, Lesbians, and Dilemmas of Citizenship. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2001); 
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failure of Reconstruction. It also, however, provides several other insights that may lead to further 
research. It may point to a more comprehensive account for the roots of Progressivism in the early 
twentieth century. This project may present at least a partial understanding of why the Progressives 
were so critical of the Constitution. Progressives took up many of the arguments about national 
citizenship used by the Radical Republicans during Reconstruction, but the institutional structure 
established by the Constitution had allowed their project to be thwarted. Woodrow Wilson, for 
example argued that the “problem at the heard to modern American politics…lay in the Framers’ 
limited vision.”  By seeking to extricate America from the control of the British monarchy, the 3
framers of the Constitution instituted an institutional framework that appeared to harken back to a 
political model “drawn from their happier experience of an earlier day.”  As Britain advanced toward 4
a “modern state design that concentrated decision making and responsibility in a single representative 
body,” America was stuck with a fragmented institutional system. The system the framers instituted, 
“forced future accommodations to change in the nation into an increasingly inhospitable frame.”  5
Indeed, Wilson saw the Civil War as at least partially caused by the Constitution’s inability to 
“provide for the irresistible growth and concentration of power” in the national legislature.  As other 6
developing states centralized, America seemed stuck in limbo, trying to force an evolving economic 
and socio-political situation onto an unaccommodating institutional framework.  
 This project also points towards a fuller understanding of citizenship as a concept in the 
United States. Similar to Wilson’s critique, citizenship as a concept appears to be perpetually 
unsettled and evolving as a result of the institutional structure. The lack of stable teleological or 
whiggish development seems to be, at least in part, explainable by the fragmented state. Each attempt 
to push towards some ideal of citizenship is tripped up by institutional hurdles, rather than simple 
ideological backlash. Indeed, one of the fundamental premises of APD is that Lockean liberalism is, 
 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development. (Cambridge, UK: 3
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in fact, not the dominant philosophy in American political culture. This project has opened a new 
window to understanding why. If, as I have argued, citizenship as a concept is perpetually unsettled 
and subject to contestation within and between political institutions that, in turn, shapes its meaning 
over time, then citizens themselves may get stuck in the frictional gaps. This result might point 
towards an more robust explanation for why, in colloquial terms, “second-class citizen” status 
abounds in the United States. Citizenship is delicate. Institutional makeup can help explain why 
citizenship can be granted, taken away, altered, expanded, narrowed, reframed, or otherwise changed 
for different groups of persons at different times. Normatively, the relative ease with which 
citizenship can change as a result of the institutional arrangement is double sided. On the one hand, it 
allows for liberalizing projects that attempt to expand citizenship to groups otherwise marginalized, 
such as happened during Reconstruction, the Progressive Era, the Civil Rights Movement, perhaps 
even during the era during which the Supreme Court was lead by Earl Warren, and most certainly in 
Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015. On the other, however, as has been seen, by the same mechanisms, it 
limits these projects by allowing illiberal challenges to gain a stronger foothold.  
 For example, it seems American democracy is not “alive and well,” especially when the 
criminal justice system is taken into account. Political scientists Amy Lerman and Vesla Weaver 
explain how the rise of the carceral state in the United States has had profound effects on the 
democratic citizenship of large classes of people, but especially blacks.  In a 1994 interview, advisor 7
to President Nixon John Ehrlichman (one of the Watergate co-conspirators) explained how the “war 
on drugs” was highly racialized: 
“You want to know what this was really all about?” he asked with the bluntness of a man 
who, after public disgrace and a stretch in federal prison, had little left to protect. “The Nixon 
campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left 
and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to 
be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with 
marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those 
communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and 
vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the 
drugs? Of course we did.”  8
 Amy E. Lerman, and Vesla M. Weaver. Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime 7
Control. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
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That the “war on drugs” was a political tool used to “racialize” the “crime problem” or “criminalize” 
the “race problem” was not doubted, but rhetoric this stark provides a causal link between the two 
that had long been suspected.  It is no surprise, then, that the carceral state that resulted from these 9
“crime” policies disproportionately affected blacks — that was their purpose. Lerman and Weaver 
argue that punishment (through carceral state policies) is an important aspect of the modern 
American state “because it transforms the social and economic relationships of its citizens.”  In 10
addition, they show that “criminal justice is important because it transforms citizens’ relationships to 
the polity.”  Custodial citizens, who are largely members of racial or ethnic minority groups, exist 11
somewhere in limbo between “full citizens” (whatever this might mean) and non-citizens through 
their blurred relationship with the state. Indeed, their are able to vote and are entitled to formal 
equality before the law, but  
because of their race, their income, and the characteristics of their neighborhoods in which 
they live, these individuals are systematically more likely to be exposed to public institutions 
that deny them voice, treat them as suspect, do not respond to their needs, and are 
unaccountable to their complaints.  12
As a result, their standing as citizens is stunted and limited. The point here is hardly definite or clear. 
However, the analysis in this project may provide grounds for further investigation between 
institutional design and the rise of carceral state policies that have limited citizenship standing for 
large classes of persons. Indeed, the fragmented state and perpetually unsettled definition of 
citizenship I have argued for might make policies like the racialized “war on drugs” less immediately 
objectionable because their true intent and impact can be hidden under layers of institutional overlap, 
deferred responsibility, and confusing rhetoric. In other words, ensuring that policies that violate 
some Lockean ideal definition of equal citizenship (by drawing from several traditions of citizenship, 
including ascriptive hierarchical notions) may be hard to guard against in the United States because 
 Naomi Murakawa. “The Origins of the carceral crisis: Racial order as ‘law and order” in postwar American 9
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of the fragmented institutional design.  In turn, however, they may also be harder to implement 13
across the board. But this might be precisely the point — the resulting frictions that occur between 
and within state institutions allow policies that affect citizenship to go unnoticed and unchallenged. 
Further research in the field of APD is needed to test this hypothesis, however.  
 Finally, the analysis contained in this project reaffirms a broader story about political 
development and political change in the United States. I have suggested that the multiple explanatory 
notions provided by the field of American Political Development employed most explicitly in this 
project, layering, path dependency, critical junctures, political entrepreneurship, and durable shifts, 
all accurately help depict the interaction between political ideas and institutions during 
Reconstruction. First, this supports the study of APD as a discipline. Second, however, it also raises 
several important insights into the discipline. Namely, there seems to be tension in some of  
fundamental ideas undergirding APD scholarship. One of the most insightful claims of APD is that 
politics is dynamic: the key element to explain in politics is not equilibrium, but change. Also, APD 
suggests that that this change is often (or even mostly) produced by dynamics internal to political 
systems rather than exogenous shocks— frictions created by the layering of new institutions or 
policies upon old ones; the creation of unintended consequences that political entrepreneurs may 
exploit to thereby foster new opportunities for further change. In other words, politics is always 
developing. Nevertheless, at the same time, APD posits that there are such definable moments that 
can be cast as "developments," or "durable shifts in governing authority." It seems, then, that there 
appears to be an internal tension between the definition of development as focused on durability and 
the definition of politics as focused on change. In other words, we must ask if the key insight of APD 
is that politics is never clearly in equilibrium then how can it be said to be durable?  
 The analysis contained in this project points towards a possible resolution to this apparent 
dilemma. Reconstruction resulted in a (not so) durable shift — we got the Reconstruction 
Amendments — but that only succeeds in resetting the ideals. Reconstruction ultimately failed to 
reset policies or law, for constitutional text is fungible at best, or ignored at worst. The durable shift 
 Rogers Smith. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. (New Haven: Yale University 13
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may be a resetting of the ideals, but not a resetting of lived experience. In fact, in terms of lived 
experience, Reconstruction ended up with the abandonment of the ideals, something that I have 
argued the constitutional structure of governance paradoxically enables. Perhaps the great irony of 
the design of American constitutional governance is that it enables the abandonment of the ideals in 
the constitutional text. This project has suggested just how much formal institutional changes cannot 
be taken as emblematic of durable shifts in governing authority. As Stuart Chinn has argued, political 
change cannot simply be “foisted upon the larger matrix of governance and fit seamlessly with 
preexisting constraints. Instead, a recalibration usually follows the enactment of major reforms 
because of three primary conditions.”  First, “principles of reform are often articulated in broad, 14
open-ended, and universalistic terms.”  Second, “when major reforms are enacted, preexisting 15
institutions and individual rights are usually disrupted and rearranged.”  And third, “reformers 16
consistently lack either the foresight or the political consensus and willpower to resolve all problems 
of recalibration upfront.”  Politics may produce a durable shift in some element of the fragmented 17
state, but due to the nature of the fragmented state, that durability does not, or indeed cannot, exist 
throughout. The development of politics as a whole does not stop, but it may reach points of 
durability in different institutions for brief moments. These points may be referred to as specific 
moments of development. 
 This definition of development, however, does not quite fit with that of Orren and 
Skowronek.  Development seems to be more nuanced. If we use the definition provided by Orren 18
and Skowronek of development and the achievement of a “durable shift in governing authority,” then 
development is not common in the United States.  This definition does not fit the evidence, as the 19
American state has of course changed significantly since its founding. And so, the definition of 
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 Ibid.15
 Ibid.16
 Ibid: 539.17
 Orren & Skowronek (2004).18
 Ibid, 123.19
Conclusion !154
development should be narrowed to account for the momentary periods where development in 
particular institutions at a particular time appears “sticky.” “Stickiness” is not to suggest that 
development has paused, but rather to account for how it might slow to a crawl in one institution for 
a short period, while change proceeds at a normal pace in other zones of the state. These moments are 
still worth analyzing, and require a more nuanced lens — one that account for the interplay between 
political ideas and institutions. 
!155
References 
Ackerman, Bruce. We the People (2): Transformations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard  
 University, 1998. 
Amar, Akhil Reed. America's Constitution: A Biography. New York: Random House, 2005. 
—— "The Supreme Court, 1999 Term–Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine" (2000). Faculty  
 Scholarship Series. Paper 851.http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/851  
Avins, Alfred. “The Civil Rights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment  
 and Public Accommodations.” Columbia Law Review 66, no. 5 (1966): 873-915. 
Aynes, Richard. “The Antislavery and Abolitionist Background of John A. Bingham.” Catholic  
 University Law Review 37, no. 4 (1988): 881-933 
—— "Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the   
 Slaughter- House Cases." Chicago-Kent Law Review 70, no. 627 (1994): 627-88. 
—— “On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment.” Yale Law Journal 103, no. 1,  
 (1993): 57-104. 
Ball, Terence, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson. Political Innovation and Conceptual Change.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Baum, Dan. "Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs." Harper's Magazine Online, April 2016. 
Béland, Daniel. “Ideas and Institutional Change in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and Policy 
 Drift.” Social Science Quarterly 88, no. 1 (2007): 20-38. 
Bensel, Richard Franklin. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America,  
 1859-1877. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
Bernstein, David E. Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive  
 Reform. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011.  
Brandwein, Pamela. Reconstructing Reconstruction: The Supreme Court and the Production of  
 Historical Truth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999. 
Breen, T. H. "Subjecthood and Citizenship: The Context of James Otis's Radical Critique of John  
 Locke." New England Quarterly 71, no. 3 (1998): 378-403. 
Breyer, Stephen G.. Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution. New York:   
 Knopf, 2005. 
Bosniak, Linda S. "Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage." Northwestern University  
 Law Review 94, no. 3 (2000): 963-84. 
Canaday, Margot. The Straight State : Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America. 
Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2009. 
!156
Carter, Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and  
 Gavin Wright, eds. Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition On Line. 
 Cambridge University Press 2006.  
Castles, Stephen, and Alastair Davidson. Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of 
 Belonging. New York, NY: Routledge, 2000. 
Chinn, Stuart. “Institutional Recalibration and Judicial Delimitation.” Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 3 
 (2012): 535-564 
——— Recalibrating Reform: The Limits of Political Change. New York, NY: Cambridge   
 University Press, 2014.  
Cohen, Elizabeth F. Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge   
 University Press, 2009. 
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).  
Congressional Record (1873-1875). 
Cott, Nancy F. “Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States.” American Historical  
 Review 103, no. 5, 1998.: 1440-1474.  
Cresswell, Stephen. “Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice in Northern  
 Mississippi, 1870-1980.” The Journal of Southern History 53, no. 3 (1987): 421-440. 
Curtis, Michael Kent. No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights.  
 Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986. 
Engel, Stephen. American Political Confront the Court: Opposition Politics and Changing   
 Responses to Judicial Power. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
——“Developmental Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Politics: Fragmented Citizenship in a   
 Fragmented State." Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 2 (2015): 287-311 
——Fragmented Citizens: Changing Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Lives. New York, NY: NYU  
 Press, 2016. (Forthcoming. Manuscript on file with Author) 
  
Fitzgerald, Michael. “The Ku Klux Klan: Property Crime and the Plantation System in   
 Reconstruction Alabama.” Agricultural History 71, no. 2 (1997): 186-206 
Foner, Eric. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1970 
—— Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. Updated Edition ed.   
 New York, NY: Harper Collins, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1988. 
—— "The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction— And Vice-Versa." Columbia Law  
 Review 112, no. 7 (2012): 1585-1606. 
Forment, Carlon. “Peripheral Peoples and Narrative Identities: Arendtian Reflections on Late  
 Modernity.” In Democracy and Difference, Benhabib, Seyla, ed., 314-330. Princeton, NJ.  
 Princeton University Press. 1995 
!157
Francis, Megan Ming. Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State. New York,  
 NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Frymer, Paul. Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the  
 Democratic Party. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
—— "Review: Law and American Political Development." Law and Social Inquiry 33, no. 3 (2008): 
 779-803. 
Gerken, Heather. “Dissenting by Deciding.” The Stanford Law Review 56, no. 1745 (2005): 101-160 
—— “Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview.” The Yale Law Journal 123, no. 6 (2014):  
 1891- 1918 
—— “Forward: Federalism All-The-Way-Down.” The Harvard Law Review 123, no. 4 (2010): 6-74 
—— "The Loyal Opposition." The Yale Law Journal 123, no. 6 (2014): 1958-1994. 
Gillman, Howard. The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers  
 Jurisprudence. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.  
Glenn, Brian. "The Two Schools of American Political Development." Political Studies Review 2  
 (2004): 153-65. 
Gunther, Gerald, Casper Gerhard, Phillip Kurland, eds. Landmark briefs and arguments of the  
 Supreme Court of the United States. Washington: University Publications of America, (1975).  
Heyman, Steven J. "The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth   
 Amendment." Duke Law Journal 41, no. 3 (1991): 507-71. 
Hodes, Martha. “The Sexualization of Reconstruction Politics: White Women and Black Men in the  
 South after the Civil War.” Journal of the History of Sexuality 3, no. 3, Special Issue: African  
 American Culture and Sexuality (1993): 402-417.  
Kaczorowski, Robert J. “Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights During the First Reconstruction.”  
 Fordham Urban Law Journal 23, no. 1 (1995): 155-186.  
——. The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice and Civil  
 Rights, 1866-1876. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005. 
——. Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, N.Y.U. Law  
 Review 61, no. 863 (1986): 863-940 
—— "To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights after the Civil War." The  
 American Historical Review 92, no. 1 (1987): 45-68. 
Kahn, Ronald, and Ken Kersch. The Supreme Court & American Political Development.   
 Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 
Kaplan, Morris. Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and The Politics of Desire. New York,  
 Routledge. 1997 
Kramer, Larry D. The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review. New  
 York, Oxford.: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
!158
Koppelman, Andrew. “The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination.” The Yale  
 Law Journal 98, no. 1 (1988): 145-164 
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Second ed. Oxford,  
 England: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
—— Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford Political Theory.  
 Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. "Return Of The Citizen: A Survey Of Recent Work On   
 Citizenship Theory." Ethics 104, no. 2 (1994): 352-81. 
Labbé, Ronald, and Jonathan Lurie. The Slaughterhouse Cases: Regulation, Reconstruction, and  
 the Fourteenth Amendment. Abridged Edition ed. Lawrence, KS: University Press of   
 Kansas, 2005. 
Lash, Kurt T. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American   
 Citizenship. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Lerman, Amy E., and Vesla M. Weaver. Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of  
 American Crime Control. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2014. 
Lieberman, Robert. "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change." American 
 Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (2002): 697-712. 
Magliocca, Gerard N. American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth  
 Amendment. New York and London: NYU Press, 2013. 
Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change." In Explaining  
 Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, edited by James Mahoney and   
 Kathleen Thelen. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Marshall, T.H. “Citizenship and Social Class,” in The Citizenship Debates: A Reader. Shafir, Gershon 
 ed., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 1998, 93-112. 
—— Class, Citizenship, and Social Development; Essays. Garden City, N.Y.:  Doubleday, 1964. 
Mettler, Suzanne; Milstein, Andrew. "American Political Development from Citizens' Perspective: 
Tracking Federal Government's Presence in Individual Lives over Time." Studies in 
American Political Development 21 (2007): 110-30. 
Murakawa, Naomi. “The Origins of the carceral crisis: Racial order as ‘law and order” in postwar  
 American politics,” in Joseph Lowndes, Joseph, Julie Novkov, and Dorian T. Warren, eds.  
 Race and American Political Development. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. 
“The Negro Citizen in the Supreme Court." The Harvard Law Review 52, no. 5 (1939). 
Novak, William. The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America. Chapel  
 Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974. 
!159
Phelan, Shane. Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians, and Dilemmas of Citizenship. Philadelphia,  
 PA: Temple University Press, 2001. 
Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ:   
 Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Oldfield, Gary. “Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World.” In  
 The Citizenship Debates, Shafir, Gershon ed., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota   
 Press, 1998. 
Olsen, Otto. “The Ku Klux Klan: A Study in Reconstruction Politics and Propaganda.” The North  
 Carolina Historical Review 39, no. 3 (1962): 340-362.1 
Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development.   
 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Pocock, J.G.A. “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times.” In The Citizenship Debates,  
 Shafir, Gershon ed., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998 
Pascoe, Peggy. “Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of "Race" in Twentieth-Century  
 America.” The Journal of American History 83, no. 1 (1996): 44-69 
—— What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America. New York,  
 NY: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
Ramsay, David. A Dissertation on the Manner of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a  
 Citizen of the United States. American Antiquarian Society and NewsBank, Evans   
 22088., 1789. 
Riesenberg, Peter. Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau. Chapel Hill,   
 NC., University of North Carolina Press. 1992. 
Scheingate, Adam D. "Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political  
 Development." Studies in American Political Development 17 (2003): 185-203. 
Scheingold, Stuart A. The Politics of Rights Lawyers: Public Policy, and Political Change. 2nd  
 ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have  
 Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
Siegel, Reva. "Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The  
 Case of the De Factors ERA." California Law Review 94 (2006): 1-97. 
Shafir, Gershon, ”Introduction: The Evolving Tradition of Citizenship." In The Citizenship   
 Debates: A Reader, edited by Gershon Shafir. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota   
 Press, 1998. 
Shapiro, Herbert. “The Ku Klux Klan During Reconstruction: The South Carolina Episode.” The  
 Journal of Negro History 49, no. 1 (1964): 34-55 
Skowronek, Stephen. "The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, and the  
 American Political Tradition." American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (2006):   
 385-401. 
!160
Shklar, Judith N. American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard  
 University Press, 1991. 
Smith, Rogers. "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America." The  
 American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 549-66. 
——. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven: Yale   
 University Press, 1997. 
“The Supreme Court Database." The Supreme Court Database. http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ 
index.php. 
Swinney, Everette. “Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-1877.” The Journal of Southern  
 History 28, no. 2 (1962): 202-218 
Valelly, Richard M. The Two Reconstructions : The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement. American 
Politics and Political Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
Wiecek, William M. “The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875.” The American 
Journal of Legal History, 13 no. 4 (1969): 333-359 
Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University  
 Press. 1990 
 
